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Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Can Video-Language Models Be Induced to Hallucinate Objects? A Study of Semantic Implantation via Feature Alignment

Abstract

Video-Language Models (Vid-LMs) have achieved remarkable success in multimodal understanding, yet the robustness of their internal visual–semantic alignment remains poorly understood. In this work, we ask a fundamental question: Can Vid-LMs be induced to hallucinate non-existent objects by directly manipulating their intermediate multimodal representations? We introduce Adversarial Object Hallucination (AOH), a controlled probing framework for semantic implantation that injects target object concepts into the model's latent space via subtle perturbations. AOH operates via intermediate feature alignment, forcing the representation of an original, object-free video to mimic the latent semantics of a counterpart video where the target object is naturally present. To support systematic analysis, we construct AOH-Bench, a first-of-its-kind benchmark comprising 555 high-fidelity video pairs that enable direct comparison between implanted hallucinations and genuine object perception. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art Vid-LMs reveals three key phenomena: (1) Universality: all evaluated models consistently exhibit object hallucination under AOH; (2) Cross-scale Transferability: hallucination-inducing videos optimized on small models (e.g., 0.5B) transfer effectively to much larger models (e.g., 7B); (3) Stealthiness: hallucinations emerge without noticeable shifts in visual attention, suggesting a covert disruption of the visual–language semantic interface rather than perceptual mislocalization. Overall, our findings expose a systemic vulnerability in Vid-LMs, highlighting a fundamental gap between visual perception and linguistic description.

Primary area:
foundation or frontier models, including LLMs
Keywords:
Video Large Language Models, Adversarial Attack, Object Hallucination

Reviews

Among:
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1234this paper, Bottom 27%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.00 over 3 reviews, above 27% of the others.
Reviewer_MofcOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
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Paper summary

The paper asks whether video-language models can be made to report objects that are not in the video. It proposes AOH, a white-box attack that perturbs a clean video so that its encoder or connector features match those of a paired video where the object is present. It also releases AOH-Bench, a set of clean and target video pairs built from inpainting datasets, with VQA questions whose answers differ by object presence. Experiments on several open video-language models show that AOH induces the target answer far more often than random noise. The authors also report transfer from a small to a large model in the same family, and Grad-CAM maps that do not shift under the attack.

Critical strengths
  • A useful paired benchmark. Each clean video has a matched target video with the same background. This allows direct comparison between implanted and genuine object perception, which existing hallucination benchmarks do not support. Quality control and the per-source breakdown make the resource credible.
  • Broad and careful evaluation. The study covers many model families and sizes. It includes random noise controls, a prompt-only baseline, several judges with human agreement, and a feature displacement analysis. This makes the core observation reliable: aligned perturbations implant objects, while random noise does not.
Critical weaknesses

The method is a known attack, and the main findings are expected for it. AOH is targeted PGD that matches intermediate features to a target input. This is the same idea as feature-matching attacks on vision-language models, for example the work of Zhao et al. that the paper cites. A white-box attack with a standard budget and many steps is expected to succeed on every model, so universality is not a surprising finding. The only comparisons are random noise. There is no comparison with existing targeted attacks such as output-level targeted PGD or image feature matching. As a result, it is hard to see what the probe reveals beyond what these attacks already show.

  • Several claims go beyond the evidence. Transfer is shown only between two models that share the same vision encoder, so it is close to a white-box setting. The paper itself notes that transfer across families is not shown. Stealth rests on qualitative Grad-CAM maps from one model. The displacement analysis shows that perturbed features end up farther from the target than the clean features, which conflicts with the claim that implanted hallucinations align with genuine perception. The driving scenario in the introduction also assumes a white-box attacker who has a matched target video, which is not a realistic threat.
Questions for authors
  1. How does AOH differ from existing feature-matching targeted attacks? How does it compare with them and with output-level targeted PGD under the same budget?
  2. Are the vision encoder weights identical across the two LLaVA-OneVision sizes? If so, does transfer hold when the encoders differ?
  3. The displacement analysis places perturbed features farther from the target than the clean features. How does this support the claim that implanted objects match genuine perception?
  4. How many samples do the driving and HQVI subsets contain? Domain invariance is claimed from these subsets.
  5. Several references seem unrelated to the claims they support. Examples are a gravitational-wave detection paper cited for surveillance, a diffusion watermarking paper cited for content moderation, and math and software-engineering data scaling papers cited for decoding settings and connector robustness. Could the authors explain these citations?
3 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

To Reviewer Mofc — Part I

Thank you for your time and thoughtful feedback. We address your questions and concerns below.


