acceptodds
Withdrawn from ICLR 2027

BR-MAS: Byzantine-Resilient Multi-Agent Collaboration via Adaptive Quorum Consensus

Withdrawn from ICLR 2027, so left out of the paper lists and the map.

Abstract

Multi-agent systems (MAS) built from LLMs are increasingly deployed on real collaborative tasks, yet their interaction fabric is fragile: a few Byzantine participants (colluding, contradicting, or injecting misinformation) can derail outcomes that no single-agent defense addresses. Existing collaboration paradigms fail structurally: discussion-based schemes have no containment mechanism, role-based schemes concentrate trust in single points of failure, and consensus-based protocols rest on self-reported confidence that adversaries can fabricate. We observe that LLM agents can judge each other’s proposals, so voting weight can track verified behavior instead of self-report. The honest/Byzantine weight ratio ρ then becomes a single lever on both fault tolerance and quorum cost: the bound improves from the classical f < n/3 to f < nρ/(ρ + 2) in general, and to f < nρ/(ρ + 1) under single-proposal-single-vote enforcement. We instantiate this in BR-MAS, a pluggable Byzantine-resilient collaboration framework combining structured consensus proposals, four-dimensional decentralized verification, a behavior-driven Byzantine classifier with weight amplification, and an adaptive quorum with early termination. Across MMLU-Pro, TAMAS, ARGUS, and MARBLE—two backbone families, three capability tiers, and up to six of seven agents adversarial—BR-MAS degrades gracefully where baseline accuracy collapses nearly to zero, sharply reduces attack success, and cuts token cost by an order of magnitude.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
Multi-agent System, collaboration, consensus

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 10%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 1.67 over 3 reviews, above 10% of the others.
Reviewer_ozPbOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
1
Read review
Paper summary

This paper proposes BR-MAS, a Byzantine-resilient multi-agent collaboration framework that integrates decentralized proposal verification, credibility-based voting weights, and adaptive quorum consensus. The authors derive fault-tolerance bounds beyond the classical one-third threshold and evaluate the framework across four benchmarks involving adversarial agents and misinformation attacks.

Critical strengths
  1. The paper addresses an important problem in the security and reliability of LLM-based multi-agent systems.

  2. The proposed framework integrates multiple mechanisms into a coherent protocol and demonstrates promising empirical improvements across several adversarial scenarios.

  3. The evaluation covers multiple benchmarks and model configurations, and supplementary code is provided.

Critical weaknesses
  1. Overstated theoretical contribution. The paper repeatedly claims to surpass the classical one-third Byzantine fault-tolerance bound. However, classical BFT concerns agreement among distributed nodes, whereas LLM-based multi-agent collaboration aims to produce correct conclusions through reasoning and discussion. These are different objectives, and agreement does not necessarily imply correctness. Moreover, the proposed bounds rely on stronger assumptions, including trustworthy weight assignment and reliable verification. Therefore, the claimed breakthrough over classical BFT appears overstated.

  2. Unreliable credibility estimation. The proposed credibility scores are updated based on proposal acceptance and agreement with the final consensus rather than ground truth. Since consensus outcomes can themselves be manipulated, the mechanism may reward malicious agents and penalize honest dissenters, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of incorrect decisions. The paper does not adequately establish how this risk is prevented.

  3. Limited novelty compared with prior work. Credibility-based weighted voting has already been explored in Credibility Governance (arXiv:2603.02640), including under misinformation and adversarial conditions. The paper does not sufficiently clarify how its credibility estimation and weighted voting mechanisms differ from existing approaches.

  4. Inconsistent experimental results. Tables 6 and 19 report substantially different accuracies for apparently identical configurations. For example, at f=3 in the same-tier setting, the reported accuracy is 0.385 in Table 6 but 0.615 in Table 19. Such discrepancies raise concerns about the consistency of the experimental setup and the reliability of the ablation conclusions.

  5. Insufficient experimental rigor. The MMLU-Pro experiments use only 13 questions per configuration, without adequate statistical analysis. Furthermore, the substantial token savings may primarily result from replacing lengthy discussions with shorter structured proposals, rather than from adaptive quorum consensus itself. More controlled comparisons are needed.

