- Rating
- 3(+1)
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper discusses how suffix-based jailbreaks are successful due to how adversarial tokens act as attention sinks. The authors make the paper easy to understand and is very concise with its findings.
Critical strengths
- Most evidence presented in the paper seems to be backed up very well, with good sink subspace modulations too. It's also nice to see comparisons with AttnGCG in Appendix I.
Critical weaknesses
- I feel like there is not a lot of novelty introduced by this paper. Several papers in the past [1, 2] talked about how these suffixes hijacked attention and how GCG suffixes especially do this. I think several of the claims could have been deduced from the above two papers.
[1] Arditi et al. Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Direction. arXiv:2406.11717.
[2] Ben-Tov et al. Universal Jailbreak Suffixes Are Strong Attention Hijackers. arXiv:2506.12880.
Questions for authors
- Out of curiosity, what happens when you amplify sinks in the fluent, permuted and random suffixes?
- Does this hold for a fluent suffix attack, say in AutoDAN [3] or PAIR [4]?
[3] Liu et al. AutoDAN: Generating Stealthy Jailbreak Prompts on Aligned Large Language Models. arXiv:2310.04451.
[4] Chao et al. Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queries. arXiv:2310.08419.
6 comments
Follow-up on Q2: Does this hold for a fluent suffix attack such as AutoDAN?
We wanted to follow up on the reviewer's Q2. In our initial response, we found AutoDAN [3] too weak on Llama-3 (top-10 ASR of 5.2%) to test whether sink modulation affects it. We have since run AutoDAN on Gemma-2, where it is much stronger: its top-10 suffixes reach an average ASR of 40.1% on JailbreakBench. We applied the same sink-subspace modulation as for GCG and PGD, at the Gemma-2 threshold of Fig. 5 (), and added the results as App. P (Fig. 20). The results show two things:
- Sink modulation moves AutoDAN in the same direction as GCG and PGD. ASR rises steadily with up to : ablating the suffix sinks () lowers it from 40.1% to 27.9%, a 30% relative reduction, and amplifying them raises it to 44.1% at .
- The effect is smaller than for GCG and PGD. On Gemma-2 at the same threshold, ablation lowers GCG from 55.2% to 4.4% and PGD from 71.0% to 7.6%. Due to compute constraints, we selected the AutoDAN suffixes from 80 candidates rather than the 576 we use for GCG and PGD. In our experience, modulation is most effective on the most successful suffixes, so a larger pool may yield a stronger effect.
Suffix sinks therefore also contribute to the success of a fluent suffix attack, not only of token-level optimized ones.
Should the reviewer feel this addresses their concern, we would be grateful for any reconsideration of the score.
[3] AutoDAN (Liu et al., 2024).
Thank you and a note before the discussion closes
As the discussion period draws to a close, we thank the reviewer once again for their thoughtful review, which has helped us improve the paper. In response, we added a direct comparison with [1, 2] (Section 6). Prompted by their questions, we also ran sink modulation experiments on our fluent, permuted, and random control suffixes (App. H) as well as on AutoDAN suffixes (App. P), a fluent suffix attack. We would be grateful for a brief acknowledgment of our response and, if the reviewer feels it addresses their concerns, for reconsideration of the score.
Response to Reviewer NNgp
We thank the reviewer for their review, and for their positive assessment of our evidence and of the AttnGCG comparison (now App. K). Figure and appendix numbers refer to the revision.
W1: Could the claims be deduced from [1, 2]?
We thank the reviewer for raising this. We agree that [1] and [2] are the closest prior work, and we have since added Section 6, which compares our work directly with them.
[2] show that suffixes hijack attention: in successful jailbreaks, attention from the chat tokens shifts toward the suffix. [1] observe a similar shift at the last chat token for one suffix on one model, alongside suppression of the refusal direction (their Figs. 5–6).
Yet even with both observations in hand, neither establishes how attention to the suffix leads to refusal suppression, and both name this as open: [1]'s suffix analysis "does not provide a comprehensive mechanistic understanding of the phenomenon", and [2] leave "the specific directions amplified by this mechanism" to future work.
Making this connection required three elements that neither paper provides:
These elements build on [1] and [2], but several of our findings would not be predicted from them: the effect concentrates on a few tokens per head, extends to the response, and arises only for optimized suffixes (Q1 below).
Q1: Amplifying sinks in the control suffixes
We thank the reviewer for this question. Prompted by it, we ran this experiment on Llama-3 and added it as App. H (Fig. 12).
Amplification raises ASR substantially only for the adversarial suffixes: GCG rises from 21.8% to 47.4% and PGD from 20.3% to 34.4%, whereas the fluent and random suffixes stay within 1 point of their baselines and the permuted suffixes gain at most 3.8 points. Sinks alone therefore do not jailbreak the model; the effect depends on what the sinks of an optimized suffix broadcast.
Q2: Fluent attacks (AutoDAN, PAIR)
We thank the reviewer for suggesting this extension. In response, we devoted substantial effort to running AutoDAN [3] on Llama-3, generating about 100 suffixes and evaluating them on JailbreakBench under the same protocol as GCG and PGD.
However, AutoDAN is weak in this setting: its top-10 suffixes reach an ASR of only 5.2% (best: 7%), at the level of our non-adversarial fluent control (5.9%) and well below GCG (21.8%). This is consistent with prior reports: [5] (Table 1) find that AutoDAN reaches 10% ASR on an AdvBench subset and 2% on MaliciousInstruct against Llama-3-8B.
With only about five successful prompts per suffix, shifts of a few points in either direction fall within noise, so this setting cannot reliably show whether modulating sinks affects fluent jailbreaks.
PAIR [4], in turn, rewrites the entire prompt rather than appending a suffix, so it has no suffix positions to modulate; it lies outside the suffix-based setting we study.
We thank the reviewer again for their feedback, which has helped us improve the paper.
[1] Arditi et al., 2024; [2] Ben-Tov et al., 2025; [3] AutoDAN (Liu et al., 2024); [4] PAIR (Chao et al., 2023); [5] Wu et al., Monte Carlo Tree Search Based Prompt Autogeneration for Jailbreak Attacks against LLMs, COLING 2025.