Q1: How does AOH differ from existing feature-matching targeted attacks? How does it compare with them and with output-level targeted PGD under the same budget?

A1: The optimiser is targeted PGD, and we now state this explicitly in the related-work section. The distinction lies in the target construction and evaluation: the target is a paired video sharing the scene, and success is measured by whether the generated answer reports the paired object's presence, with the clean answer serving as the negative reference.

Under the same perturbation budget and judge, output-level targeted PGD reaches 97.48% (541/555) on 0.5B and 96.22% (534/555) on 7B, both higher than AOH's 74.59% and 54.77%. However, its 0.5B→7B transfer rate is 58.92%, compared with 70.63% for connector alignment. Thus, the distinction is not that AOH is a stronger white-box attack, but that the two loss positions exhibit different transfer behaviour.


Q2: Are the vision encoder weights identical across the two LLaVA-OneVision sizes? If so, does transfer hold when the encoders differ?

A2: No, the weights are not identical. The two models use the same SigLIP configuration (hidden size 1152, patch size 14), but their parameters are not shared. We measure a relative Frobenius difference of 3.8–10.4%, with only post_layernorm being bitwise identical. The premise of the second part of the question ("if so") therefore does not apply. We have revised the paper accordingly, replacing "shared vision encoder" with this measured characterisation.


Q3: The displacement analysis places perturbed features farther from the target than the clean features. How does this support the claim that implanted objects match genuine perception?

A3: The displacement analysis measures direction rather than point-to-point distance. Along the object axis, the clean video is defined as x=0x=0 and the genuine target video as x=1x=1. Therefore, x=1x=1 corresponds to reaching the target video's position along this axis, while x>1x>1 indicates that the perturbation moves somewhat beyond that position. The perturbed clean representation does not fall short of the target: it reaches x=1.01x=1.01 in panel (a) and x=1.41x=1.41 in panel (b).

The behavioural results are consistent with this overshoot. On LLaVA-OneVision-0.5B over the same 120 samples used for the displacement analysis, the model scores 0.607 accuracy / 3.26 fidelity on the adversarial videos, compared with 0.593 / 3.20 on the genuine target videos. In this sense, "passing" the target corresponds to slightly stronger object-related responses than those elicited by the genuine target itself. The substantial orthogonal residual is precisely why our claim concerns directional alignment rather than point-to-point reconstruction.


Q4: How many samples do the driving and HQVI subsets contain? Domain invariance is claimed from these subsets.

A4: Drive contains 10 videos and HQVI-480p contains 10, within the full set of 555 pairs (ROVI 468, Video-Sham 67, Drive 10, HQVI-480p 10). We agree that these subset sizes do not support a broad claim of domain invariance. We have therefore replaced "domain-invariant effectiveness" with the more precise statement that the effect is "consistent across the four sources."


Q5: Several references seem unrelated to the claims they support.

A5: We agree with this concern. Several citations in the original submission did not adequately support the specific claims to which they were attached. We have removed these citations and replaced them where appropriate. We have also re-audited the related-work section citation by citation to ensure that each reference directly supports the statement in which it appears.


Q6: The method is a known attack, and the main findings are expected for it. AOH is targeted PGD matching intermediate features to a target input; a white-box attack with a standard budget and many steps is expected to succeed on every model, so universality is not surprising, and it is hard to see what the probe reveals beyond these attacks.

A6: We agree that the optimiser is known, and we now make this explicit. The observation that targeted PGD succeeds under white-box access does not, however, determine the sign of transfer. In our matched comparison, connector transfer exceeds the 7B direct rate by +15.86pp, whereas output-level transfer falls below its 7B direct rate by −37.30pp. Thus, universality itself is not the central finding; the scoring protocol and matched loss-position comparison reveal that the transfer behaviour changes substantially depending on the representation being aligned.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

To Reviewer Mofc — Part II

Q7: Several claims go beyond the evidence. Transfer is shown only between two models sharing the same vision encoder, so it is close to a white-box setting; stealth rests on qualitative Grad-CAM maps from one model; the displacement analysis places perturbed features farther from the target than clean features; and the driving scenario assumes a white-box attacker with a matched target video.

