- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper proposes BadAvg, which introduces a differentiable FedAvg layer into backdoor optimization for federated contrastive learning. The attacker estimates benign clients’ updates and optimizes the attack against the estimated aggregated encoder, with experiments measuring both attack success and persistence after poisoning stops.
Critical strengths
1.The motivation is clear: an attack optimized on a local encoder may become ineffective after aggregation with benign updates.
2.Evaluating attack success 100 rounds after the attacker stops participating provides useful information beyond peak attack success.
3. The experiments cover IID and non-IID partitions, different attack-start rounds, and two server-side defenses.
Critical weaknesses
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Multi-clean trains multiple models on the attacker’s own data, so it mainly captures randomness in local optimization rather than differences in client data. The paper does not show whether this variation adequately represents the heterogeneity among actual clients.
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The defense evaluation is limited to two methods from 2019 and 2023, and the related work provides little discussion of more recent defenses. This limited coverage makes it difficult to assess how well BadAvg performs against current FL backdoor defenses.
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BadAvg uses norm control to make malicious updates resemble benign ones, but a high ASR alone does not demonstrate that the attack is stealthy. Whether its gains come from better resistance to forgetting, better evasion of defenses, or both?
Questions for authors
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The norm penalty in Eq. (4) does not appear to depend on the differentiable aggregation layer. Could the same penalty be applied to the baselines, and if so, why does Section 4.2 claim that they cannot impose norm constraints during training?
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The norm target is based on the attacker’s own clean update. How well does it represent the norms of benign clients’ updates, particularly under non-IID data?
W1. Multi-clean indeed captures optimization noise rather than cross-client heterogeneity, and we already stated this in the supplementary of the original manuscript. Our results suggest, however, that accurately modeling heterogeneity is not necessary for the attack. Global-delta does not simulate clients at all: it inverts the realized global transition and therefore implicitly reflects whatever heterogeneity actually occurred in that round. In our comparison of simulation strategies, neither dominates and both remain effective under both. No single estimation strategy is therefore necessary for the attack to succeed, which we consider a result rather than a limitation. We make this explicit in the revised text.
W2. Our evaluation covers two defenses of distinct and complementary types: a norm-based filtering and noise-injection defense, and a truth-discovery-based robust aggregation. These represent the two dominant families of server-side protection, and Clip+Noise in particular is the defense adopted by BAGEL, the closest prior FCL attack, so it is the directly comparable choice rather than an arbitrary one. Our results show the two behave very differently against the same attacks (Clip+Noise suppresses persistence, while FedTruth leaves much of the backdoor intact), a contrast that is itself informative and would not emerge from testing a single defense. We agree that broader coverage, including defenses designed specifically for federated self-supervised learning, would strengthen the evaluation, and we consider it a natural direction for future work.
W3. Our results already separate these two effects. In the undefended setting there is nothing to evade, so BadAvg’s advantage there (it is the strongest attack in most undefended settings on both peak and final ASR) isolates and demonstrates its resistance to dilution by benign aggregation. Under the defenses, both mechanisms are used, and BadAvg remains the strongest attack on peak ASR in most settings. Figure 3 shows explicitly how its update interacts with the norm-based filter (clipped to the benign norm rather than discarded). We therefore attribute BadAvg’s gains to both resistance to forgetting and correct handling of norm-based filtering, not to one alone. We also agree that a high ASR alone does not establish stealthiness and we do not claim it does: utility preservation is measured separately by the accuracy drop, and interaction with norm-based filtering by whether an update is discarded or clipped (Figure 3). We do not measure detectability by other means and have scoped the stealthiness claim accordingly.
Q1. The reviewer is correct that Eq. (4) is separable from the aggregation layer. The Section 4.2 claim is too strong, and we have corrected it in the revised manuscript: the reworded version now states that the baselines could add the same penalty, but cannot optimise the backdoor against its post-aggregation effect, which is what the differentiable layer provides. A norm penalty on a BadEncoder-style attack constrains only the raw local update and cannot shape what survives averaging. Beyond the manuscript correction, we have empirically verified that adding our penalty to the baselines does not recover the gap (see our response to Reviewer UfhE). Upon acceptance, we will include this controlled comparison as a dedicated ablation.
Q2. The attacker’s clean update is not an arbitrary proxy: it is produced by the same local training procedure on a subset of samples drawn from the same partitioning, as any benign client’s, so it is itself a sample from the benign norm distribution. Under Dirichlet partitioning the estimate is noisier, but the same happens for the quantity being matched: benign norms are themselves more dispersed, so a norm-based defense must use a looser threshold to avoid discarding benign clients, thus the attacker needs less precision. We have proved this empirically and added the analysis in the revised paper (Figure 3). Under Dirichlet partitioning on CIFAR-10, BadAvg’s rescaled update has a norm of 8 against a benign median of 9.2 (within the benign norms), and is never discarded by Clip+Noise defense. The target βt is therefore an adequate estimate where the reviewer expects it to be hardest, because the defense’s tolerance own augments.