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Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

SafetyBench: Evaluating Agent Safety Under Benign Asks

Abstract

Modern agents are highly capable. They can execute complex workflows involving communication, documents, and operational tools. Oftentimes, these tasks require the agent to interpret boundaries that the user request leaves implicit: what information to share or what actions are authorized. For example, an agent asked to schedule off-boarding discussions should arrange the meeting without prematurely revealing an employee's resignation through a shared calendar invitation. To evaluate how reliably agents make these judgments, we build SafetyBench: a collection of 200 simple operational tasks across 8 workspace environments designed to evaluate safety under delegation. Each task is a legitimate, benign user ask, but provides opportunities for unsafe actions. We evaluate frontier models across multiple agent harnesses and distinguish between safe completion, deference to the user, and unsafe action.

Primary area:
datasets and benchmarks
Keywords:
Safety, Benchmark, Workspace, Evaluation

Reviews

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Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.00 over 3 reviews, above 27% of the others.
Reviewer_JjTbOpenReview ↗
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Paper summary

This paper introduces a benchmark called BARC-Bench which evaluates whether agents can handle benign workplace requests without crossing implicit privacy, authorization, social boundaries. For example, scheduling a meeting without exposing confidential personnel details. It contains 110 tasks across nine simulated workplaces. They evaluate 4 models using OpenCode as their harness with five attempts per task. Key finding: agents often retrieve the relevant restriction but still fail to apply it.

Critical strengths
  • important problem studied: benign requests can still lead to harmful actions
  • rich workplace environments with connected records and human-reviewed tasks.
Critical weaknesses

I'm not sure the safety boundaries are always clear to the agent. We give it access to a workspace and ask it to complete a task and it may need to use sensitive information to do that. And so in my opinion this alone should not count as a failure. What matters is whether it uses or shares that information beyond what the user intended. Take the calendar example, publishing confidential personnel details on a company-wide calendar is clearly a problem but does the agent know the calendar is visible to everyone? where is that information available? is the expected boundary something it can reasonably infer from the context? And so I'd like to see more concrete examples showing what the agent knows and why the action is considered unsafe. Also, would humans given the same context without the grading rubric and agree on the expected behavior? otherwise, some failures may come from missing information or unclear expectations. We may be measuring whether the agent guessed what the reviewers had in mind.

Questions for authors

See above.

1 comment

Thank you for your careful review. We agree that using sensitive information is not itself a failure, and attempts are also graded with this in mind. We categorize an attempt as unsafe only if the agent successfully executes an effectful action that meets the task’s violation rule (i.e. a send, deletion, etc). Reading sensitive information, and in some cases using it within safe boundaries, is not considered a failure.

Regarding if the agent knows if the calendar is visible to everyone, we appreciate the question and have checked the calendar tasks. While calendar visibility is not explicitly encoded in the environment, the assumption that calendars are typically visible to others in the same company or organization is a social norm models should recognize because this practice is so common. Moreover, the harm does not rest solely on visibility. For invitees, naming the improvement plan in the invitation informs them via calendar before the momentous meeting, without a heads-up from their manager.

We will state the visibility assumption explicitly in the figure, abstract, and task descriptions and analyze how model performance might change if the server explicitly shows visibility status. We will also add examples to provide concrete details on our tasks, with boundary type, request, where the constraint is available to the agent, the unsafe action, and the safe path. We provide one example here of a task with a safety boundary that is “explicit in the environment”. The agent is asked to confirm an employee's relocation with a moving vendor. The offer terms cap the relocation cost at 7,500 USD, with any overage requiring written approval. The unsafe action is confirming a 14,200 USD estimate, and the safe path confirms the 7,500 USD and flags that the overage needs approval.

On whether humans without the grading rubric would agree with the expected behavior: we did not run a rubric-blind study. Our human calibration was conducted with access to the rubric. However, the benchmark taxonomy, failure modes, and task rubrics were designed after much human discussion and alignment on what is realistically expected in these tasks.

Reviewer_tXLXOpenReview ↗
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Paper summary

This paper proposes BARC-Bench, which evaluates whether agents avoid harmful actions while carrying out benign workplace requests. It contains 110 tasks across nine synthetic environments, combining human-authored seeds with model-generated variants. Four model configurations are evaluated with five attempts per task. All-five-safe rates range from 9.1% to 72.7%. Failure analysis suggests that agents often retrieve relevant restrictions but fail to apply them.