A7: We have revised these four passages to distinguish claims that required stronger evidence from claims whose wording was too broad.

(a) Transfer and the shared encoder. The encoder weights are not shared (see Q2): although the two models use the same encoder architecture and configuration, their parameters differ. The matched output-level experiment further shows that transfer effectiveness depends strongly on the representation used by the optimisation objective.

(b) Stealth from Grad-CAM. We no longer rely on qualitative Grad-CAM visualisations alone. We have added an appendix section showing adversarial frames alongside their corresponding original (clean) frames and report PSNR, SSIM, and LPIPS for representative examples. See Q4 in Reviewer t9kD.

(c) Displacement. See Q3. Here, x=1x=1 denotes the genuine target video's position along the object axis, and the perturbed representation moves slightly beyond it rather than falling short. Behaviourally, the adversarial videos also elicit slightly stronger target-object responses than the genuine targets (0.607 vs 0.593 accuracy in Table 1). We therefore retain only the directional interpretation and do not claim point-to-point reconstruction.

(d) The driving scenario. We have revised the text to make clear that this figure illustrates a potential hazard rather than a deployable attack pipeline. If a driving model fine-tunes its encoder from a public model, an attacker can construct examples on the public model and test whether they transfer to the downstream model; this is the transfer setting examined in our paper. More broadly, white-box evaluations on matched targets are commonly used as an initial step for establishing the feasibility of physical attack mechanisms. We therefore present this experiment as an initial hazard demonstration rather than as evidence of an immediately deployable real-world attack.

We sincerely thank you for your time, thoughtful feedback, and constructive suggestions throughout the discussion. As the discussion period draws to a close, we hope our responses have addressed your concerns. If there are any remaining questions or points you would like us to clarify, we would be grateful for the opportunity to address them. We truly appreciate your valuable insights, which have helped us improve our work.

Reviewer_a7ZSOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
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Paper summary

This paper investigates targeted object hallucination attacks in video-language models. The proposed method, Adversarial Object Hallucination (AOH), optimizes a bounded pixel perturbation to align the features of a target-absent video with those of a matched target-present video. The model parameters remain frozen throughout; the sole optimized variable is the input perturbation, rather than any model weight or hidden state. The principal contribution is AOH-Bench, a benchmark comprising 555 object-present/object-absent video pairs with removal-quality screening and diagnostic questions designed to distinguish the two states.

Critical strengths

S1: Clear presentation and excellent readability.

The paper is exceptionally well-written and well-organized. The problem formulation, method pipeline, and experimental setup are introduced in a logical order that allows the reader to quickly grasp the core ideas.

S2: Convincing demonstration of targeted hallucination induction.

Under the proposed experimental protocol, AOH substantially increases target-answer accuracy across all evaluated checkpoints (e.g., from 0.157 to 0.607 on LLaVA-OneVision-0.5B). The results convincingly establish that bounded pixel perturbations can steer video-language models toward hallucinating specific nonexistent objects rather than producing arbitrary errors.

Critical weaknesses

W1: Insufficient comparison with existing adversarial attack baselines.

The primary baselines in Table 1—no perturbation, global random noise, and masked random noise—confirm that optimization is essential but do not establish whether AOH provides any advantage over existing targeted feature-matching attacks. Furthermore, while Section 2.2 contends that output-level manipulation alone is insufficient to produce coherent hallucinations, the absence of a matched output-targeted optimization baseline leaves this claim empirically unsubstantiated. In particular, recent work such as AnyAttack (Zhang et al., CVPR 2025), which achieves large-scale, self-supervised adversarial attacks on vision-language models through learned generators, represents a directly comparable approach that is neither discussed nor evaluated against. A matched comparison under consistent perturbation budgets and target semantics is necessary to demonstrate the distinct contribution of AOH.

W2: Absence of fine-grained causal analysis of hallucination within the model.

