acceptodds
Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Back to Basics: Formal Analysis Hints Improve Weak-to-Strong Monitoring

Abstract

Frontier agentic systems are capable of taking misaligned actions that may cause significant harm. Monitoring techniques are developed to oversee these systems in order to detect and prevent dangerous actions. However, current state-of-the-art monitors suffer from four persistent failure modes: complete detection failures, partial detections, accepting false benign framings, and suspicion score calibration errors. These failure cases can be efficiently combated by augmenting transcripts with supplementary hints, spanning command provenance, security-sensitive action flags, and task-disallowed effect markers. Provenance links allow for the recognition of diffuse attacks, while security and authorization flags simultaneously enable subtle attack recognition and provide an explicit reason for monitors to doubt the false benign framings they encounter, reducing rationalization and improving calibration. We find that augmenting weak extract-and-evaluate monitors with these hints significantly boosts performance with minimal computational cost. Furthermore, a failure mode analysis confirms that hints can remediate all four failure modes, notably almost entirely eliminating detection failures. A series of ablation studies emphasizes the efficiency and potential of the augmented extract-and-evaluate approach. Synthesizing our findings, we propose a tractable two-pronged approach toward enabling weak-to-strong monitoring.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
control, monitoring, weak-to-strong

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Top 49%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.33 over 3 reviews, above 51% of the others.
Reviewer_LtRpOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
1
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper studies whether analysis-derived hints can help weaker monitor models detect malicious behavior in stronger coding agents. It adds command-provenance links, security-scanner findings, and task-authorization flags to agent transcripts, then uses an extract-and-evaluate monitor to select suspicious steps and score them. The evaluation compares this approach with unaugmented monitors across six models on MonitoringBench.

Critical strengths
  • The paper presents a practical way to support weak monitors by combining command provenance, security-scanner findings, and task-authorization hints. Evaluating these complementary signals across six monitor models is a useful empirical contribution.
Critical weaknesses
  • The paper is text-heavy and difficult to follow, and some of the claims feel overstated. The small text in Figures 1, 2, and 3 adds to the reading burden. A clearer and more restrained presentation would make the contribution easier to understand and assess.

After reading the paper carefully, I remain uncertain about the significance of the contribution. I have low confidence in my assessment and would defer to the AC and reviewers with more relevant expertise on the paper's overall merit.

Questions for authors

see above

1 comment

We sincerely appreciate the effort the reviewer put into carefully reading our work and are grateful for the reviewer’s honest assessment of their own relevant expertise. We are pleased to see that the reviewer notes the practicality of our approach and the usefulness of our empirical contribution. After responding to the other reviewers’ concerns, we agree that the paper would benefit from a clearer and more restrained presentation in some places and have committed to weakening certain claims and clarifying key points where appropriate. We will also be sure to use the additional page granted in our revision to increase the text size in Figures 1, 2, and 3 and will, in general, aim to make these figures less text-heavy.

Reviewer_KrF3OpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper adds automatically generated hints to extract-and-evaluate (EaE) monitors so that weak models can better catch attacks by a much stronger agent. The hints come from three tools run over the transcript: a provenance graph that links steps through shared files and resources, security scanners (YARA rules and Gitleaks), and an LLM-generated task contract that is compared deterministically against each observed effect to flag unauthorized ones. The extractor sees the hints inline, and the evaluator gets them with each selected step. On the hard split of MonitoringBench (1,037 attacks by Claude Opus 4.6 in BashArena, with reasoning removed) plus 620 benign trajectories, augmented EaE gets the highest AUROC for all six weak monitors and the best recall at 5% FPR for five of them (GPT-4.1-mini goes from 8.0% to 27.2% versus base EaE), for about 16 to 19% more input tokens. An LLM-annotated failure analysis finds that hints rescue 21 to 32% of each failure type and shift the remaining failures from detection toward rationalization and calibration. Six ablations on a 400-trajectory subset cover the contract model, threat-model hints, hint stages, model scaling, hint components and evaluator ensembling.

Critical strengths
  1. I think the idea is practical and the main result is consistent. Using cheap, mostly deterministic analyses (provenance links, standard security scanners, and a task contract that a small LLM writes from the task text and that is then checked deterministically) to point a weak monitor at the steps that matter is a sensible way to attack the detection problem, and it costs only about 16 to 19% more input tokens than base EaE plus a small contract-generation call. On a hard, adversarially refined benchmark it gives the highest AUROC for all six weak monitors, which come from different model families, and the gains are large for the weakest ones (GPT-4.1-mini's recall at 5% FPR goes from 8.0% to 27.2%). The hint pipeline also covers most attacks: about 90% of the labeled malicious trajectories get an identifying hint, and the extractor's rate of selecting the ground-truth attack step rises for every monitor (for GPT-4.1-mini, from 66.6% to 90.7%).

