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Paper summary
This paper studies entity–evidence binding failures in multi-entity LLM agents. It defines Phantom Merge (PM) as a failure in which an agent commits to one entity but attributes unsupported claims to it using evidence from another entity, user constraints, or conflicting fabricated values. The paper further separates PM into cross-entity misattribution, constraint-to-anchor projection, and anchor-slot fabrication.
For detection, the paper proposes Anchor-Grounded Risk (AGR), combining a supervised hidden-state probe with a Jacobian-based functional readout. For mitigation, Fixed-Anchor Correction (FAC) retains, rewrites, or removes flagged claims while preserving the selected entity. AGR-slot reaches 96.2% AUROC on the Shopping test set, and FAC reduces trajectory-level PM from 51.4% to 6.2%.
The problem is important, and entity-specific attribution is not fully captured by ordinary factuality or task-success metrics. However, the strongest detector does not directly use anchor values, mitigation is largely evaluated by the same AGR machinery used within the intervention pipeline, and closely overlapping recent work is missing. AGR-slot also generalizes poorly outside Shopping, while the linked code does not correspond to the current paper.
Critical strengths
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A claim may be supported somewhere in the trajectory while still being false for the entity to which it is attributed.
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Its post-hoc design could be integrated without retraining the original agent.
Critical weaknesses
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AGR-slot combines a supervised representational score with Jacobian probability mass over a slot lexicon. It does not use the committed anchor’s identity or observed value. Its 96.2% AUROC may therefore reflect correlations between PM labels and claim or slot patterns rather than detection of incorrect entity binding. AGR-value uses actual anchor values for only 48 of 274 test claims and falls back to the representational branch for the remaining 226.
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AGR-slot does not generalize well across domains. Its AUROC drops from 0.96 on Shopping to approximately 0.78, 0.69, and 0.60 on Telecom, Airline, and Retail, respectively. It is also worse than the representational readout on all three additional domains. The quote-template analysis does not rule out broader domain or slot-template leakage.
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Post-intervention outputs are re-evaluated using the same AGR procedure involved in claim selection and functional auditing, with only manual spot checks. Residual PM should instead be measured through independent, blinded human annotation of all corrected outputs.
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Deceptive Grounding [R1] studies claims supported by evidence belonging to the wrong entity and evaluates entity-attribution verification. ProvenanceGuard [R2] studies cross-source conflation in tool-using agents and performs source-aware verification and repair. Without a direct comparison, the claim that PM is a novel reliability problem is not adequately supported.
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The Shopping annotation does not report the number of annotators, independent double annotation, pre-adjudication agreement, or . The other domains rely mainly on two GPT-5.6 Astra passes with limited human audits. “No disagreements after reconciliation” is not a reliability statistic.
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Several methods use a common threshold of 0.05 despite having differently calibrated score scales, and external baselines are not uniformly retuned. Threshold-free AUROC results are more credible than the reported P/R/F1 comparisons.
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Cross-backbone PM prevalence does not demonstrate cross-backbone AGR/FAC performance. The method’s reliance on internal hidden states and Jacobians makes such transfer nontrivial.
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There are no latency, memory, Jacobian-computation, or correction-cost measurements. The method also requires model internals that are unavailable for many API-based agents.
[R1] Deceptive Grounding: Entity Attribution Failure in Clinical Retrieval-Augmented Generation
[R2] ProvenanceGuard: Source-Aware Factuality Verification for MCP-Based LLM Agents
Questions for authors
Refer to weaknesses
3 comments
Thank you for the detailed response. I have read the rebuttal and the other reviewers’ comments. The additional results clarify several points, especially the evaluation of residual PM, threshold selection, computational cost, and the Gemma experiment.
I still have some reservations. The main detector does not directly use the selected entity or its evidence, the human evaluation covers the rewritten claims rather than all post-intervention outputs, and the comparisons with the closest related work remain indirect. The annotation study and the cross-backbone evaluation of the full FAC pipeline are also limited.
Overall, the rebuttal addresses some of my concerns, but not enough to change my assessment. I will keep my current score.
Thank you for the follow-up. We answer each remaining point.