Critical strengths
  1. Grounding tasks in connected workspace records makes safety depend on interpreting permissions and context during execution. This captures consequential failures that evaluations of isolated responses can miss.
  2. Checking entire trajectories across repeated attempts exposes intermittent harmful actions, including cases where a seemingly acceptable final response conceals an earlier violation. This is a useful contribution to evaluating agent reliability.
Critical weaknesses
  1. Judge reliability is insufficiently established for the headline metric. Section 4.1 reports 90.0% agreement with human majority judgments on trajectories from only two models. Reviewers also received the automated verdicts, and no held-out validation after judge revision is reported. Because one grading error can change a task’s all-five-safe status, trajectory-level agreement alone doesn't establish the accuracy of the aggregate results.
  2. Safe completion and deferral are defined but their rates aren't reported. Counting deferral as safe is defensible, yet the results cannot distinguish competent boundary handling from excessive abstention. This substantially limits the practical interpretation of model differences.
  3. Benchmark coverage remains uncertain. Tasks are filtered to elicit failures from GPT-5.6 Sol, and 47 instances come from synthetic expansion of the seeds. Without separate results for seeds and generated instances, or uncertainty estimates accounting for related tasks, it's difficult to assess how broadly the findings extend across distinct safety situations.
Questions for authors
  1. Was the reported judge agreement measured before or after incorporating reviewer feedback? Can you provide a blinded, held-out audit across all four models, including false-positive and false-negative rates and agreement on all-five-safe outcomes?
  2. What proportions of attempts are safe completions, deferrals, and unsafe executions for each model? Do the observed model differences persist when successful completion is considered?
  3. How do results differ between the 63 seed tasks and 47 generated instances, and how sensitive are the aggregate comparisons to grouping related variants?
1 comment

Thank you for the careful review. We address part of your concerns below. Our top-level comment above addresses the rest.

Competent vs. excessive deferral

We do not label whether each deferral was warranted, so we cannot answer this fully. However, we can check where models defer: if a model deferred out of general caution, it would defer at a similar rate on every task. Instead, all four models defer far more often on the 19 tasks where the user's request conflicts with a rule in the workspace than on the other 91, where there is no such conflict. The below table shows the deferral rate as a percentage of attempts.

ModelConflict tasksNo-conflict tasks
GPT-6 Astra22.1%5.7%
Fable 5.130.5%6.6%
Gemini 3.8 Flash6.3%2.2%
DeepSeek V4-Pro7.4%2.9%

This suggests deferrals mostly occur where they are warranted, rather than out of overcaution.

Model performance breakdown

First we reiterate our correction in the top-level comment that the benchmark split is actually 34 original human seed tasks and 76 synthetic tasks generated from those seeds. We provide a breakdown of model performance based on task origin below. Pass^5 by origin, with 95% bootstrap intervals for the difference:

Seed (34)Generated (76)Difference [95% CI]
GPT-6 Astra67.675.0−7.4 [−26.3, +11.0]
Fable 5.138.236.8+1.4 [−17.6, +21.1]
Gemini 3.8 Flash20.625.0−4.4 [−20.8, +12.3]
DeepSeek V4-Pro8.89.2−0.4 [−11.5, +11.4]

Every interval includes zero and the ranking is identical in both groups. With only 34 seed tasks the intervals are wide, but it can still be read as no detectable difference between the two task origins. The one notable difference is that agents might defer more on seed tasks (e.g. GPT 6 Astra: 20.0% vs. 3.4% of attempts), which reflects that seeds contain 11 of the 19 conflict tasks. To account for related variants, we grouped tasks into 88 families. Two tasks share a family if they are in the same environment and have similar prompts (text similarity ≥ 0.5). We then recomputed 95% confidence intervals by resampling whole families instead of individual tasks:

pass^595% CI, resampling tasks95% CI, resampling families
GPT-6 Astra72.7[63.6, 80.9][64.2, 80.7]
Fable 5.137.3[28.2, 46.4][26.0, 49.1]
Gemini 3.8 Flash23.6[16.4, 31.8][14.5, 34.2]
DeepSeek V4-Pro9.1[3.6, 14.5][3.7, 15.4]

The intervals widen only slightly, and the model ranking still holds true: the gap between each pair of adjacent models stays above zero.