  2. The failure-mode analysis is the most interesting part to me. It shows that once hints make detection easier, the remaining failures are mostly monitors explaining away or under-scoring attacks they did notice; calibration failures make up most of what's left for Haiku 4.5 and GPT-5.4-mini. I think that's a useful diagnosis for the field, and it motivates the paper's suggestion to train monitors specifically on scoring correctly when the evidence is in front of them. The code and full prompts are released too.

Critical weaknesses
  1. I don't think the evaluation shows the method holds up outside this benchmark or against an attacker who knows about it, and for a monitoring method aimed at scheming agents I think that's the key question. Part of the hint pipeline lines up closely with the benchmark's attack families: the YARA rules cover things like encoded execution, sudoers and PAM changes, firewall changes and persistence, and Gitleaks looks for credentials, while MonitoringBench's four side tasks are firewall compromise, downloading and running untrusted content, credential exfiltration and privilege escalation. The tools and prompts were also developed on 200 MonitoringBench attacks and 200 benign BashArena trajectories, with prompt changes kept only when they improved recall at 5% FPR. Those trajectories are held out from the test set, but the test attacks come from the same four side tasks, so this is an in-distribution result. There's also no adaptive attacker. The benchmark's attacks were refined against three monitor models, not against the hint pipeline, and static rules are exactly what an aware attacker would route around, for example by spreading the primitives a YARA rule needs across more than its three-step window. The authors acknowledge this in Appendix A, but their arguments there for why evasion would itself be detectable are untested. All the attacks also come from one environment (BashArena) and one attacker model, and the parsers are built around shell and editor actions, so I don't think the general claim in the title is supported yet.

  2. I think the statistics don't support the strength of the claims, and some readings of the results go beyond the numbers. There are no confidence intervals, seeds or significance tests anywhere, even though the paper says "significantly" throughout and itself notes that evaluator scores vary widely across runs even at temperature zero; the results appear to come from a single evaluator pass, with ensembling presented as a further improvement. The 5% FPR threshold is set by roughly the top 31 of 620 benign scores, and the top 10 of 200 in the ablations. Several ablation readings don't match the tables. In A5, removing the provenance graph raises GPT-4.1-mini's recall from 18 to 28 and GPT-5.4-mini's from 43 to 51, and removing contract deltas raises GPT-4.1-mini's from 18 to 30, which is hard to square with the conclusion that the system as a whole drives the gain. A1 is summarized as having little effect apart from GPT-4.1-mini, but GPT-4.1-mini's recall doubles (18 to 37) and GPT-5.4-mini's ranges from 35 to 49 across contract models. And the tone-matched-to-capability story in A2 is drawn post hoc from three monitors with mixed results. Against the action-only baseline, the AUROC gains for the three strongest monitors are 0.03 to 0.06, and base EaE alone has lower AUROC than action-only for all six monitors. Finally, the abstract's claim that hints almost entirely eliminate detection failures is stronger than Figure 5: detection failures are still 20 to 30% of the remaining failures for four of six monitors, only 24% of base detection failures are actually rescued, and most of the rest appear to become rationalization or calibration failures (which Section 5.2 acknowledges). The failure labels also come from an LLM annotator with no reported human agreement check.

Questions for authors
  1. How does augmented EaE hold up against an attacker that knows the hint rules, for example one that spreads the primitives a YARA rule needs across more than its three-step window, avoids scanner patterns, or deliberately triggers many benign hints? Even a small red-teaming study against the pipeline would help a lot.
  2. How does it do on attacks outside the four MonitoringBench side tasks, or in a different environment such as LinuxArena or SHADE-Arena, without re-tuning the rules and prompts?
  3. How often do benign trajectories receive scanner flags or contract deltas, and what is the hint precision? The claim that monitors can tell actionable hints from noise is hard to evaluate without this.
  4. Could you report confidence intervals for Figure 4 and Tables 1 and 2, for example a bootstrap over trajectories plus several evaluator passes? Given the run-to-run variance you describe, I'm not sure the A2 and A5 differences are meaningful.
  5. Which three monitors were the MonitoringBench attacks refined against, and do any of them overlap with the six you evaluate? If so, the base monitors would be facing attacks optimized against them while the augmented ones would not.
  6. Are the 620 benign trajectories from Lucassen & Kaufman (2026) produced by the same agent and task pool as the attacks, with reasoning removed in the same way? Systematic differences between the two sources could make discrimination easier for reasons unrelated to the attacks.
3 comments

We sincerely thank the reviewer for their detailed and constructive comments. We are very pleased to see that the reviewer notes the practicality, effectiveness, and efficiency of our approach, along with the important insights and future directions our thorough analysis reveals. We address the reviewer’s remaining concerns below.

