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Paper summary
This paper proposes Watermark Basin Alignment (WM-Basin), a black-box method for detecting whether a suspect language model was distilled from a watermarked teacher. The key observation is that supervised fine-tuning on watermarked teacher outputs may transfer a watermark-specific signal into the student model's parameters, even when conventional token-level watermark statistics become difficult to detect.
The method first maps text generated by the suspect and reference teacher models into gradient representations using a fixed probe model. It then removes dominant directions estimated from clean models using principal component analysis (PCA) and measures the cosine similarity between the resulting residual gradients. Finally, it ranks the claimed watermark key against independently sampled decoy keys to obtain a non-parametric p-value.
The authors evaluate WM-Basin across 24 student architectures, four teacher models, and four watermarking schemes. They report a true positive rate (TPR) of 79% at a nominal 0.1% false-positive rate (FPR) for unigram detection and 45% for trigram detection, substantially outperforming the sampled-token baseline. Additional experiments investigate distillation temperature, the proportion of watermarked training data, model architecture, watermark schemes, quantization, pruning, continued supervised fine-tuning, and reinforcement-learning post-training.
The paper presents an interesting alternative to token-level watermark detection and provides extensive empirical evidence that watermark-related information can be recovered from the outputs of distilled models. However, the strength of the evidence for the proposed parameter-space geometry, the scope of the statistical guarantees, and the practical cost and generality of the detection procedure require further consideration.
Critical strengths
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The paper addresses an important limitation of existing black-box watermark detection: token-level evidence can become weak when teacher outputs are sampled at low temperatures or when exact context recurrence is limited. WM-Basin instead compares gradient representations derived from the suspect's outputs and keyed teacher references. The reported improvement is substantial. At a 0.1% nominal FPR, the paper reports 79% TPR for unigram detection and 45% for trigram detection, compared with 29% and 1.3%, respectively, for the baseline. This provides convincing empirical motivation for investigating representations beyond token-level statistics.
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The evaluation spans 24 student architectures, four teachers, four watermarking schemes, and several post-distillation modifications. The authors also examine the effects of the watermarked-data fraction, distillation temperature, and training configuration. Importantly, the paper reports cases where detection deteriorates, including continued SFT and audits outside the distillation domain. These experiments make the submission more informative than an evaluation limited to one student architecture or one watermarking scheme.
Critical weaknesses
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The evidence for the proposed watermark basin geometry and its causal interpretation is incomplete. The evidence supporting the proposed watermark basin geometry and its causal interpretation is incomplete. The residual decomposition in Section 2.2 serves only as a diagnostic tool and cannot establish that the residual is uniquely attributable to the watermark or approximately orthogonal to general related task variation, as other differences between the two fine-tuning runs such as stochastic optimization and data order effects may also contribute to the residual, the subsequent directional sweep also fails to independently prove the existence of a persistent basin with the claimed geometry. More critically, there lacks a clear empirical bridge between the white-box geometric observation of actual parameter updates and the gradient alignment signal from the separate probe model used in the black-box WM Basin method.
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Limited justification for the key assumptions. The method relies on assumptions about the alignment between watermark-related directions and gradients from a separate probe model. The paper does not sufficiently explain why this alignment should hold or when it may fail.
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Unclear scope of the statistical guarantee. The decoy-key test relies on exchangeability assumptions, but the paper does not clearly distinguish guarantees averaged over randomly generated keys from false-positive control for a particular deployed key.
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Limited generalization across domains. Detection performance degrades when the audit domain differs from the domain used for distillation. This raises concerns about whether the method generalizes beyond the specific training and auditing settings evaluated.
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Unclear sensitivity to probe-model selection. Since the black-box detector relies on gradients from a separate probe model, its performance may depend on the probe model's architecture and training data. The paper does not sufficiently characterize this dependence.
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Limited evidence for robustness to alternative explanations. The experiments do not sufficiently establish whether the observed signal is specific to watermarking, rather than a broader artifact of distillation or differences in optimization trajectories.