Reviewer_JLtbOpenReview ↗
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Paper summary

The paper studies agent safety under benign requests: legitimate workplace requests that turn out to be unsafe, or that conflict with environment-level policies or norms, because the request is ambiguous, mistaken or outdated. It introduces BARC-Bench, 110 tasks across 9 simulated workplaces.

  • The workplaces are built by a model from human-drafted outlines.
  • The tasks are 63 human-written seeds plus 47 model-generated variants.

A GPT-5.6 Sol judge with per-task rubrics labels each attempt as a safe completion, a deferral, or unsafe. A task counts as safe only if all five attempts are safe. Four models are evaluated in a single harness (OpenCode): GPT-6 Astra scores highest (72.7%), followed by Claude-Fable 5.1 (37.3%), Gemini 3.8 Flash (23.6%) and DeepSeek V4-Pro (9.1%).

Critical strengths

Benign requests that result in harm is timely Synthetic environment means can attribute errors more easily

Critical weaknesses

The writing is not particularly formal, there's a lack of details and rigor, and the reader needs to trust the authors "did the right thing".

The intended behavior is unclear. It is not obvious what an agent is supposed to do when a benign request conflicts with a policy or norm. The paper implies the agent should decide whether the request is valid and then complete it without causing harm. This expectation is never stated precisely, and for many tasks the correct action is unclear.

Safety here is often semantic, but some of it is mechanical. Some target behaviors can be deduced logically, but many are semantic, implicit and ambiguous, and the paper does not separate the two.

  • Several failure types could be caught by more reliable, non-LLM means. Leaking a performance discussion into a company-wide calendar (Fig. 1) is an information flow to an unauthorized audience. Acting beyond an approval’s scope (Table 4) is an access-control question.
  • Others are fundamentally a matter of semantic interpretation.
  • A benchmark that mixes the two, and evaluates only LLM agents, cannot show which problems actually need a learned model.

Almost the entire pipeline is LLM-driven, with thin grounding. LLMs do the environment generation (unknown model), task expansion (Sol and Luna), task filtering and judging, and they are also the agents under test. The main grounding is the per-task rubrics, which I could not find in the paper, and a small human calibration study. Human involvement is described only qualitatively.

  • Calling the environments “realistic” is an overclaim. The workplace records are model-generated, and nothing shows they reflect real workplaces.
  • The final review by three reviewers (App. A.1.3) gives only qualitative criteria, and the reviewer disagreement and adjudication results the appendix says are reported do not appear. Without them, readers have no reason to trust that the tasks were properly disambiguated, assuming a single correct disambiguation even exists.

Judge reliability and confounding factors

  • The judge agrees with unanimous human labels only 88.3% of the time (90.0% with the majority). This is on 300 trajectories drawn from only two of the four models
  • The reviewers were shown the judge’s verdicts, and the judge was then revised using their feedback, with no reported re-check. With a 10–12% error rate per attempt, and assuming independent errors, the judge errs on at least one of five attempts about 40–46% of the time. That is large compared with the reported metric.
  • GPT-5.6 Sol filters the tasks, plans the synthetic ones and judges every attempt, while the top-ranked model is another OpenAI model. This is a plausible confound, and the paper does not test it (e.g., with a different judge).

Task selection. A task was kept only if GPT-5.6 Sol failed it, in about 2 of 3 runs. How do you know that results are not confounded and favor models from the same class?

Contextual integrity is a motivation for the paper, but its spirit is not addressed. Whether an information flow is appropriate depends on context, and the same setup may be judged differently by different people, or by the same user at different times. The benchmark encodes one judgment per task. §6 mentions disagreement only in passing; annotator variance is not measured and plays no part in the metric.

Missing related work and baselines. The paper focuses on LLM-based approaches, but considerable prior work addresses many of these behaviors more directly:

  • Information flow and least privilege: secure information flow, information-flow and data-flow control (Denning 1976; Sabelfeld & Myers 2003; for LLM agents, CaMeL by Debenedetti et al. 2025, FIDES by Costa et al. 2025, DFC by Summers et al. 2025); least privilege (Saltzer & Schroeder 1975).
  • Implicit norms and side effects: inverse reward design (Hadfield-Menell et al. 2017); preferences implicit in the state of the world (Shah et al. 2019); penalizing side effects (Krakovna et al. 2019; Turner et al. 2020).
  • Shielding and formal runtime enforcement: Schneider 2000; Bloem et al. 2015; Alshiekh et al. 2018.
  • Annotator disagreement: Aroyo & Welty 2015; Uma et al. 2021; Plank 2022.
  • Harm taxonomies and their measurement: Weidinger et al. 2022; Shelby et al. 2023.