Questions for authors

How should the proposed fault-tolerance bounds be interpreted relative to classical Byzantine agreement, given the differences in objectives and assumptions? What exactly is guaranteed beyond the classical one-third bound?

How does BR-MAS prevent incorrect or manipulated consensus outcomes from corrupting credibility scores and reinforcing subsequent errors?

What are the essential technical differences between BR-MAS and Credibility Governance, particularly regarding credibility estimation and weighted voting?

Could the authors explain the discrepancies between Tables 6 and 19, and provide larger-scale evaluations with statistical analysis and efficiency comparisons under matched token budgets?

Reviewer_mTxcOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
1
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The paper considers the problem of dealing with Byzantine agents in LLM-based multi-agent systems. In such settings, LLM agents with heterogenous capabilities or expertise collaborate in order to answer queries. However, malicious agents can disrupt this collaboration. The paper argues that existing approaches, based on discussion or role-based approaches, are limited in their capabilities, and that a more formal perspective rooted in consensus protocols in distributed systems is required. The paper's key argument is that LLM-based agents are able to judge the reliability of other agents based on context and the interaction history. This motivates a consensus protocol that is adaptive: agents are assigned weights based on assessed reliability, rather than relying on the uniform weights of classic protocols. The system model is defined and analysed in a general sense, then the BR-MAS approach is introduced, which uses a specific scheme for deriving agent weights and quorum thresholds. Experiments generally show improved performance over baseline setups.

Critical strengths

S1. The paper identifies a timely problem and proposes an approach that is promising in principle and backed by significant research in distributed systems.

Critical weaknesses

W1. Lack of clarity arising from possible LLM-driven writing

The key weakness of the work is by far its lack of clarity. The writing uses many specialist terms, concepts, and notations that are assumed to be known to the reader, but are often left undefined or assumed to be known throughout. To give examples: symbols are used without definition in the abstract; Byzantine agents are never defined; classic BFT voting is never explained; ReAct-style trajectories that underpin the approach are also never explained, etc.

These are just a few examples, but the lack of clarity is a pervasive feeling that affects every paragraph of the text. The writing is locally coherent, but lacking a clear narrative that can be followed sentence by sentence. The general feeling reading the manuscript is that it is LLM-generated to a very large extent, and not human-originated writing that was merely edited using LLMs, as is claimed in the AI use statement.

The results section also bears the hallmarks of AI writing and focuses predominantly on restating results as opposed to offering interpretation and insight. It is not necessary to restate results that are already visible in the figures, or redefine experimental protocol / definition of metrics in the figure captions.

Given the pervasive lack of clarity in the paper, I do not have confidence that the contents of the submission were verified by authors with the appropriate expertise.

W2. Limited statistical significance

The paper does not specify whether multiple runs were used and, in the absence of confidence intervals or error bars in all tables and figures, the results cannot be treated as statistically significant. Multiple runs with different initial random conditions (e.g., consensus weights, LLM sampling seeds) should be used, and performance reported with confidence intervals or error bars.

Questions for authors

Please address W1 and W2 as these are the key points that affect my assessment. I am also listing some further queries and suggestions for improving the work below.

C1. The analysis applies to the general system model and not to the specific proposed weighting mechanism itself. Can you make any formal statements about it, or otherwise qualify the theoretical claims to the system model?

C2. The use of "verified" to refer to the reliability assessment is very misleading, since this is not a verification in a formal sense, but merely a judgement output by an LLM, which may itself be unreliable. I would recommend clarifying this upfront (not leaving it to the appendix), and ideally using another wording.

C3. Since the veracity, rationality, value, and security criteria used to produce the vector v\textbf{v} are English words with multiple meanings, their definition in the Appendix should be linked from the main text.

Reviewer_Z9czOpenReview ↗
Rating
3
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper proposes BR-MAS, a Byzantine-resilient framework for LLM multi-agent collaboration. It combines structured consensus proposals, four-dimensional peer verification, behavior-driven voting weights, and adaptive quorum consensus. The authors derive weight-dependent fault-tolerance bounds and evaluate robustness and token efficiency across QA and multi-agent benchmarks under adversarial conditions.