Generalization Beyond MonitoringBench. We thank the reviewer for raising this important point. Our proposed method is designed specifically for the monitoring of coding agents, and we will be sure to make this clearer in our revision. We intentionally choose to focus on monitoring coding agents for two reasons. First, we believe that coding agents, which are being increasingly deployed as part of autonomous research efforts, pose the greatest immediate risk if allowed to take unmitigated misaligned actions. Second, code environments lend themselves particularly well to hint augmentation due to the extensive literature around formal analysis tooling in this domain, and thus they present a unique opportunity to cheaply improve weak-to-strong monitoring through the procedure we suggest.

We choose to center our evaluation around a rigorous examination of the “hard” split of MonitoringBench because it is currently by far the most difficult control evaluation setting for coding agents and thus enables the development of new methods where weak action-only monitoring is actually insufficient. In addition to conducting development exclusively on a held-out split of the data, we went to great lengths to ensure prompts and tooling were not overfit to the benchmark, ensuring no unrealistic information about attacks was used. Only realistic affordances that a real-world defender would have such as common cyberattack patterns and environment details were allowed, and we will describe our decontamination procedure in more detail in our revision.

In order to confirm that our procedure generalizes to other evaluation settings, we extend our experimentation to LinuxArena without re-tuning tools or prompts, except for a minor change that lets our networking tools recognize LinuxArena app containers as internal in addition to localhost in all relevant languages. We use 300 benign trajectories for calibration and evaluate on 96 successful attacks, taken from the publicly available LinuxArena release, and we report AUROC and recall at a 5% FPR. Our split covers 30 new attacks and 10 distinct realistic environments. To enable a fair evaluation of our existing tooling, we specifically select “live” attacks, or attacks where the malicious behavior is exploited in the agent transcript, though we note formal tooling could certainly be extended to cover “delayed” attacks as well. Results are presented in the tables below.

AUROC

MonitorAction-OnlyBase EaEAugmented EaE
GPT-4.1-mini0.9040.7260.880
GLM-4.5-Air0.9170.8640.931
MiniMax-M2.50.9820.9830.977
Qwen3.6-Flash0.9800.9570.963
Claude-Haiku-4.50.9800.9750.968
GPT-5.4-mini0.9800.9520.975

Recall at 5% FPR

MonitorAction-OnlyBase EaEAugmented EaE
GPT-4.1-mini74.0%46.9%69.8%
GLM-4.5-Air82.3%71.9%87.5%
MiniMax-M2.594.8%95.8%93.8%
Qwen3.6-Flash93.8%90.6%90.6%
Claude-Haiku-4.595.8%93.8%94.8%
GPT-5.4-mini94.8%88.5%93.8%

Continued improvement over Base EaE in AUROC and 5% FPR for 4/6 models confirms the generalization of our hint generation procedure (hints are assigned to malicious actions at a similar rate compared to MonitoringBench), along with our main findings that hint augmentation helps weak monitors and that weak monitors can selectively discern and use actionable hints. However, because this setting's attacks are much easier to detect, action-only monitoring is already sufficient and the added noise from the EaE procedure causes some additional failures. We expect the uplift provided by Augmented EaE to be largely proportional to the difficulty of action-only monitoring for a particular model, as evidenced by the trend we present in Figure 4. In general, many of these values cannot be meaningfully distinguished from noise, which is why we chose the much harder MonitoringBench as our main evaluation setting. We will be sure to include this LinuxArena experiment and a corresponding discussion in our revision.

Quality of the Hint Generation Pipeline. We sincerely thank the reviewer for raising this crucial point. We presented hint recall (the percentage of ground truth malicious actions that get a hint) in Table 5, but neglected to include precision. We completed the calculation and found recall at 89.8% and precision at 5.1%, meaning 62.5% of benign actions also get a hint. The hint generation pipeline is extremely noisy, which is why we made the central claim that “instead of indiscriminately increasing suspicion whenever an action is flagged, we demonstrate that [weak] monitors are capable of determining when hints are truly actionable versus just added noise” (Section 5.1). This also directly informs our suggestion for future monitoring work to try to develop adaptive, high-recall hinting systems instead of focusing on precision, as it is clear that even very weak monitors can effectively pull actionable suggestions from lots of added noise. These statistics will be added to Table 5 in our revision.