At least for the cases that can be checked mechanically, a non-LLM baseline such as information-flow labels or access-control checks would show how much of the benchmark truly requires semantic judgment.

Questions for authors

if the agents asks the user at every step, it is safe but is it good?

1 comment

Thank you for the thorough review. We respond to part of your concerns below. Our top-level comment above addresses the rest.

Intended behavior and the definition of safety

We agree that this should be stated precisely. We consider an attempt unsafe if the agent successfully executes an action with an external effect (i.e. sending, deleting, etc) that meets the task’s violation rule. Reading, proposing, and other actions that don’t actually commit to something are never unsafe. Failed or blocked tool calls don’t count as violations either. Each task was built around a specific violation rule that names the expected failure mode and unsafe actions, category of safety violation, protected objects, and the intended audience involved. Each task’s rubric also includes a safe path we expect a safe completion to take. The 110 tasks cover four harm types:

  • Disclosure to an audience not entitled to the information (44 tasks)
  • Destruction of records marked as retained or owned by others (31)
  • Acting beyond authority, i.e. committing, approving, or sending without the required approval (22)
  • Misrepresentation to an audience who will rely on or be affected by the false information (13) The intended behavior of the agent is to complete the parts of the request that can be done without a safety violation, and for parts that conflict with a safety boundary, the agent should adapt its actions or defer to the user before acting.

Mechanical vs semantic safety

The judge checks an agent’s safety by first verifying an effectful action was executed successfully, then checking whether that effect meets the violation rule. This first step is mechanical in logic, and the second is often semantic, and both are currently carried out by the LLM judge. For example, in disclosure tasks, the second step means whether what was disclosed lets its audience infer the sensitive information. By harm category, approximately 45 tasks (deletions and unauthorized sends) have failures caught by the first step, 57 (disclosure and misrepresentation) by the second, and 8 (commitments) are mixed.

Non-LLM controls and baselines

We agree some of these failures could be prevented by information-flow or access controls where such controls exist, and we will discuss this literature in section 2. But real agentic deployments aren’t guardrailed completely: even though there are safeguards, edge cases will arise as agents and use cases develop, and there will be cases the guardrails haven’t covered yet. Safe behavior under such conditions is therefore a capability we want in the agent itself; we believe the agent needs to be inherently safe, not because something in the harness or environment forced it to be. BARC-Bench measures this capability directly, by giving the agent ordinary workplace access and no protective scaffolding. We see external controls and agent judgment as complementary layers.

Grounding and human involvement

The universes were generated by Claude Opus 4.6 from human-written ledgers specifying personas, narrative arcs, tools, permissions, and intended safety surfaces. Each universe went through at least six rounds of “generalist” human QC to check for realism, richness, and consistency, as well as QC by paid annotators with experience in the field. Task expansion used GPT 5.6 Sol for planning and GPT 5.6 Luna for writing and validation. For the human-written tasks, a person chose each goal, safe route, harmful action, and rubric, and an LLM helped port the drafts into the environment. Seed tasks received a second human review, all 110 tasks received a final review by three reviewers, and the judge was calibrated against 300 human-labeled trajectories. We also agree that "realistic" overstates what the environments demonstrate; we will instead describe the environments as grounded, internally consistent, human-reviewed synthetic workplaces.

Rubrics

Each rubric contains the violation rule, harm category, whether the request conflicts with a rule in the environment, the boundary type, and a safe path. We will add examples to the appendix.

Reviewer disagreement

You are right that the appendix refers to disagreement and adjudication results that are not reported. We will remove that statement.

Contextual integrity and annotator variance

We agree with your points. While average pairwise human agreement on trajectory verdicts was high at 93.3%, we will expand the limitations to state that the benchmark reflects one specified norm per task.

Related work

Thank you for these pointers. We will add the prior work you shared.

Comments on the paper

2 comments

We thank the reviewers for their rich feedback. In this comment we address concerns shared by two or more reviewers or concerns relevant to all reviewers.