Critical strengths

S1. Addresses an important security problem in multi-agent collaboration, particularly collusion, misinformation, and compromised agents.

S2. Proposes a modular framework integrating structured verification, behavior-based reputation, and adaptive quorum voting, with accompanying theoretical analysis.

S3. Evaluates multiple collaboration paradigms, backbone capabilities, and adversarial settings, reporting improvements in robustness and token efficiency.

Critical weaknesses

W1. Circular reputation estimation and unreliable Byzantine classification (Sec. 3.3–3.4).

Agent reputation depends on historical consensus rather than ground truth: malicious agents may reinforce each other's reputation, while honest dissenters are penalized [1,2]. Exponential weighting could amplify this feedback. Moreover, the initialization s0=θ=0.5s_0=\theta=0.5 classifies all agents as honest, including Byzantine ones, making the initial quorum potentially unsafe under an adversarial majority. It is unclear how reliable weights can be established without trusted labels, potentially violating Assumption A1. The authors should clarify bootstrapping and evaluate reputation manipulation and classification errors.

W2. Inconsistency between theoretical guarantees and the implemented protocol (Sec. 2.3, 3.4, Appendix B–E).

The liveness proof uses q≤WHq\leq W_H, but Algorithm 1 excludes the proposer from voting while including its weight in quorum calculation. For example, with five honest agents weighted (10,1,1,1,1)(10,1,1,1,1), a proposal from the highest-weight agent requires q>7q>7, although the remaining verifiers hold only 44, preventing acceptance. Furthermore, the stronger bound f<nρ/(ρ+1)f<n\rho/(\rho+1) assumes reliable verification and additional restrictions, whereas implementation uses the general-model quorum. The authors should reconcile the protocol with its safety/liveness guarantees.

W3. Insufficient verification of security assumptions and adaptive attacks (Sec. 3.2, 4.1–4.4).

LLM-based peer verification may suffer from correlated errors, fabricated evidence, and adversarial persuasion [1,3]. Despite introducing verification error δ\delta theoretically, the paper does not systematically measure its impact on actual fault tolerance. Existing attacks also insufficiently target the proposed reputation mechanism. Adaptive strategies, including reputation farming, coordinated voting, and delayed defection, remain largely unexplored [3,4]. Verification error rates, classification accuracy, and long-horizon adaptive attacks should be evaluated.

W4. Limited experimental evidence and insufficient efficiency analysis (Sec. 4, Appendix G–J).

Experiments involve at most seven agents, with only 13 MMLU-Pro questions per configuration, making accuracy estimates potentially unstable. Stronger baselines, such as independent verification and alternative fault-tolerant collaboration methods [5], would help establish the actual gains. Moreover, the reported token savings conflate shorter structured proposals, reduced discussions, and early quorum termination. Matched-budget ablations and end-to-end latency, GPU cost, and verification-overhead measurements are needed to substantiate efficiency claims.

[1] M. Cemri et al. Why Do Multi-Agent LLM Systems Fail? NeurIPS 2025. arXiv:2503.13657.

[2] K. Li et al. Aligned Agents, Biased Swarm: Measuring Bias Amplification in Multi-Agent Systems. ICLR 2026. arXiv:2604.08963.

[3] T. Jiang et al. AgentLAB: Benchmarking LLM Agents against Long-Horizon Attacks. ICML 2026. arXiv:2602.16901.

[4] T. Li et al. A2ASecBench: A Protocol-Aware Security Benchmark for Agent-to-Agent Multi-Agent Systems. ICLR 2026. arXiv:2602.11327.

[5] J.-T. Huang et al. On the Resilience of LLM-Based Multi-Agent Collaboration with Faulty Agents. ICML 2025. arXiv:2408.00989.

Questions for authors

Consensus occurs after an agent completes its ReAct trajectory. If a Byzantine agent has already modified files, updated databases, or invoked external APIs, rejecting its proposal cannot necessarily undo these effects. Does the framework support pre-execution authorization, sandboxing, or transactional rollback? Otherwise, should its security guarantees be restricted to accepting shared collaboration records rather than preventing malicious actions?

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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