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- Informativeness
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- Presentation
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Paper summary
The paper addresses the problem of custom-domain policy refusal control in LLMs. They introduce “Circuit-restricted weight editing”, a method that uses Edge Attribution Patching (EAP-IG) to find refusal-causal circuits in a model, and then computes a masked weights update that works only on the parameters within these circuits to improve safety while maintaining model utility without the need for any inference-time steering. The method is evaluated across 6 models from 2 different families showing almost consistent gains against steering baselines. The paper also gives extensive experiments and ablations across safety, utility, and circuit selection.
Critical strengths
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The idea behind the proposed methodology is intuitive and interesting. If refusal in LLMs is propagated through specific circuits, identifying and updating these parameters makes a lot of sense. The method also avoids inference-time overhead.
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The paper provides extensive experimental evaluation across multiple models and harm categories, with several interesting ablations and evaluations of safety and utility preservation.
Critical weaknesses
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Limited evidence of category-specific refusal control. The method is proposed for models or systems that “may need to strengthen refusal for one policy domain”, but the results in Table 5 seem to contradict this. All models, regardless of the category of prompts used to identify updatable parameters, improve comparably across all categories. In the “Health” category, for example, other edit categories produce better safety results in that category compared to the “Health” edit. While this does not contradict the authors' definition of harmful-versus-benign selectivity, it raises questions about the value of category-conditioned circuit discovery.
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Limited generalization of the claimed refusal selectivity. Although Table 1 shows relatively low benign over-refusal, the method seems to induce significant over-refusal on challenging over-refusal benchmarks (XSTest) in the Gemma example in Table 15. The ‘optimal’ steering weight in Table 1 leads to significant over-refusal (). Reducing the steering strength to lower over-refusal drops harm refusal from to only . This makes the usability of the method in real-world scenarios questionable.
Questions for authors
- Could you please provide additional over-refusal / harm refusal trade-offs across models and steering strengths?
- What is the impact of using categorical prompts during the first phase of your pipeline (circuit discovery)? How would the results in Table 5 look with a baseline where all categories were used together?
- In Section 3.1, the clean and corrupted runs change both the prompt harmfulness and the refusal/compliance continuations. This makes it difficult to isolate which part is responsible for refusal. Have the authors considered a counterfactual using the same harmful prompt with refusal and compliance continuations?
- How does your method compare to more recent safety weight-editing and steering baselines? See [1, 2]
[1] AlphaSteer: Learning Refusal Steering with Principled Null-Space Constraint (Sheng et al, ICLR 2026).
[2] Turning the Spell Around: Lightweight Alignment Amplification via Rank-One Safety Injection (Abu Shairah et al, EMNLP 2026).
3 comments
I thank the authors for their response and for running many additional experiments, which I really appreciate.
Unfortunately, some of the new results further reinforce my original concerns. The pooled categories edit performs comparably to, and sometimes better than, the category-specific edits, further questioning the need for per-category circuit discovery. The authors suggest this may be due to the dataset, but this explanation needs actual evidence to support. Otherwise, the benefit of category-specific discovery remains unclear, especially with the paper's motivation of enabling targeted policy edits.
Additionally, the rebuttal mentions adding "full α curves on XSTest-safe, OR-Bench-hard and MMLU," but I could not find these plots in the revised paper or appendix. Could the authors please include them or point me to their location?
For these reasons, I will maintain my original score for now.
Thank you for the follow-up. We apologize for the missing figure, the α curves are now Figure 11 in Appendix L.
Pooled vs. per-category discovery. The pooled results follow from how the contrastive data of Lee et al. (2025) is built. In all 700 training rows, the five categories share the same benign prompt, and each category's harmful prompt is a rewrite of that prompt. Within a row, the harmful prompts of different categories share 0.20 of their words, against 0.03 across rows. Half of each category's discovery contrast is therefore identical, so the category masks overlap and a pooled edit loses little on harmful vs. ordinary benign refusal. Where per-category discovery does make a clear difference is on hard-benign prompts. At matched test harmful refusal on Crime (94.0% vs. 94.3%), the Crime-only edit refuses 54.4% of XSTest-safe and 86.0% of OR-Bench-hard prompts, against 69.6% and 95.7% for the pooled edit.
