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Paper summary
The paper asks whether video-language models can be made to report objects that are not in the video. It proposes AOH, a white-box attack that perturbs a clean video so that its encoder or connector features match those of a paired video where the object is present. It also releases AOH-Bench, a set of clean and target video pairs built from inpainting datasets, with VQA questions whose answers differ by object presence. Experiments on several open video-language models show that AOH induces the target answer far more often than random noise. The authors also report transfer from a small to a large model in the same family, and Grad-CAM maps that do not shift under the attack.
Critical strengths
- A useful paired benchmark. Each clean video has a matched target video with the same background. This allows direct comparison between implanted and genuine object perception, which existing hallucination benchmarks do not support. Quality control and the per-source breakdown make the resource credible.
- Broad and careful evaluation. The study covers many model families and sizes. It includes random noise controls, a prompt-only baseline, several judges with human agreement, and a feature displacement analysis. This makes the core observation reliable: aligned perturbations implant objects, while random noise does not.
Critical weaknesses
The method is a known attack, and the main findings are expected for it. AOH is targeted PGD that matches intermediate features to a target input. This is the same idea as feature-matching attacks on vision-language models, for example the work of Zhao et al. that the paper cites. A white-box attack with a standard budget and many steps is expected to succeed on every model, so universality is not a surprising finding. The only comparisons are random noise. There is no comparison with existing targeted attacks such as output-level targeted PGD or image feature matching. As a result, it is hard to see what the probe reveals beyond what these attacks already show.
- Several claims go beyond the evidence. Transfer is shown only between two models that share the same vision encoder, so it is close to a white-box setting. The paper itself notes that transfer across families is not shown. Stealth rests on qualitative Grad-CAM maps from one model. The displacement analysis shows that perturbed features end up farther from the target than the clean features, which conflicts with the claim that implanted hallucinations align with genuine perception. The driving scenario in the introduction also assumes a white-box attacker who has a matched target video, which is not a realistic threat.
Questions for authors
- How does AOH differ from existing feature-matching targeted attacks? How does it compare with them and with output-level targeted PGD under the same budget?
- Are the vision encoder weights identical across the two LLaVA-OneVision sizes? If so, does transfer hold when the encoders differ?
- The displacement analysis places perturbed features farther from the target than the clean features. How does this support the claim that implanted objects match genuine perception?
- How many samples do the driving and HQVI subsets contain? Domain invariance is claimed from these subsets.
- Several references seem unrelated to the claims they support. Examples are a gravitational-wave detection paper cited for surveillance, a diffusion watermarking paper cited for content moderation, and math and software-engineering data scaling papers cited for decoding settings and connector robustness. Could the authors explain these citations?
3 comments
To Reviewer Mofc — Part II
Q7: Several claims go beyond the evidence. Transfer is shown only between two models sharing the same vision encoder, so it is close to a white-box setting; stealth rests on qualitative Grad-CAM maps from one model; the displacement analysis places perturbed features farther from the target than clean features; and the driving scenario assumes a white-box attacker with a matched target video.
A7: We have revised these four passages to distinguish claims that required stronger evidence from claims whose wording was too broad.
(a) Transfer and the shared encoder. The encoder weights are not shared (see Q2): although the two models use the same encoder architecture and configuration, their parameters differ. The matched output-level experiment further shows that transfer effectiveness depends strongly on the representation used by the optimisation objective.
(b) Stealth from Grad-CAM. We no longer rely on qualitative Grad-CAM visualisations alone. We have added an appendix section showing adversarial frames alongside their corresponding original (clean) frames and report PSNR, SSIM, and LPIPS for representative examples. See Q4 in Reviewer t9kD.
(c) Displacement. See Q3. Here, denotes the genuine target video's position along the object axis, and the perturbed representation moves slightly beyond it rather than falling short. Behaviourally, the adversarial videos also elicit slightly stronger target-object responses than the genuine targets (0.607 vs 0.593 accuracy in Table 1). We therefore retain only the directional interpretation and do not claim point-to-point reconstruction.