Additional detail on deferrals

As reviewer JLtb points out, if the agent stops to ask the user for guidance all the time, it is safe but not good. Deferral is safe, but it is not completion, and we now report completion separately, as also asked by reviewer tXLX. Per task (% of 110):

GPT 6 AstraFable 5.1Gemini 3.8 FlashDeepSeek V4-Pro
All-safe (pass^5, as in the paper)72.737.323.69.1
All five attempts are safe completions60.924.515.55.5
Safe, with ≥ 1 deferral or refusal11.812.76.40.0
Safe only through operational failure0.00.01.83.6

Per attempt (% of 550):

GPT-6 AstraFable 5.1Gemini 3.8 FlashDeepSeek V4-Pro
Safe completion73.643.525.818.4
Deferral8.510.72.93.6
Refusal0.01.64.40.5
Operational failure0.00.01.56.2
Unsafe17.844.265.571.3

An example interpretation: GPT 6 Astra completes all five attempts safely on 60.9% of tasks; the remaining 11.8 points of its 72.7% all-safe rate are tasks kept safe only by deferring or refusing at least once. Counting only full safe completion, the model ranking is unchanged.

Judge reliability

We acknowledge the limitations both reviewers JLtb and tXLX have identified. Reported judge agreement was measured before we improved the judge based on the human agreement results and human auditor feedback. UPDATE: We were able to measure our current judge’s agreement with two humans on 53 trajectories. The two humans agreed on 48 trajectories; on these 48, the judge agreed with them on 47, with Cohen’s kappa at 0.96. On all 53, the judge agreed with each human 91% and 96% of the time—at least as well as they agreed with each other. There is substantial improvement from the previous judge version.

We also provide insight into the judge’s run-to-run stability: The majority vote of three total judge runs per trajectory agree with the original verdicts on 99.1% of trajectories (Fleiss' kappa = 0.96; 96.9% unanimous). Pass^5 changes by at most 1.8 points (GPT-6 Astra 72.7% to 74.5%; Fable 5.1 37.3% to 36.4%; the other two unchanged). This shows that even though the 10% disagreement with humans seems daunting, the verdicts are still stable.

This result addresses variance in the aggregate results. We agree with reviewer tXLX’s point that trajectory-level agreement does not establish the accuracy of an all-five-safe aggregate by itself. Our additional runs show that the aggregate is insensitive to the judge’s run-to run-variation, but not to systematic errors the judge makes consistently. However, this insensitivity indicates that trajectory safety is generally black-and-white, i.e. low risk of a false pass or fail given one judge verdict. Furthermore, we show additional evidence of pass^5 stability: this table shows how many failed tasks had exactly 1 unsafe attempt out of 5, how many had 2+ unsafe attempts, and the percentage of total failed tasks that had 2+ unsafe attempts.

ModelExactly 1 unsafe2+ unsafeShare of 2+ unsafe
GPT-6 Astra62480.0%
Fable 5.1145579.7%
Gemini 3.8 Flash67892.9%
DeepSeek V4-Pro79393.0%
Overall3325088.3%

This shows that in the vast majority of failed tasks (88.3% overall, and ~80% even for the strongest models), failure does not hinge on a single unsafe attempt, making it even less common for a single misgraded safe attempt to flip a task from pass to fail. Even if one attempt is falsely flagged, most failed tasks have at least one other flagged attempt, which, given our judge’s high alignment with human judges, is likely to be a genuine failure.

Failure filtering

Reviewers JLtb and tXLX raise concerns with BARC-Bench’s coverage of failure modes. During task development, we actually screened tasks with two models, Claude Opus 4.8 and GPT 5.6 Sol, picking two of the most capable models in each family. Because Sol consistently behaved more safely than Opus 4.8, we adopted Sol as the single stricter bar, keeping tasks only if Sol failed them in at least 2 out of 3 runs. Sol was chosen because it was the safest model available, not because of its model family. In fact, selecting tasks based on an OpenAI model's failures should, if anything, bias the benchmark against OpenAI-family agents, yet GPT 6 Astra ranks first. However, we concede we have not tested a judge from a different model family and will list this as a limitation.

Correction to task creation origins

We make a correction: the final 110 tasks actually contain 34 human-authored seed tasks and 76 synthetic instances, different from our original appendix numbers.

We were able to finish our human-judge agreement survey on the current version of the judge we used and updated the above comment to include these results. The update is copied here:

We were able to measure our current judge’s agreement with two humans on 53 trajectories. The two humans agreed on 48 trajectories; on these 48, the judge agreed with them on 47, with Cohen’s kappa at 0.96. On all 53, the judge agreed with each human 91% and 96% of the time—at least as well as they agreed with each other. There is substantial improvement from the previous judge version.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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