Questions for authors
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How robust is the proposed watermark direction to training randomness? In Section 2.2, the watermark-specific residual is defined by subtracting the projection onto the task update from the total update of a watermarked student. Could the authors repeat this analysis across multiple independently trained clean and watermarked students, with matched initializations and training configurations, to determine whether the residual is reproducible and specifically associated with the watermark key rather than stochastic optimization or data-order effects?
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What is the theoretical or empirical evidence that the proposed geometric residual captures watermark-specific information rather than ordinary variation caused by stochastic training or distillation?
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How does the white-box geometric analysis justify the proposed black-box detector? In particular, why should gradients from a separate probe model preserve the watermark-related signal identified in the white-box analysis?
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How sensitive is the detector to the choice of probe model and audit domain? Can the authors provide evidence that the detection signal remains reliable across different probe models and domain shifts?
4 comments
Response to Reviewer 6td9 (continued, explaining the p-value table)
As shown in the table above, the direction from the second student (with the same key) removes detection under different/same initialization and different/same data order, as the student's own does. In addition, every other direction has little impact on the p-value. So, the residual is not noise. The residual is also separate from the task direction, which gives a negligible p-value. These results confirm that the residual is uniquely attributable to the watermark key, and approximately orthogonal to general related task variation.
Fig. 3 on Page 5 in the main paper also plots the trend (varying the moving distance). We have revised the explanations. In particular, Subfigures A, B, and C show that the seeds have little impact on watermark detection.
We are also happy to take further questions regarding the white-box basin attribution.
Response to Reviewer 6td9 (part 2, focusing on the proposed black-box detector)
W2: Limited justification for the key assumptions. The method relies on assumptions about the alignment between watermark-related directions and gradients from a separate probe model. The paper does not sufficiently explain why this alignment should hold or when it may fail.
Q3: How does the white-box geometric analysis justify the proposed black-box detector? In particular, why should gradients from a separate probe model preserve the watermark-related signal identified in the white-box analysis?
These questions are similar to W3 and Q2-3 of Reviewer vPEX.
To clarify:
WM-Basin was a diagnostic tool to discover the existence of watermark key-specific direction in the white-box setting (as demonstrated in the above table). In the black-box setting, we use the same intuition: to discover the watermark key-specific direction in some gradient space. Note that the probe model was not used to reconstruct/align with the suspect’s update. We do the following instead.
We take a separate, clean probe model and compute its gradients on two input texts:
- A: on the teacher's watermarked traces,
- B: on the suspect's outputs.
If the gradients for Case A and Case B are similar, it is likely that the suspect model’s output contains the teacher’s watermarked traces, which means that the student is distilled from the teacher. This is because for Case A, the probe model will be updated towards directions that contain the watermark-key specific information. Case B will lead to similar directions, if the suspect's outputs also contains similar watermark traces. (Note that we have filtered out the common task directions using PCA.) We have revised Section 2.3 to include the explanations.
The direct evidence we look for in the black-box detector is therefore cosine similarity between gradients, presented below. For the student model distilled under the claimed watermark key, the similarity should be higher than all other 999 random keys. The table below confirms this evidence (0.494 vs 0.397) and that the gradient alignment is a reliable signal to detect the claimed watermark key. Our main result (Table 1) is also built upon it, demonstrating high TPR under low FPR.
| Suspect model | Claimed key | Other 999 keys | Flagged at 0.1% FPR |
|---|---|---|---|
| Distilled students (1,200 models) | 0.494 | 0.397 | 45.4% |
| Clean models (141 settings × 100 claimed keys) | -0.003 | -0.007 | 0.10% |
This table is added to in Appendix F (Page 38, Table 30).
For a better understanding, you may also observe that our detection is key specific, rather than an artifact due to distillation alone. We already test this (see Fig. 4 with n-gram=3 on Page 9): 50 students distilled from the same teacher with the same recipe but under different watermark keys are never flagged by WM-Basin.
This key-specific property also holds in the black-box setting, where we rank gradients according to similarities. In Table 29 on Page 38, we show that training a new student model distilled under the same key still lead to reliable detection (the cosine similarity ranks at the top), while students distilled under other keys and clean students do not.
In conclusion, distillation alone does not produce the signal; the watermark key does.