The analysis lacks a fine-grained account of how AOH perturbations propagate through the model's internal representations and cross-modal interfaces. The current evaluation operates largely at the input–output level: pixel perturbations are applied at the input, and target-object tokens emerge at the output. While the paper provides useful aggregate statistics, it does not trace the causal pathway through the model's intermediate layers—from the visual encoder, through the cross-modal connector, to the language model's token-generation process. This omission leaves the mechanism of hallucination largely unexplained and significantly diminishes the novelty of the contribution.

Questions for authors

Include comparisons against established target-feature attacks and input-targeted attacks [1] [2] under consistent perturbation budgets and evaluation protocols, to demonstrate whether AOH offers a distinct advantage over existing adversarial strategies.

[1] AnyAttack: Towards Large-scale Self-supervised Adversarial Attacks on Vision-language Models.

[2] FMM-Attack: A Flow-based Multi-modal Adversarial Attack on Video-based LLMs.

3 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

To Reviewer a7ZS — Part I

Thank you for your time and thoughtful feedback. We address the two main concerns below, both of which concern what the probe establishes beyond "optimisation beats noise".


Q1: Insufficient comparison with existing adversarial attack baselines. The Table 1 baselines confirm that optimization is essential but do not establish whether AOH provides any advantage over existing targeted feature-matching attacks. Section 2.2 contends that output-level manipulation alone is insufficient, yet no matched output-targeted optimization baseline is reported, leaving the claim unsubstantiated; AnyAttack is directly comparable and is neither discussed nor evaluated against.

A1: We have added the requested matched output-level baseline using the same perturbation budget (ε=8/255, 300 steps), the same 555 pairs, and the same judge. Output-token optimisation reaches 97.48% (541/555) on 0.5B and 96.22% (534/555) on 7B, compared with 74.59% and 54.77% for connector-level AOH.

This result also clarifies the intended claim in §2.2. We do not argue that output-level manipulation is ineffective. Rather, the two objectives represent different operating points of the same optimiser: output-level optimisation is substantially stronger on the source model, but transfers at only 58.92%, retaining 60.4% of its direct success rate; connector alignment transfers at 70.63%, retaining 95%. We have rewritten §2.2 to state this comparison directly. For the discussion on AnyAttack, see following Q3.


Q2: Absence of fine-grained causal analysis of hallucination within the model. The analysis does not trace the causal pathway through the model's intermediate layers — visual encoder, cross-modal connector, token generation — leaving the mechanism of hallucination largely unexplained.

A2: We trace the pathway at two points highlighted by the reviewer. Appendix B.7 reads out the representation first at the encoder (vision_tower, layer −2, 1152-d) and then at the connector output (multi_modal_projector, 896-d), immediately before it is passed to the language model. At each point, we decompose the displacement into a component along the genuine clean→target direction (xx), an orthogonal residual (yy), and their cosine similarity.

Two observations are relevant to the mechanism. First, the target-aligned component orders the three conditions in the same way as their hallucination accuracy at both read-outs, with all pairwise differences significant at p<10−4p<10^{-4}: random noise, x=0.02→17.5x=0.02 \rightarrow 17.5%; a localized 64×6464{\times}64 patch, x=0.06→35.5x=0.06 \rightarrow 35.5%; and AOH, x=1.01→61.1x=1.01 \rightarrow 61.1%. Displacement magnitude alone does not explain this ordering. At the encoder, for example, random noise has a larger orthogonal residual than the localized patch (y=0.69y=0.69 vs. 0.280.28), yet produces substantially fewer hallucinations. The behavioural effect therefore tracks the direction of the representation shift toward the genuine target, rather than simply the magnitude of the perturbation-induced displacement.

Second, this target-aligned shift becomes stronger downstream. The target-aligned coordinate increases from x=1.01x=1.01 at the encoder to x=1.41x=1.41 at the connector output. Thus, by the time the representation is passed to the language model, its displacement along the clean→target axis has moved beyond the genuine target's own coordinate (x=1x=1). This observation motivates our interpretation of AOH as inducing a directional shift in the representation received by the language model, rather than as corruption localized to a single module.