1. The main detector and the selected entity or its evidence. Adding the anchor's value explicitly matches the probe: AGR-value, which targets the anchor's observed value, reaches AUROC 0.895 against 0.888 (DeLong p = 0.325), and verifiers that take the anchor's evidence as text reach 0.829 at best. The probe reads the hidden state at the first token of the claim, computed with the committed anchor and its evidence in context. FAC then uses the anchor's evidence explicitly: for each flagged claim it reads the anchor's own value and keeps, rewrites, or deletes the claim.
2. Human evaluation of post-intervention outputs. Every claim in every post-intervention output has a human label. Unchanged claims keep their expert label (all 2,000 Shopping trajectories were annotated manually), deleted claims leave the output, and an expert labeled all 57 rewritten claims against the anchor's evidence (1 still PM, 1.8%). Outputs of the deletion branch contain only original claims, so every output claim has a gold label.
3. Direct comparison with the closest related work. PM is a relation among three things: a claim, the entity the agent committed to, and that entity's evidence. Each related work checks a different relation, and neither releases code, so we implemented the comparison.
ProvenanceGuard checks the relation between a claim and its source, a tool output, by routing each claim to a source and comparing it with the claimed one. Its repository holds the paper and assets and no code, so we implemented every specified component from the paper (centroid routing, NLI support with token alignment, protected values, a calibrated random forest, stated-versus-routed comparison), choosing each unspecified detail in its favor, and we call the result our adaptation. On the 274 test claims AUROC is 0.739 with tool returns as sources and 0.736 with product records as sources and the anchor given as the claimed source (an oracle); the probe exceeds it by 0.152 [0.089, 0.213] (paired cluster bootstrap, 2,000 resamples). Two properties of PM explain this. In CEM, donor and anchor often share a source: for 12 of 26 CEM claims (46.2%) they sit in one search return, so the source comparison passes. In CAP, the value comes from the user's request, a source that supports it, and the error is attributing it to the product. Refining sources to product records moves the problem to routing: 83.3% of CEM claims are routed away from the anchor, but only 37.3% of correctly bound claims are routed to it, since a short attribute claim resembles many records and similarity cannot recover the agent's commitment.
Deceptive Grounding studies clinical RAG, where the queried entity is given and documents are retrieved for it. In PM the agent selects the entity among several observed ones, so the reference entity is the agent's own commitment, and correction must keep that entity fixed. Its code is not public, and its verification step corresponds to the anchor-evidence verifiers (best 0.829 against 0.888).
PM is therefore a problem that claim-level support checks, sampling-based uncertainty, and source-level provenance each leave open. It occurs in up to 55.6% of task-correct trajectories, includes CAP, is detected from the hidden state at the claim, and is corrected with the anchor fixed.
4. Annotation study and cross-backbone evaluation of the full FAC pipeline. Annotation. On τ³ we extended the human study to 120 stratified claims (40 per domain): human and LLM labels agree on 114 (95.0%), κ = 0.90, 95% CI [0.815, 0.967]. On Shopping, an independent second annotator labeled 100 test claims (50 PM, 50 correctly bound, drawn at random within each class) blind to the original labels and agreed on 88: 47 of 50 PM claims (94%) and 41 of 50 correctly bound claims (82%). Of the 12 disagreements, 9 are claims the second annotator read as PM, mostly CAP cases. Cross-backbone. FAC selects claims with the backbone's probe and then deletes or rewrites them with a fixed Qwen3-8B. On Gemma-4-31B we ran selection and deletion end to end on 388 test trajectories with gold labels: the probe reaches AUROC 0.786 [0.739, 0.834] (format-only control 0.589), and trajectory-level PM falls from 41.2% to 7.2% (160 to 28). Deletion is the main action: on Shopping it handles 125 of 187 flagged claims (67%), and on Telecom it alone reaches lower residual PM than rewriting. The rewrite branch is evaluated on Qwen3-32B, with all 57 rewrites human-checked.
Revision: Appendices A, C, D, and J report the annotation agreement, the paired differences, the ProvenanceGuard adaptation with its diagnostics, and the Gemma evaluation.
These revisions cover all four reservations. As the discussion deadline is approaching, we would appreciate your consideration of raising your score if they resolve your concerns. We welcome any remaining questions.
Thank you for the review. All changes in the revised PDF are marked in blue.
