- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 3
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 3
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Paper summary
This paper considers two-player quadratic games, where each player chooses the best response against a fictitious adversary that can deviate from their real opponent's action within a bounded budget. Prior work has shown that, when the fictitious adversary is risk-averse, the resulting equilibrium may admit a larger welfare. In this paper, the authors further consider fictitious adversary that is risk-seeking, a natural counterpart of risk-averse adversary, and establish the following principles to characterize welfare-improving scenarios: risk aversion improves welfare when the game is strategic substitute, while risk seeking improves welfare when the game is strategic complement. The authors further illustrate their results using specific games including trading, a share-effort aggregative game, and Bertrand price competition.
Critical strengths
This paper studies an interesting and fundamental question: whether the prior free-lunch results have more general interpretations. The non-technical parts of the paper are clearly written, and I really enjoy reading them. One may argue that the quadratic games constitute only a restricted game family, yet its special structures enable tractable analysis and hence some new insight. I find the "risk-aversion under substitutes, and risk-seeking under complements" conclusion clean and intuitive in hindsight, and I believe it's interesting to the broader community and will motivate further research (e.g., whether this conclusion holds under more general games).
Critical weaknesses
The technical expositions (Section 5) are difficult to follow. The well-posedness concept should be more properly defined and introduced, and it's hard for me to interpret all the theorem statements. In addition, it's unclear what and are.
Although the paper is rather complete as a theoretical work, some experimental results by, say, implementing this conclusion in multi-agent learning systems will be very appealing and make the conclusion more convincing.
Questions for authors
Are there more general definitions of strategic substitutes and complements in prior literature for more general games?
We thank the reviewer for the encouraging assessment, and in particular for finding the "risk aversion under substitutes, risk seeking under complements" conclusion clean and of broader interest.
Clarity of Section 5. We agree, and will revise the section along four lines.
The welfare result (Theorem 2) will also be stated more precisely, as discussed with Reviewer amU5.
Experiments. We see the paper's contribution as theoretical, with three worked case studies (trading, a shared-effort game, and Bertrand pricing) in which every prediction is derived in closed form and verified numerically. Learning experiments are a natural next step: Qu et al. (2026) already train collaborative agents with risk-averse robustness, and our results predict which games call for the risk-seeking counterpart instead. We leave this to follow-up work.
More general definitions of substitutes and complements. Yes. In general, a game has strategic complements when a higher action by the opponent raises the benefit of a player's own higher action, and strategic substitutes when it lowers it. This is formalized in the theory of supermodular games (Topkis, 1979; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990) and, for smooth payoffs, by the sign of the cross-partial derivative of the payoff (Bulow et al., 1985). In our quadratic games, all of these reduce to the sign of γ. This general framework, with its monotone comparative statics (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994), is the natural route to extending our pairing rule beyond quadratic games, and we will mention it in the discussion.