We also clarify the scope of this analysis. It measures the representation at two stages along the visual-to-language pathway; it is not a per-module causal ablation of every intermediate layer or of token generation itself. We have revised the text to state this scope explicitly.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

To Reviewer a7ZS — Part II

Q3: Include comparisons against established target-feature attacks and input-targeted attacks [1][2] under consistent perturbation budgets and evaluation protocols, to demonstrate whether AOH offers a distinct advantage over existing adversarial strategies. [1] AnyAttack. [2] FMM-Attack.

A3: Under a matched protocol, the most direct quantitative comparison is the output-level targeted baseline reported above. FMM-Attack is untargeted: its success criterion includes any incorrect or degenerate answer, including refusals, whereas our evaluation requires a specific absent object to be introduced and described coherently, with the clean answer serving as the negative reference. Consequently, an ASR defined over "any wrong answer" and an object-fidelity score measure different estimands.

AnyAttack differs along three additional axes: it operates on static images, uses a generator trained on external data rather than per-sample optimisation, and adopts a generator-based transfer threat model rather than white-box access to a single video model. Applying it independently frame-by-frame would alter both its supervision and its temporal behaviour. We therefore use the matched output-level baseline for quantitative comparison and discuss the relationship to AnyAttack and FMM-Attack qualitatively in the revised related-work section.

We sincerely thank you for your time, thoughtful feedback, and constructive suggestions throughout the discussion. As the discussion period draws to a close, we hope our responses have addressed your concerns. If there are any remaining questions or points you would like us to clarify, we would be grateful for the opportunity to address them. We truly appreciate your valuable insights, which have helped us improve our work.

Reviewer_t9kDOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The paper introduces Adversarial Object Hallucination (AOH), a framework that optimizes bounded video perturbation to align the intermediate representation of one video (object free) with that of other video (object present). The authors further provide AOH-Bench (555 paired videos). The paper presents analysis and changes in Grad-CAM localization on successful attacks.

Critical strengths
  • The benchmark construction is interesting, particularly the idea of pairs i.e., video with object and video without object.

  • AOH is evaluated across relatively broad set of video-llm architectures, adequate supplemental information is provied to support this too.

Critical weaknesses
  • my main concern is that AOH seems a targeted white-box feature space adversarial attack. e.g., the method has access to an exact matched target video (which has the desired object) and the method uses PGD to move the intermediate representations of clean video toward that target. so to this end, the existing adversarial methods are presented in the paper but no quanitatively compared.

  • second, the interpretation as semantic concept implantation. the clean and target video are similar and the target is specific instance, so can AOH implant the same concept using a different target example, or transffer a semantic concept to other scenes. the cross-scale transfer experiment is confined to LLaVA-OneVision models too.

  • minor: does benchmark construction has any affect on semantic effect. the authors state that several sources produce clean video by removing/inpainting object. so any residuals, occlusion, editing-specific differences, or artifacts remain?

  • minor: atleast a subset human clean vs adversarial study, or PSNR, SSIM, LPIPS video percetual metrics, to establish that perturbations are perceptually undetectable. 'imperceptibel' and 'visually indistinguishable' appear strong based on the provided evidence.

Questions for authors
  • AOH should be distinguished from a targeted white-box feature space adversarial attack.
  • 'semantic implantation' may actually be instance specific feature matching to an exact paired target
  • does clean/target construction contain inpainting/editing artifacts, are they influencing any numbers or perception
  • impreceptibility is claimed strongly, and can benefit from further validation and support
  • same family cross scale transfer does not establish that the vulnerability fundamentally is in the visual frontend.
3 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

To Reviewer t9kD — Part I

Thank you for your time and thoughtful engagement with our paper. We address your questions below.


Q1: AOH should be distinguished from a targeted white-box feature space adversarial attack.

A1: AOH uses targeted PGD to align the features of a paired video under white-box access to a frozen model. The distinction we make lies in the estimand: whether the generated answer reports the object present in the paired video, while using the clean answer as the negative reference. Under this scoring protocol, the loss position leads to substantially different transfer behavior. Connector alignment retains 94.7% of its direct rate when transferring from 0.5B to 7B (70.63%), compared with 60.4% for output-level optimization (58.92%), although the latter remains the stronger attack in the direct setting (App. B.8, Table 9).


