- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
Read review
Paper summary
This paper looks at how the choice of evaluation labels affects tool-call safety monitors in prompt injection settings. It distinguishes between whether the current calls complete an attack and whether the full run eventually succeeds, showing that this choice can really change monitor scores and which monitors get selected. It also tests the chosen monitors in blocking experiments, where the safety-utility tradeoff depends on the agent and the threshold used.
Critical strengths
I like how the paper draws a clear line between predicting eventual attack success and identifying calls that actually complete an attack. Keeping the predictions fixed and changing only the labels makes that especially obvious.
The analysis doesn’t stop at metric shifts, it checks monitor selection and calibration, then tests the selected monitors in actual blocking experiments.
The blocking-disabled control is a solid design choice, since it isolates the effect of blocking from any changes in the execution setup.
Critical weaknesses
Here are my main concerns:
-
the contribution feels a bit narrow. The paper does a good job showing that evaluating different events can affect monitor scores and selection, but the broader takeaway isn’t fully clear. It doesn’t really establish when local completion is the better defense target, especially since earlier attempts that don’t fully complete an attack may still be worth blocking. Does this only apply to monitors in prompt injection?
-
The practical implications are underdeveloped. The local labels depend on knowing the attacker’s goal, having an executable success checker, and being able to replay the environment. Those are useful for benchmarks, but often aren’t available in production, and the paper doesn’t give much guidance on how to use these findings for monitor selection or calibration in practice.
-
The motivation for the defense setting could be stronger. The paper assumes a pre-execution monitor without really explaining when this is preferable to other prompt injection defenses. If the broader point is about evaluating monitors, it would also help to say whether the framing applies to loss-of-control settings, where the agent itself is pursuing an unwanted objective instead of following injected instructions.
Questions for authors
see above
Thank you for your thoughtful feedback on the paper's contribution, practical implications, and scope.
Comment to W1
We agree that earlier calls can deserve blocking even when they do not complete an attack. We do not establish local completion L as a better target for choosing which calls to block. Our contribution is a way to distinguish recognition of immediate completion from forecasting eventual success, and evidence that this distinction changes how monitors are evaluated.
For example, reading an injected message may enable a later leak while having L=0. A monitor could correctly recognize that the read does not complete the goal, yet receive a positive terminal label Y because the leak happens later. This does not make Y wrong for forecasting, or the read safe to allow. The benefit of blocking it needs separate execution tests.
We constructed L using official goal checks before and after the pending calls. With TS-Guard scores fixed, new-agent AUROC was 0.628 against Y versus 0.841 against L: +0.213 [0.085, 0.327], persisting after excluding source runs with native Mistral call text. Repeating monitor selection and calibration under system resampling gave excess L loss 0.224 [0.133, 0.325] from using Y. The interval included zero when tasks and goals were also resampled. Changing from Y to L did not consistently favor a different monitor across candidate pools. Brackets are 95% intervals under the respective procedures. We believe these results make the distinction useful for assessing what capability a reported score actually supports.
The issue also arose without an attacker: MANTRA's operating-rule checks gave terminal/local disagreement on 9-30% of decisions. Its monitors remained weak, and selecting using L did not improve on selecting using Y and recalibrating to L. This supports applicability beyond injection, without establishing better prevention.
Comment to W2
You are right that exact L is unavailable without a known goal and executable checker. Where those are missing, we recommend selecting and calibrating for an event that can be labeled, such as a specified operating-rule violation, and stating what those labels measure. We do not solve unknown-goal labeling in production.
The practical steps are to define the event and eligible calls, obtain checker-based or clearly identified proxy labels, select and calibrate on development data, choose thresholds on separate validation data, then measure executed security and utility against a blocking-disabled control. Proxy labels need validation and should not be treated as exact L. Our original thresholds were chosen after seeing execution outcomes, so our experiments do not prospectively validate this whole workflow.
Replay reconstructs offline labels from existing traces; instrumented benchmark runs can instead log the checks directly. The deployed scorer need not run the checker: our paired classifier used checker-derived training labels without privileged goal text or checks in scoring inputs. AgentDojo-L provides benchmark labels and validation/exclusion records. Our judges that labeled calls without replay still needed the known goal and gave mixed calibration results, so they did not remove the limitation you identify.
Comment to W3
We chose pre-execution monitoring because it offers an external gate before tool side effects, without retraining the agent. It is useful where that intervention point is available and can complement other defenses. We did not compare defense classes or establish general superiority.
The same evaluation framing can apply when the agent itself pursues an unwanted objective, provided an observable criterion is defined on the relevant snapshots. The objective need not come from an injected instruction. We tested injection and MANTRA rule violations, not intentionally deceptive or loss-of-control agents; transfer to those settings remains untested.