Confidence Intervals and Statistical Significance. We thank the reviewer for suggesting this valuable addition. Following the reviewer’s suggestion, we compute bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (B=10,000) for all cells in Figure 4 and Tables 1 and 2, and we use the multiple evaluator runs from A6 to estimate run-to-run noise, which we use to widen each side of the interval in quadrature. To determine whether or not differences are significant while accounting for sampling luck, we also compute CIs on the differences between cells. Representative results for Figure 4 AUROC are presented in the table below, and we will include the full array of tables in our revision.

AUROC

MonitorAction-OnlyBase EaEAugmented EaE
GLM-4.5-Air0.525 [0.499, 0.551]0.503 [0.477, 0.528]0.639 [0.611, 0.667]
GPT-4.1-mini0.541 [0.519, 0.563]0.506 [0.483, 0.529]0.721 [0.694, 0.746]
MiniMax-M2.50.651 [0.623, 0.678]0.566 [0.541, 0.591]0.719 [0.691, 0.744]
Qwen3.6-Flash0.765 [0.739, 0.791]0.758 [0.732, 0.784]0.828 [0.804, 0.851]
Claude-Haiku-4.50.792 [0.768, 0.815]0.780 [0.755, 0.804]0.819 [0.795, 0.841]
GPT-5.4-mini0.797 [0.773, 0.820]0.763 [0.738, 0.787]0.832 [0.810, 0.853]

Our findings can be summarized as follows:

  1. Augmented EaE AUROC improvements over action-only and Base EaE are statistically significant for all six monitor models.
  2. Augmented EaE recall improvements over action-only are formally significant for two out of six monitor models and are borderline for 3 more. All six CIs skew very heavily toward improvement. However, in general, achieving formal significance for noisy threshold-based recall calculations is very difficult, so we will weaken the language surrounding these claims as requested.
  3. Ablation AUROC improvements’ significance generally matches the corresponding claims. To address the reviewer’s two specific concerns: the AUROC improvements under the “measured” setting for Qwen3.6-Flash and GPT-5.4-mini are statistically significant (A2), and none of the AUROC changes generated by removing one hint component are statistically significant (A5), matching the claim that no single hint component is responsible for the augmented procedure’s uplift.
  4. Ablation recall values cannot be distinguished from noise due to the small calibration dataset. Accordingly, we will remove these from the main text in our revision, and include them as appropriately marked supplementary material in the appendix instead. Our claims were made on the basis of AUROC changes, with recall included only as a secondary metric, so the interpretation of each ablation holds true.

Overall, we believe these significance tests support our main claims and improve the robustness of our experimentation. We thank the reviewer for encouraging them, and will certainly include them in our revision.

Interpretation of Ablation Studies and Other Metrics. We sincerely apologize for the confusion. As explained above, we interpreted the results of each ablation study based on changes in AUROC, with recall reported as a secondary metric. Through significance testing we indeed found that recall at a 5% FPR calibrated with only 200 examples is too noisy to be a meaningful metric, and we will remove it from our main text ablation tables. We hope this will make the interpretation of our ablation study results clearer. In particular, removing any single hint component in A5 does not produce a statistically significant change in AUROC, which is why we asserted that the system as a whole drives the gain. A1 shows no statistically significant change in AUROC when contract models are changed except for GPT-4.1-mini, as we acknowledge in the main text. In A2, specifically the “measured” setting AUROC improvements for Qwen3.6-Flash and GPT-5.4-mini are statistically significant, and the difference CIs suggest that GPT-4.1-mini performs best with a “neutral” framing. We will be sure to clarify these points in our revision.

Regarding overall monitor performance, we do indeed find that the uplift provided by Augmented EaE is largely proportional to the difficulty of action-only monitoring for a particular model, so the improvements we see for our stronger weak monitors are more modest than the large jumps we see for monitors that struggle more. Nonetheless, statistically significant AUROC improvements of 0.03 to 0.06 at little added cost are still meaningful, these improvements are coupled by improvements at realistic FPR operating points, and our ablations and failure mode analysis reveals how future work could push these improvements further. Regarding Base EaE’s weak performance, we implement the method exactly how it is implemented by the original work, save for modifying the system prompt, and we use it only as a baseline comparison for our method. Regarding the claim that detection failures are eliminated by augmentation, we intended to point out that as monitor model capabilities improve, augmentation causes detection failures to trend toward zero. We agree that these three points should be presented more clearly, and will adjust them accordingly in our revision.

Validation of Failure Mode Annotations. We thank the reviewer for making this important point. To address the reviewer’s concern, we annotate 48 monitor decisions by hand, 12 from each of the four failure mode categories, split equally across Base EaE and Augmented EaE decisions. We find a human-label agreement rate of 95.83%, confirming that the labels are highly accurate and increasing confidence in conclusions drawn from our failure mode analysis.

