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- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
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Paper summary
This paper considers attribute inference for models trained with differential privacy and fairness guarantees. The paper runs an attribute inference attack for 3 different algorithms that train with attribute differential privacy and fairness guarantees, 8 tabular datasets, across different privacy budgets. The attack targets demographic attriibutes that are considered sensitive/protetcted. The paper finds that the relationship between attribute inference attack success and privacy budget need not be monotonic.
Critical strengths
- The authors conduct a thorough experimental analysis across diverse datasets and algorithms.
Critical weaknesses
- The contribution of the paper is rather limited as it does not introduce a new attack or algorithm, but evaluates an existing attack on prior methods.
- The authors acknowledge that the success of the attribute inference attack can be based on prior correlations between the protected attribute and other features, thus the success of the attack is not an indication of the model's privacy leakage. However, the authors do not provide any baseline for attack success without access to model output. They also do not use attacks which take into account the attacker's prior probability of success. As such, the attack results are hard to interpret. In the end, there is no clear takeway, other than the fact that the privacy budget does not have a clear relationship with the attack success.
- The authors suggest that empirical audits are important for understanding what information is "recoverable from deployed model outputs", however I find this language misleading because we have no baseline for what is recoverable about the sensitive attribute even before the model outputs are deployed.
Questions for authors
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2 comments
Dear Reviewer,
We wanted to follow up and ask whether you have had a chance to review our response. We remain available to provide any additional information or clarification that might be helpful.
Thank you for your time and consideration.
We thank the reviewer for the constructive feedback and for recognizing the breadth of our experimental evaluation. We address the main concerns below.
1. Contribution and novelty. Our goal is not to introduce a new attack or algorithm, but to highlight an important gap in the evaluation of fair-learning methods that apply DP to protect sensitive attributes. Existing evaluations typically focus on formal privacy guarantees, utility, and fairness, without assessing whether protected attributes remain inferable from released predictions. Across three representative pipelines, we show that attribute inferability can remain substantial and varies with the privacy budget and learning procedure. Our findings motivate incorporating attribute inference auditing into existing privacy–fairness–utility evaluations.
2. Prior correlations and missing baselines. We agree that successful attribute inference may arise from correlations between sensitive and non-sensitive features. However, our threat model considers an adversary who observes only the released prediction score S=fD(X), without access to the target's features (X). Thus, our evaluation measures attribute inferability from model outputs, rather than additional disclosure beyond what an adversary already observing (X) could infer. Without model outputs or other target-specific information, a population-prior baseline yields AUC = 0.5. While feature-only imputation would provide a useful complementary comparison, it assumes a different adversarial access setting. We clarify this distinction in our added section of appendix C and the interpretation of our results.
3. Main takeaway. Our central finding is not that DP guarantees are violated, but that formally protecting sensitive attributes does not necessarily prevent their inference from released predictions, notably due to feature correlations and how privatized attributes are used within learning pipelines. This distinction is particularly important for practitioners, who may interpret sensitive-attribute DP guarantees as providing broader protection against attribute inference than they actually ensure. Our work highlights this gap between formal guarantees and practical inferability, motivating the integration of empirical attribute inference audits into existing privacy–fairness–utility evaluations. We thank once again the reviewer again for the suggestions, which will help us clarify the scope and contributions of our work. We hope that our responses have addressed your main concerns and would be grateful if you could reconsider your assessment in light of these clarifications.