Thank you for the questions on pooled discovery, the same-prompt counterfactual, hard-benign trade-offs and newer baselines. New results are in Section 5.5 and Appendix L (orange).
W1/Q2. Category specificity and a pooled baseline. The category edits share much of their structure. One reason is that we use the contrastive dataset of CAST (Lee et al., 2025), in which all category datasets are designed around the same benign prompts, so the discovery sets are similar to each other. Our selectivity claim is about harmful versus benign prompts within a policy; we do not claim zero transfer across harm categories. We implemented the pooled baseline you suggested: one shared support discovered from 700 examples (about 140 per category), one pooled update, and a single α = 0.65 chosen on joint validation (mean harmful refusal, every benign rate ≤ 10%). One checkpoint serves every category, with no routing:
Pooling helps Health and Legal (+7.1 pp each, p ≈ 0.018 after correcting for five categories); the other differences are not significant. MMLU is 68.52% vs. 68.74% base. Pooled discovery works as an extension of the framework, and per-category discovery remains available when a single policy is targeted.
W2/Q1. Hard-benign trade-offs. The revision adds full α curves on XSTest-safe, OR-Bench-hard and MMLU for Llama Crime/Legal and Gemma Crime. Lower strengths give a different trade-off: Gemma Crime at α = 1 has 62.7% validation harmful and 16.4% XSTest-safe refusal with unchanged MMLU (59.7%); base is 24.7% and 6.4%. Training the contrastive update with hard-benign negatives on the standard support lowers OR-Bench-hard refusal from 78.0 to 55.7% and FalseReject-test from 47.5 to 24.9% at the same 62.7% validation harmful refusal (paired p ≈ 4.4e-12 and 1.4e-10; XSTest not significant), with MMLU 59.0% vs. 59.7% (exploratory; Appendix L includes a ratio-matched control).
Q3. Same-prompt counterfactual circuits. We ran this on Llama-3.1-8B and Gemma-3-4B, Crime and Legal: discovery holds each harmful prompt fixed and contrasts a refusal continuation with a compliance continuation, and training and calibration are unchanged (Appendix L). The paper's contrast (harmful prompt with refusal vs. harmless prompt with compliance) gives higher test harmful refusal in three of four settings: Llama Crime 94.0 vs. 90.0%, Gemma Crime 97.1 vs. 92.6%, Gemma Legal 38.9 vs. 34.3% (p ≤ 0.044), with no significant benign difference. The same-prompt contrast is better on Llama Legal (65.1/9.7 vs. 58.9/10.3, p = 0.012). It selects a largely different set of channels (Jaccard 0.13–0.20 with the standard mask) that still gives a usable edit. We keep the paper's construction and report the same-prompt variant in Appendix L.
Q4. Newer baselines (Appendix L, Table 42). Test refusal (%, n = 350) and MMLU (5-shot) on Llama-3.1-8B Crime:
AlphaSteer steers activations at inference time, constrained to a null space meant to leave benign inputs unchanged; we used the official repository and steering matrix. At C-ΔΘ's benign refusal it reaches 79.1% harmful refusal, against 94.0% for C-ΔΘ, and no strength in its grid reaches 94.0%. At this strength its MMLU falls to 42.3% (base 68.7%).
ROSI adds a rank-one refusal direction to the attention and MLP output projections, with no training. We adapted it to each category and chose the layer on validation. On Llama Crime it reaches 70.0% harmful refusal only at a strength where MMLU falls to 56.7%. On Gemma Crime it reaches 45.1% with MMLU at 26.0%, and on Llama Legal 2.3%, against 97.1% and 58.9% for C-ΔΘ. Both baselines buy harmful refusal with general capability: MMLU drops by about 5 points for AlphaSteer at a much lower harmful refusal, and by 12 to 34 points for ROSI. C-ΔΘ reaches the highest harmful refusal while keeping MMLU within 0.3 points of the base model on Llama (68.5 vs. 68.7%) and within 0.1 points on Gemma, because it learns its update from contrastive data on the selected channels only.