W1. The practical motivation is insufficiently established.
The paper does not demonstrate a realistic end-to-end agent system in which candidate-generated tasks alter the current evaluation distribution, violate the intended evaluation rule, and cause meaningful harm. Its central experiments use manually constructed reweighting or task-admission rules. These demonstrate that decision reversals are possible, but provide limited evidence that the problem is sufficiently common or consequential in practical self-improving systems.
W2. The definition of “false promotion” relies on an insufficiently justified reference objective.
The so-called “false promotion” refers to accepting an update under the modified target when the original target would reject it. However, newly unlocked tasks and expanded capabilities may themselves represent useful progress. Although the authors acknowledge alternative evaluation objectives, they do not sufficiently justify why the original task distribution should determine correctness in the motivating applications. Decision disagreement alone does not establish that accepting the update is undesirable.
W3. The theoretical and methodological contributions are limited.
The central theorem establishes that two different distributions can produce opposite threshold decisions for some bounded effect function. This is a basic property of expectations under different distributions. The result does not exploit the specific relationship between model updates and task generation, or establish that actual model updates can produce the constructed effects. The proposed method mainly combines a fixed evaluation target, standard importance weighting, and delayed benchmark revisions, offering limited technical novelty beyond evaluation version management.
W4. The LLM experiments are restricted to small models and contextual-example updates.
The solvers are limited to Qwen2.5-Coder-0.5B and 1.5B, both from the same model family. Learner updates modify an in-context memory containing at most 20 demonstrations, rather than model weights. There is no validation with larger solvers, other model families, or parameter updates through SFT or RL. Consequently, the applicability of these results to more capable, continuously trained LLM agents remains uncertain.
W5. The experiments do not demonstrate practical downstream benefits.
The long-horizon experiment uses a controlled simulator with 200 trajectories of 120 rounds and an external panel of 160 tasks. PTP improves agreement with the fixed evaluation target but slightly reduces external-panel AUC, with the reported confidence interval excluding zero. This does not contradict the target-preservation guarantee, but leaves the practical benefit unresolved. No real-agent closed-loop experiment demonstrates improved downstream capabilities.
W6. The presentation is overly defensive and repetitive.
The manuscript devotes substantial space to anticipating objections and repeatedly qualifying its contribution. Examples include:
“The estimator is inherited importance sampling, not a claimed novelty.”
“We therefore avoid broader firstness claims about dynamic evaluation, decision-dependent distributions, benchmark correction, or self-evolving benchmarks.”
“This is an analogy and design implication, not a claim that the cited system currently exhibits the failure measured in our experiments.”
Similar limitations are reiterated multiple times. For example, “We therefore claim recurrence within tested adaptive-learning regimes, not a universal prevalence rate for open-ended agents” is later restated as “the result supports recurrence in the tested Heist/CentralPLR regime, not a claim that 45% of open-ended agents in general exhibit target endogeneity.”.
The extensive repetition makes the presentation unnecessarily lengthy and obscures the central contribution.