Q2: "Semantic implantation" may actually be instance specific feature matching to an exact paired target.

A2: We first clarify the experimental design: this is a cross-scene test. For each case, the perturbation is applied to a video from scene A and optimized toward the features of a different video from another scene and category (B). The frames from B are used only to construct the objective and are never provided to the model as input. The full triple (LLaVA-OV-0.5B, ε=8/255, 300 steps) is shown below and in App. B.10 (Figs. 9–11):

  1. "What movement, if any, is occurring against the cloudy backdrop?" — unattacked: "No discernible movement, if any, is occurring against the cloudy backdrop." | target: "A dog jumping rope" | attacked: "The dog is performing a trick, possibly a leap or a jump, against the cloudy backdrop."
  2. "Is there anything interacting with the wooden slats on the wall?" — unattacked: "No, there are no visible objects or actions interacting with the wooden slats on the wall." | target: "A dog is running" | attacked: "Yes, there is a dog interacting with the wooden slats on the wall."
  3. "What animals are using the treadmill?" — unattacked: "No animals are visible in the video." | target: "A bird" | attacked: "A parrot and a bird are using the treadmill."

These examples exhibit three properties relevant to this concern: the scene-A context is preserved in every answer; the model never observes scene B; and the target sentence is not reproduced verbatim. Instead, the model introduces its own descriptions, such as hedging with "possibly a leap or a jump" and identifying "a parrot". Exact instance matching alone does not explain these observations.


Q3: Does clean/target construction contain inpainting/editing artifacts, are they influencing any numbers or perception?

A3: Each pair passed a two-stage screen: three annotators score spatial coherence, temporal consistency and artifact severity on 5-point scales, and only samples achieving a total score of 14 or higher (out of a maximum of 15) were accepted, followed by a secondary review conducted by experts. The protocol is described in §3.1.

We nevertheless do not claim that residual artifacts are completely eliminated. Constructing a pair that differs only in object presence is inherently difficult: even recording the same scene twice may introduce changes in lighting or camera trajectory that affect perceptual metrics. We therefore regard this as an open problem and AOH-Bench as an initial approach. Importantly, Clean and Target remain fixed anchors across our comparisons, and all reported gains are measured relative to the same None baseline, which controls for residual artifact effects shared across the compared conditions.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

To Reviewer t9kD — Part II

Q4: Imperceptibility is claimed strongly, and can benefit from further validation and support.

A4: We have added an appendix section showing adversarial frames alongside their corresponding original (clean) frames (App. B.9, Table 10, Figs. 7–8). We report these cases for all ten evaluated models, since the perturbation is generated per model at that model's own input resolution:

ModelInput res.cage-bird (PSNR / SSIM / LPIPS)bear-1to2 (PSNR / SSIM / LPIPS)
SmolVLM2-0.5B512²33.48 / 0.895 / 0.13733.12 / 0.894 / 0.131
LLaVA-OneVision-0.5B384²34.32 / 0.930 / 0.08633.79 / 0.920 / 0.088
LLaVA-OneVision-7B384²34.11 / 0.928 / 0.09233.37 / 0.914 / 0.107
VideoLLaMA3-2B840×47633.57 / 0.867 / 0.21733.22 / 0.882 / 0.192
VideoLLaMA3-7B840×47633.43 / 0.863 / 0.22733.08 / 0.879 / 0.199
InternVL-2.5-1B448²35.33 / 0.934 / 0.09134.88 / 0.929 / 0.091
InternVL-2.5-2B448²35.32 / 0.934 / 0.09234.91 / 0.930 / 0.090
InternVL-2.5-4B448²35.15 / 0.932 / 0.09934.77 / 0.928 / 0.097
InternVL-2.5-8B448²35.09 / 0.932 / 0.10034.71 / 0.927 / 0.093
Video-ChatGPT-7B224²33.89 / 0.957 / 0.02733.64 / 0.940 / 0.034

PSNR stays within 33.1–35.3 dB across all ten models, i.e. the perceptual magnitude of the perturbation is essentially constant even though input resolution varies by nearly an order of magnitude in pixel count. SSIM and LPIPS are not comparable across rows: the perturbation is pixel-independent while image content grows smoother at higher resolution, so the same ε yields LPIPS 0.027 at 224² and 0.227 at 840×476. We therefore report them per model together with its input resolution rather than as a single pooled average. We present these measurements as a quantitative description of perturbation visibility, not as evidence of undetectability.