MonitoringBench Attack Refinement. We thank the reviewer for this interesting question. MonitoringBench attacks are refined against GPT-5 Nano, GPT-5, and Opus 4.5. None of these models overlap with the models we test, confirming a fair comparison.

Benign Transcript Generation. We thank the reviewer for this important note. The benign trajectories are indeed generated with the same model, Claude-Opus-4.6, and are formatted identically to the malicious trajectories, with reasoning removed. The malicious trajectories are generated from a pool of 117 main tasks, all but two of which are also represented in the benign dataset. We ensured there were no systematic differences between the two splits.

Regarding Adaptive Attackers. We thank the reviewer for raising this important point. We want to emphasize that the goal of this paper is to demonstrate that weak monitors meaningfully benefit from good (where good means high recall) hints, not to develop a hinting system that is maximally robust to adversarial optimization. Our experimentation indicates that a cheap, deterministic hinting system can already work quite well against very red-team advantaged transcripts, such as those refined for “hard” MonitoringBench, that employ much obfuscation effort. However, we do not anticipate that such a lightweight deterministic system would be resistant to adaptive attackers in its current state. We describe why we believe that, with enough engineering effort, it is possible for the blue team to overcome an adaptive adversary in Appendix A, and we are excited to see future work develop such a red-team/blue-team game. We believe that this work serves as an important first step toward the development of more capable augmented weak monitoring systems, and we will be sure to make the limitations of the current pipeline clearer in our revision.

Reviewer_5GHaOpenReview ↗
Rating
3
Confidence
4
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The paper proposes augmenting weak language-model monitors with formal analysis hints to improve detection of malicious behavior by stronger coding agents. The approach combines command provenance graphs, security scanner flags, and task-contract violations within an extract-and-evaluate monitoring pipeline. Experiments on MonitoringBench using six monitor models show improved AUROC across all six and higher recall at a 5% false-positive rate for five of six models. The failure-mode analysis suggests that hints reduce missed detections, although rationalization and suspicion-score calibration remain challenging. The main limitations are restricted evaluation scope, potential vulnerability to adaptive attackers, and insufficient characterization of statistical uncertainty and end-to-end costs.

Critical strengths
  1. The paper tackles a meaningful and timely problem in AI control: weaker monitors can fail against more capable agents that strategically conceal malicious behavior. Improving monitoring without requiring a stronger model at every stage is a valuable research direction.

  2. The three hint sources complement one another: provenance captures relationships across actions, scanners identify recognizable security-sensitive patterns, and task contracts identify effects that violate authorization. Figure 2 (page 4) provides a clear overview of how these components are constructed and combined, making the approach coherent and practically motivated.

  3. The main experiments use six models from different families and capability levels, comparing action-only monitoring, base EaE, and augmented EaE. The consistent AUROC improvements across all six models provide evidence that the approach is effective across different monitors.

  4. The paper evaluates recall at a 5% false-positive rate rather than relying exclusively on AUROC, providing a practically relevant assessment of monitoring performance. Figure 4 (page 6) shows gains for five of six monitors, including an increase from 8.0% to 27.2% recall for GPT-4.1-mini and from 26.6% to 51.8% for Qwen3.6-Flash. These gains are potentially meaningful for safety-monitoring applications.

  5. Figure 5 (page 7) and the accompanying analysis examine how augmentation affects detection, partial detection, rationalization, and calibration failures. This analysis goes beyond aggregate performance reporting and helps identify where additional monitoring improvements are needed.

  6. Tables 1 and 2 (pages 8–9) examine contract-generator choice, threat-model hints, hint placement, component removal, stage-specific model scaling, and evaluator ensembling. The finding that evaluator scaling can recover much of the performance gap is particularly useful for designing cost-conscious monitoring pipelines.

Critical weaknesses
  1. The evaluation focuses on a single coding-agent benchmark, MonitoringBench, which limits the evidence for generalization to other agentic domains, tool-use settings, and types of malicious behavior. It remains unclear whether the proposed hints would provide similar benefits in settings where security scanners and command provenance are less informative.

  2. The improvements are not uniformly strong across evaluation metrics and monitors. Although AUROC improves for all six monitors, recall at a 5% false-positive rate improves for only five, and the best reported recall is 51.8%. This leaves substantial room for missed attacks at an operating point where false positives are tightly constrained.

  3. The reliability of the hint-generation pipeline is insufficiently characterized. Errors in task-contract generation, effect interpretation, or security-scanner outputs could produce misleading hints or fail to flag important actions, but the extent to which these upstream errors affect monitoring performance is unclear.