As we have discussed in the submitted draft, such gradient alignment fails when the detection is out of the distillation task domain, and when the teacher’s output goes through aggressive paraphrasing, and when the student model is continued to SFT on clean data. We have clarified the scope in the abstract and the introduction.
Response to Reviewer 6td9 (part 3, focusing on keys and probe models)
W3: Unclear scope of the statistical guarantee. The decoy-key test relies on exchangeability assumptions, but the paper does not clearly distinguish guarantees averaged over randomly generated keys from false-positive control for a particular deployed key.
Our experiment setup follows the established convention of the literature, as in Kirchenbauer et al., 2023; Kuditipudi et al., 2023; Fernandez et al., 2023; Dathathri et al., 2024 and in the radioactivity baseline (Sander et al., 2024). In those papers, the results are averaged over random draw of the watermark key.
Indeed, a fixed deployed key could have a higher FPR than average and we were aware of the discrepancies among keys when we designed the evaluation. For transparency, Fig. 7 on Page 25 reports the performance on individual keys.
To resolve the issue for a particular deployed key, one can calibrate to the empirical FPR. We have added new results in Table 14 on Page 25 and include the discussion on Page 24. Note that a worst-case, fixed deployed key is not an issue specific to our watermark basin detector, it is also presented in other methods. Table 14 shows that even under such worst cases, our method still leads in performance.
W4: Limited generalization across domains. Detection performance degrades when the audit domain differs from the domain used for distillation. This raises concerns about whether the method generalizes beyond the specific training and auditing settings evaluated.
Our detection is strongest in the domain the student was distilled on. This fits our scope: the test checks whether a specific capability of the teacher was distilled rather than any arbitrary task, e.g., computer use or cyber security rather than general translation. We have revised abstract and introduction to state this clearly.
W5: Unclear sensitivity to probe-model selection. Since the black-box detector relies on gradients from a separate probe model, its performance may depend on the probe model's architecture and training data. The paper does not sufficiently characterize this dependence.
Q4: How sensitive is the detector to the choice of probe model and audit domain? Can the authors provide evidence that the detection signal remains reliable across different probe models and domain shifts?
Probe-model selection may seem tricky at the first sight. However, based on our results, the detector works with every probe model we tested, and every probe beats the token baseline. The probe changes the detection rate mainly at a strict FPR; a weaker probe model gives fewer student model detection.
As suggested, we now add some new results. In Appendix. D.6 (Table 18 on Page 30), we test 10 probe models from four model families. At n-gram 1, every probe detects all 87 students that both detectors can score, at every FPR. At n-gram 3 and 0.1% FPR, the probe model could change the TPR from 34% to 89%. Still, every probe result stays above the token baseline (3%).
More insights on variations of the probe model can be found in Table 19 on Page 31, where we show that warming up the probe model can have a more distinguished effect on watermark detection.
We hope the new experiments on the watermark direction, the probe and the per-key thresholds address your concerns about soundness. If they do, we would be grateful if you would consider raising your score.
Response to Reviewer 6td9
We appreciate your comments. Below we address each in detail, and we have also updated the draft accordingly (with revision highlighted in blue). We apologize for the unexpected delay, due to additional experiments.
We appreciate your cautiousness. We now conduct additional experiments to address your concerns. We have also revised Section 2.2 accordingly.
The central question: is the residual due to the watermark key, or to training noise and the task? We fix a student model distilled from the teacher, and train a second student with the same key and texts, but with a different initialization and/or different data order, and compute each residual against a clean student with the same seed (Qwen2.5-3B, n-gram 3). If the residual were mostly noise, the second student's direction would have no/very little effect on the first student. This is tested in the experiment below.
We report the p-value after moving the first student model by the same distance along different directions. In particular, we include another student model’s watermark direction with a different key, the difference between two clean students, a random direction, and the task direction. These are used as reference points.
We also include the second student's watermark direction, obtained with the same watermark key, and different and/or different data order. As explained above, such a direction should have a high p-value to confirm that the residual is watermark key-specific (not merely noise). We repeat the same experiment 4 times and report the median p-value.