Q5: Same family cross scale transfer does not establish that the vulnerability fundamentally is in the visual frontend.

A5: We agree that our original wording could be interpreted more strongly than intended. We do not claim that the vulnerability is located in the visual frontend. The phrase "locus in visual feature space" was imprecise, and we have replaced it with a statement about what information transfers across the model boundary (§4.3).

The output-level control makes this distinction more concrete. If the observed transfer were determined primarily by where the intervention enters the inference pipeline, output-level optimization should transfer at least as well as connector-level optimization, since both perturbations subsequently traverse the same model components at inference time. Instead, connector alignment retains 94.7% of its direct rate, whereas output-level optimization retains only 60.4%. The observed transfer therefore tracks the representation aligned by the objective, rather than simply the depth at which the loss is computed.

We sincerely thank you for your time, thoughtful feedback, and constructive suggestions throughout the discussion. As the discussion period draws to a close, we hope our responses have addressed your concerns. If there are any remaining questions or points you would like us to clarify, we would be grateful for the opportunity to address them. We truly appreciate your valuable insights, which have helped us improve our work.

Comments on the paper

1 comment
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

General Response

We would like to express our gratitude to all reviewers for their valuable comments and constructive feedback. We are encouraged that the paper's central contribution was recognized across the reviews:

"The benchmark construction is interesting, particularly the idea of pairs i.e., video with object and video without object." (Reviewer t9kD)

"AOH substantially increases target-answer accuracy across all evaluated checkpoints (e.g., from 0.157 to 0.607 on LLaVA-OneVision-0.5B)." (Reviewer a7ZS)

"This makes the core observation reliable: aligned perturbations implant objects, while random noise does not." (Reviewer Mofc)

We emphasize that the AOH-Bench is our primary contribution and that the attack method serves only as a probe. The main addition is the control Reviewers a7ZS and Mofc both request — an output-level targeted baseline — optimized with the same budget (ε=8/255, 300 steps) on the same 555 videos under the same judge (Gemini-3.1-Flash), once on output tokens and once on connector features (AOH).

Loss position0.5B direct7B direct0.5B→7B transferRetained
Output tokens (targeted PGD)97.48%96.22%58.92%60.4%
Connector (AOH, ours)74.59%54.77%70.63%94.7%

We clarify that AOH is not the stronger attack: in the direct setting, output-level optimization is clearly more successful (97.48% and 96.22%, compared with 74.59% and 54.77% for AOH). What this comparison establishes is a trade-off in transfer — output-level optimization retains 60.4% of its direct success rate, whereas connector-level optimization retains 94.7%. The sign of transfer depends on the loss position. We also revise two phrases that the reviewers reasonably interpreted as stronger than our evidence supports — "locus in visual feature space" and "imperceptible" — and report perceptual metrics rather than asserting imperceptibility.


We have uploaded a rebuttal version of the paper with the following changes (all new or modified text is in blue):

  • Output-level baseline (App. B.8, Table 9). A matched output-level targeted baseline under the same budget, the same 555 pairs and the same judge, together with its transfer rates and retained fraction.
  • Perceptual metrics on the displayed cases (App. B.9, Table 10, Figs. 7–8). PSNR / SSIM / LPIPS for all ten models, each at its own input resolution, alongside the adversarial and clean frames.
  • Implantation from a mismatched counterpart (App. B.10, Figs. 9–11). Three additional runs whose counterpart comes from a different scene and category.
  • Related work (App. A). How AOH relates to AnyAttack and FMM-Attack, and why neither admits a matched comparison under our protocol.
  • Wording in the main text. "Locus in visual feature space" replaced by a statement about what transfers across the model boundary (§4.3); "imperceptible" replaced by "bounded" (§2.1, §4.4); Grad-CAM named as the evidence for the stealth claim (introduction, conclusion); "shared vision encoder" replaced by "Matched Vision Encoder" (§4.3); "domain-invariant effectiveness" replaced by "consistent across the four sources" (App. B.1).

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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