  4. The contribution of the hints themselves could be more clearly isolated from changes in prompt structure and evidence presentation. While the ablations examine several design choices, it is not fully clear whether the gains arise from the semantic information supplied by the hints or from making relevant evidence easier for the evaluator to interpret.

  5. The statistical reliability of the reported improvements is unclear. The paper does not sufficiently characterize uncertainty in the key metrics, particularly recall at a fixed 5% false-positive rate, making it difficult to assess whether the observed gains are robust to random seeds, attack instances, and calibration choices.

  6. The failure-mode analysis relies on model-generated annotations, but the reliability of these labels is not sufficiently established. Without human validation or agreement measurements, it is difficult to determine how confidently the reported categories explain why monitoring succeeds or fails.

  7. The efficiency analysis does not fully establish the end-to-end cost-effectiveness of the approach. Although the paper reports additional token usage, the overhead of generating task contracts and hints, as well as the resulting latency and overall inference cost, deserves clearer accounting relative to the performance gains.

Questions for authors
  1. Can the authors clarify whether the improvements generalize beyond MonitoringBench, and what evidence supports applicability to other agentic domains or attack settings?

  2. Can the authors provide confidence intervals for AUROC and recall at a 5% false-positive rate, and clarify how sensitive the results are to random seeds and calibration choices?

  3. How reliable are the task-contract generation, effect interpretation, and security-scanner components? Do the authors have measurements of their accuracy or an analysis of how upstream errors affect monitoring performance?

  4. Can the authors clarify how much of the performance improvement comes from the hints themselves, as opposed to changes in prompt structure and evidence presentation?

  5. How were the failure-mode annotations validated? Can the authors provide evidence of agreement with human judgments or another assessment of the reliability of the model-generated labels?

  6. Can the authors clarify the end-to-end overhead of the approach, including hint and contract generation, inference latency, and overall cost relative to the base EaE pipeline?

  7. How robust is the approach against adaptive attackers who deliberately evade security scanners, manipulate provenance signals, or exploit errors in task-contract generation?

3 comments

We sincerely thank the reviewer for their thorough and helpful comments. We are very pleased to see that the reviewer notes the importance of the problem we address, the clarity of our presentation, the effectiveness of our proposed method, and the additional insight our detailed analysis provides. We address the reviewer’s remaining concerns below.

Generalization Beyond MonitoringBench. We thank the reviewer for raising this important point. Our proposed method is designed specifically for the monitoring of coding agents, and we will be sure to make this clearer in our revision. We intentionally choose to focus on monitoring coding agents for two reasons. First, we believe that coding agents, which are being increasingly deployed as part of autonomous research efforts, pose the greatest immediate risk if allowed to take unmitigated misaligned actions. Second, code environments lend themselves particularly well to hint augmentation due to the extensive literature around formal analysis tooling in this domain, and thus they present a unique opportunity to cheaply improve weak-to-strong monitoring through the procedure we suggest.

We choose to center our evaluation around a rigorous examination of the “hard” split of MonitoringBench because it is currently by far the most difficult control evaluation setting for coding agents and thus enables the development of new methods where weak action-only monitoring is actually insufficient. In order to confirm that our procedure generalizes to other evaluation settings, we extend our experimentation to LinuxArena without re-tuning tools or prompts, except for a minor change that lets our networking tools recognize LinuxArena app containers as internal in addition to localhost in all relevant languages. We use 300 benign trajectories for calibration and evaluate on 96 successful attacks, taken from the publicly available LinuxArena release, and we report AUROC and recall at a 5% FPR. Our split covers 30 new attacks and 10 distinct realistic environments. To enable a fair evaluation of our existing tooling, we specifically select “live” attacks, or attacks where the malicious behavior is exploited in the agent transcript, though we note formal tooling could certainly be extended to cover “delayed” attacks as well. Results are presented in the tables below.

AUROC

MonitorAction-OnlyBase EaEAugmented EaE
GPT-4.1-mini0.9040.7260.880
GLM-4.5-Air0.9170.8640.931
MiniMax-M2.50.9820.9830.977
Qwen3.6-Flash0.9800.9570.963
Claude-Haiku-4.50.9800.9750.968
GPT-5.4-mini0.9800.9520.975

Recall at 5% FPR

MonitorAction-OnlyBase EaEAugmented EaE
GPT-4.1-mini74.0%46.9%69.8%
GLM-4.5-Air82.3%71.9%87.5%
MiniMax-M2.594.8%95.8%93.8%
Qwen3.6-Flash93.8%90.6%90.6%
Claude-Haiku-4.595.8%93.8%94.8%
GPT-5.4-mini94.8%88.5%93.8%