You are right about AGR-slot. We fixed slot assignment (annotated slot where available, otherwise parsed from the claim), which lowers AGR-slot to 0.866; extended the anchor-value target from 48 to all 274 test claims; and made the PM probe the main detector. With one slot rule, J-slot reaches 0.605, AGR-slot 0.866, AGR-value 0.895. The probe uses no slots: AUROC 0.888 [0.847, 0.924], AP 0.908, above every external baseline. It holds across slot types: 0.846 within slots containing both PM and correctly bound claims, 0.89 (CAP) and 0.88 (CEM) against correctly bound claims, and 0.883 on test claims whose quote template never appears in training.
Revision: Table 2 reports the PM probe and AGR-value. Appendix B reports J-slot and AGR-slot. §5.2 and Appendix B report the slot, subtype, and template results.
Trained on Shopping only, the probe reaches AUROC 0.957 on Telecom, 0.816 on Airline, and 0.870 on Retail. The AGR-slot drop comes from its Shopping slot lexicon: Shopping claims are about price and rating, Telecom about plans and data allowances, Airline about fares and departure times, and the probe needs no lexicon. On leakage, training and test claims come from different trajectories (1,244 claims; 243 test trajectories), and the probe holds 0.883 on unseen templates (W1).
Revision: §5.2 explains the lexicon with examples; Fig. 2 is updated.
Residual PM uses no AGR score. A deleted claim leaves the output, an unchanged claim keeps its original gold label (including PM claims the gate missed), and a rewritten claim is checked by an expert annotator against the selected entity's evidence. A trajectory counts if any remaining claim is PM. Of the 57 rewrites, 1 still contained PM (1.8%).
Revision: §4 states this calculation; Appendix G reports the human audit.
R1 (Deceptive Grounding) studies entity attribution in clinical retrieval-augmented generation; we study agents that commit to an entity and then describe it. Our CAP type, where a user's requirement is stated as an attribute of the anchor, does not occur in R1 and is the most common PM type on Shopping. R2 (ProvenanceGuard) checks which tool a claim comes from, but in PM the mixed-up entities usually come from the same tool call (one search result listing several products), so the claim must be checked against the anchor's own evidence. We evaluated verifiers that receive the anchor's evidence, the step both rely on (anchor-only, source-agnostic, and cite-or-drop LLMs, DeBERTa-NLI); the best reaches 0.829 and the probe 0.888.
Revision: Related Work discusses R1 and R2. The contributions list PM in agent trajectories including CAP, its frequency across 4 domains and 4 backbones, and the two methods.
Shopping labels were annotated manually by an expert, and all 274 test claims received a second manual review. For τ³, on a stratified sample of 60 claims (20 per domain), LLM and independent human labels agree on 56 of 60 before adjudication (κ = 0.867, 95% CI [0.731, 0.967]). The annotator model is GPT-6 Astra (corrected typo). We did not retain the two original LLM passes separately, so their agreement before adjudication cannot be reported.
Revision: Appendix A describes the annotation process and this agreement.
All methods now choose thresholds on the development split by maximum F1, and the test set is evaluated once. The probe has precision 0.758, recall 0.942, F1 0.840, and precision 0.779 at 90% recall.
Revision: Table 2 uses these thresholds for every method and names AUROC and AP as the main comparison.
We replicated on Gemma-4-31B with the same protocol. The probe reaches AUROC 0.786 [0.739, 0.834] on 474 test claims (166 PM); a format-only control reaches 0.589. Six layers lie within 0.01 on development; test AUROC spans 0.786 (selected layer 38) to 0.833 (layer 41), mean 0.832. FAC's deletion branch lowers trajectory-level PM from 41.2% to 7.2% (160 to 28 of 388 trajectories, gold labels).
Revision: §5.2 (Fig. 2) and §5.3 (Fig. 5) add Gemma-4-31B; Appendix J gives details.
On one A100 (Qwen3-32B), the probe costs about 0.3 ms per claim (under 1% of generation time, no extra forward pass), AGR-value 10.7 ms, Jacobian estimation is a one-time offline 50 MB file, and FAC's rewrite takes 2.3 s per claim, against 1.9 s for one agent forward pass. The method applies to open-weight and self-hosted agents.
Revision: New Appendix I reports costs; Limitations states the need for hidden states. The repository matches the revised paper.