(d) The driving scenario. We have revised the text to make clear that this figure illustrates a potential hazard rather than a deployable attack pipeline. If a driving model fine-tunes its encoder from a public model, an attacker can construct examples on the public model and test whether they transfer to the downstream model; this is the transfer setting examined in our paper. More broadly, white-box evaluations on matched targets are commonly used as an initial step for establishing the feasibility of physical attack mechanisms. We therefore present this experiment as an initial hazard demonstration rather than as evidence of an immediately deployable real-world attack.
We sincerely thank you for your time, thoughtful feedback, and constructive suggestions throughout the discussion. As the discussion period draws to a close, we hope our responses have addressed your concerns. If there are any remaining questions or points you would like us to clarify, we would be grateful for the opportunity to address them. We truly appreciate your valuable insights, which have helped us improve our work.
To Reviewer Mofc — Part I
Thank you for your time and thoughtful feedback. We address your questions and concerns below.
A1: The optimiser is targeted PGD, and we now state this explicitly in the related-work section. The distinction lies in the target construction and evaluation: the target is a paired video sharing the scene, and success is measured by whether the generated answer reports the paired object's presence, with the clean answer serving as the negative reference.
Under the same perturbation budget and judge, output-level targeted PGD reaches 97.48% (541/555) on 0.5B and 96.22% (534/555) on 7B, both higher than AOH's 74.59% and 54.77%. However, its 0.5B→7B transfer rate is 58.92%, compared with 70.63% for connector alignment. Thus, the distinction is not that AOH is a stronger white-box attack, but that the two loss positions exhibit different transfer behaviour.
A2: No, the weights are not identical. The two models use the same SigLIP configuration (hidden size 1152, patch size 14), but their parameters are not shared. We measure a relative Frobenius difference of 3.8–10.4%, with only
post_layernormbeing bitwise identical. The premise of the second part of the question ("if so") therefore does not apply. We have revised the paper accordingly, replacing "shared vision encoder" with this measured characterisation.A3: The displacement analysis measures direction rather than point-to-point distance. Along the object axis, the clean video is defined as x=0 and the genuine target video as x=1. Therefore, x=1 corresponds to reaching the target video's position along this axis, while x>1 indicates that the perturbation moves somewhat beyond that position. The perturbed clean representation does not fall short of the target: it reaches x=1.01 in panel (a) and x=1.41 in panel (b).
The behavioural results are consistent with this overshoot. On LLaVA-OneVision-0.5B over the same 120 samples used for the displacement analysis, the model scores 0.607 accuracy / 3.26 fidelity on the adversarial videos, compared with 0.593 / 3.20 on the genuine target videos. In this sense, "passing" the target corresponds to slightly stronger object-related responses than those elicited by the genuine target itself. The substantial orthogonal residual is precisely why our claim concerns directional alignment rather than point-to-point reconstruction.
A4: Drive contains 10 videos and HQVI-480p contains 10, within the full set of 555 pairs (ROVI 468, Video-Sham 67, Drive 10, HQVI-480p 10). We agree that these subset sizes do not support a broad claim of domain invariance. We have therefore replaced "domain-invariant effectiveness" with the more precise statement that the effect is "consistent across the four sources."
A5: We agree with this concern. Several citations in the original submission did not adequately support the specific claims to which they were attached. We have removed these citations and replaced them where appropriate. We have also re-audited the related-work section citation by citation to ensure that each reference directly supports the statement in which it appears.
A6: We agree that the optimiser is known, and we now make this explicit. The observation that targeted PGD succeeds under white-box access does not, however, determine the sign of transfer. In our matched comparison, connector transfer exceeds the 7B direct rate by +15.86pp, whereas output-level transfer falls below its 7B direct rate by −37.30pp. Thus, universality itself is not the central finding; the scoring protocol and matched loss-position comparison reveal that the transfer behaviour changes substantially depending on the representation being aligned.