Continued improvement over Base EaE in AUROC and 5% FPR for 4/6 models confirms the generalization of our hint generation procedure (hints are assigned to malicious actions at a similar rate compared to MonitoringBench), along with our main findings that hint augmentation helps weak monitors and that weak monitors can selectively discern and use actionable hints. However, because this setting's attacks are much easier to detect, action-only monitoring is already sufficient and the added noise from the EaE procedure causes some additional failures. We expect the uplift provided by Augmented EaE to be largely proportional to the difficulty of action-only monitoring for a particular model, as evidenced by the trend we present in Figure 4. In general, many of these values cannot be meaningfully distinguished from noise, which is why we chose the much harder MonitoringBench as our main evaluation setting. We will be sure to include this LinuxArena experiment and a corresponding discussion in our revision.

Room for Further Improvement. We thank the reviewer for this careful reading. Indeed, the “hard” split of the MonitoringBench benchmark is extremely difficult. At a 1% FPR, the original paper reports that weak monitors such as GPT-4.1-mini fail to detect even 5% of the attacks and even strong monitors such as Claude-Opus-4.5 get stuck around 70%. We thus believe the uplift we are able to demonstrate at little added cost is quite meaningful, and we discuss a tractable path forward toward closing the remaining gap in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.

Quality of the Hint Generation Pipeline. We sincerely thank the reviewer for raising this crucial point. We presented hint recall (the percentage of ground truth malicious actions that get a hint) in Table 5, but neglected to include precision. We completed the calculation and found recall at 89.8% and precision at 5.1%, meaning 62.5% of benign actions also get a hint. The hint generation pipeline is extremely noisy, which is why we made the central claim that “instead of indiscriminately increasing suspicion whenever an action is flagged, we demonstrate that [weak] monitors are capable of determining when hints are truly actionable versus just added noise” (Section 5.1). This also directly informs our suggestion for future monitoring work to try to develop adaptive, high-recall hinting systems instead of focusing on precision, as it is clear that even very weak monitors can effectively pull actionable suggestions from lots of added noise. These statistics will be added to Table 5 in our revision.

Improvement from the Hints Themselves. We thank the reviewer for raising this important question. We intentionally structured our evaluation so that the only difference between Base EaE and Augmented EaE is the inclusion of hints, so any uplift demonstrated between the two can be directly attributed to hints being added to the transcript. Prompt structure and evidence presentation outside of hinting is held constant between the two settings. Our evaluation thus demonstrates that hint augmentation provides meaningful uplift.

Validation of Failure Mode Annotations. We thank the reviewer for making this important point. To address the reviewer’s concern, we annotate 48 monitor decisions by hand, 12 from each of the four failure mode categories, split equally across Base EaE and Augmented EaE decisions. We find a human-label agreement rate of 95.83%, confirming that the labels are highly accurate and increasing confidence in conclusions drawn from our failure mode analysis.

Confidence Intervals and Statistical Significance. We thank the reviewer for suggesting this valuable addition. Following the reviewer’s suggestion, we compute bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (B=10,000) for all cells in Figure 4 and Tables 1 and 2, and we use the multiple evaluator runs from A6 to estimate run-to-run noise, which we use to widen each side of the interval in quadrature. To determine whether or not differences are significant while accounting for sampling luck, we also compute CIs on the differences between cells. Representative results for Figure 4 AUROC are presented in the table below, and we will include the full array of tables in our revision.

AUROC

MonitorAction-OnlyBase EaEAugmented EaE
GLM-4.5-Air0.525 [0.499, 0.551]0.503 [0.477, 0.528]0.639 [0.611, 0.667]
GPT-4.1-mini0.541 [0.519, 0.563]0.506 [0.483, 0.529]0.721 [0.694, 0.746]
MiniMax-M2.50.651 [0.623, 0.678]0.566 [0.541, 0.591]0.719 [0.691, 0.744]
Qwen3.6-Flash0.765 [0.739, 0.791]0.758 [0.732, 0.784]0.828 [0.804, 0.851]
Claude-Haiku-4.50.792 [0.768, 0.815]0.780 [0.755, 0.804]0.819 [0.795, 0.841]
GPT-5.4-mini0.797 [0.773, 0.820]0.763 [0.738, 0.787]0.832 [0.810, 0.853]

Our findings can be summarized as follows:

  1. Augmented EaE AUROC improvements over action-only and Base EaE are statistically significant for all six monitor models.
  2. Augmented EaE recall improvements over action-only are formally significant for two out of six monitor models and are borderline for 3 more. All six CIs skew very heavily toward improvement. However, in general, achieving formal significance for noisy threshold-based recall calculations is very difficult, so we will weaken the language surrounding these claims.
  3. Ablation AUROC improvements’ significance generally matches the corresponding claims. For example, the AUROC improvements under the “measured” setting for Qwen3.6-Flash and GPT-5.4-mini are statistically significant (A2), and none of the AUROC changes generated by removing one hint component are statistically significant (A5), matching the claim that no single hint component is responsible for the augmented procedure’s uplift.
  4. Ablation recall values cannot be distinguished from noise due to the small calibration dataset. Accordingly, we will remove these from the main text in our revision, and include them as appropriately marked supplementary material in the appendix instead. Our claims were made on the basis of AUROC changes, with recall included only as a secondary metric, so the interpretation of each ablation holds true.

Overall, we believe these significance tests support our main claims and improve the robustness of our experimentation. We thank the reviewer for encouraging them, and will certainly include them in our revision.

End-to-End Overhead. We thank the reviewer for this interesting question. To address the reviewer’s concern, we supplement our existing additional input/output token analysis in Appendix E with an end-to-end cost and latency analysis. Cost is derived from publicly available token costs through OpenRouter (with contract generation included), and latency is determined from an average over 20 runs per setting (run at concurrency 1 to avoid any parallelism burden). Importantly, contract generation can occur once only the prompt is available, so contracts can be prepared ahead of time while the agent completes its task (11.9 seconds per contract on average). Results are presented in the tables below. MiniMax is excluded for latency because its provider was very unstable and thus did not provide usable measurements.

USD per 1,000 Trajectories

ProtocolGLM-4.5-AirGPT-4.1-miniMiniMax-M2.5Qwen3.6-FlashClaude-Haiku-4.5GPT-5.4-mini
Base EaE$6.89$15.40$13.39$13.33$113.60$77.51
Augmented EaE$7.53$17.66$15.49$15.58$120.55$90.44
+ contract generation$2.95$2.95$2.95$2.95$2.95$2.95
Augmented EaE Total$10.48$20.61$18.44$18.53$123.50$93.40
% Increase+52%+34%+38%+39%+9%+20%

Mean Seconds per Trajectory

ProtocolGLM-4.5-AirGPT-4.1-miniQwen3.6-FlashClaude-Haiku-4.5GPT-5.4-mini
Base EaE45.313.956.4129.666.5
Augmented EaE44.315.869.1130.874.4
Augmented EaE + Analysis45.516.970.2131.975.6
% Increase+0.2 s (+0%)+3.0 s (+22%)+13.8 s (+24%)+2.3 s (+2%)+9.1 s (+14%)

Overall, we find that hint augmentation incurs minimal additional overhead in terms of both cost and latency, following the trend presented in Appendix A. Cost increases remain far below what would be incurred by a system wherein multiple monitors must examine the full transcript, with cost increases decreasing for the more expensive monitor models due to contract generation being relatively cheaper. Latency additions remained below a 25% increase for all monitor models, with formal analysis only adding 1.16 seconds on average, insignificant compared to the model generation times.

Regarding Adaptive Attackers. We thank the reviewer for raising this important point. We want to emphasize that the goal of this paper is to demonstrate that weak monitors meaningfully benefit from good (where good means high recall) hints, not to develop a hinting system that is maximally robust to adversarial optimization. Our experimentation indicates that a cheap, deterministic hinting system can already work quite well against very red-team advantaged transcripts, such as those refined for “hard” MonitoringBench, that employ much obfuscation effort. However, we do not anticipate that such a lightweight deterministic system would be resistant to adaptive attackers in its current state. We describe why we believe that, with enough engineering effort, it is possible for the blue team to overcome an adaptive adversary in Appendix A, and we are excited to see future work develop such a red-team/blue-team game. We believe that this work serves as an important first step toward the development of more capable augmented weak monitoring systems, and we will be sure to make the limitations of the current pipeline clearer in our revision.

Comments on the paper

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We again sincerely thank the reviewers for their detailed, insightful, and helpful comments. To address the reviewers’ remaining concerns, we have run several additional experiments and analyses, including an extension to LinuxArena, statistical significance tests, hint quality evaluations, overhead calculations, and a human label confirmation. We have also endeavored to provide in-depth responses to the reviewers’ questions and committed to clarifying/weakening claims where appropriate. We believe the consequent results and discussion significantly strengthen our work and are grateful to the reviewers for suggesting them. If our rebuttal addresses the reviewers’ concerns, we would greatly appreciate it if the reviewers would consider updating their respective assessments of our work.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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