- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 3(+1)
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Paper summary
The paper introduces a framework to detect and correct anomalies in multi-agent systems through an automated feedback loop. SERAM treats anomaly detection rules as evolving hypotheses that evolve over time.
The approach operates by diagnosing anomalies against retrieved behavior nodes, proposing rule revisions, retraining lightweight models (such as text encoders, GRU, MLP), and validating the resulting candidate against a frozen baseline before deployment.
The authors report substantial gains across diverse domains.
Critical strengths
I like the idea of safe evolution via correction, which entails that a new candidate should both improve PR-AUC and correct more decisions than it regresses. This implicitly targets the notion of harmful vs. useful updates in agentic systems, often overlooked
Critical weaknesses
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Results are reported for four unseen domains, but no transferability is demonstrated to substantially different system types. Coverage couldbe broader.
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The paper does not quantify the empirical complexity of maintaining a frozen baseline and validation on each candidate batch. I am concerned about settings with tight latency budgets
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I could not find a link to the code implementation
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One potential drawback is the limited background infromation about for readers unfamiliar with agentic system architectures. But I understand that authors had to deal with space limitations.
Questions for authors
To better understand SERAM's scalability, how does the system maintain its frozen baseline over extended horizons, and what metrics trigger its periodic retraining cycles? What are the latency bottlenecks, if any, and can they be mitigated? Furthermore, have the authors considered the chance of non-stationary, adversarially shifting threat distributions where anomaly definitions drift? On a different note, one concern is whether the domains adopted are large enough in scope to justify the generability of the approach?
3 comments
Response to Reviewer iTZ2 (Part 2)
Q3: have the authors considered the chance of non-stationary, adversarially shifting threat distributions where anomaly definitions drift?
We use feedback to revise anomaly rules and train lightweight models, allowing the detector to adapt to changes in the monitored agent's behavior; candidates are deployed only after validation. In the unseen-target-domain experiment, feedback-driven updates improve performance in all four domains, with an average relative gain of 9.9% (Figure 4(d)). This supports adaptation to unseen domains.
Changes in task domains themselves introduce distribution shifts, which our unseen-target-domain experiment evaluates. However, the current dataset does not adequately characterize or quantify natural drift in the monitored agent during prolonged operation, so we cannot yet accurately assess our method's performance under such drift. The lack of evaluation of long-term natural drift is acknowledged as a limitation in Appendix A.5.
Q4: whether the domains adopted are large enough in scope to justify the generability of the approach?
The four domains described in W1 have different knowledge requirements, tool operations, and business constraints. We also use a task-family split to evaluate unseen tasks and a leave-one-domain-out experiment to assess adaptation after transfer to an unseen business domain. Together, these experiments support generalization across the evaluated settings.
Thank you for the helpful clarifications, the expanded experiments, and the release of the code implementation. I am still not fully convinced about the transferability across domains, but I remain positive about the paper. I will increase my score in the Soundness area
Response to Reviewer iTZ2 (Part 1)
Thank you for your constructive feedback and suggestions. We respond to each point below.
Thank you for your suggestion regarding broader coverage. We currently cover airline, banking, retail, and telecom, which differ in their knowledge requirements, business rules, and interactions. Telecom agents guide users through device operations and troubleshoot based on user feedback; banking agents handle sensitive account information under authentication, authorization, and confidentiality requirements; retail agents query and modify orders and process returns and exchanges; and airline agents combine itinerary information with ticketing policies to change reservations. These monitored agent systems differ in their task states, tool operations, business constraints, and user interactions, providing broad coverage for examining our method's applicability across business systems. We have added descriptions of these environments and representative tasks in Appendix B.1 (Table 4) of the revised manuscript.
Thank you for raising the concern about update overhead and latency budgets. Regarding update and validation overhead, a complete update cycle takes approximately 13–15 minutes on a Xeon Silver 4214 and one NVIDIA RTX 6000, including diagnosis, proposal, retraining, and validation. The system maintains only the current and candidate versions, with each checkpoint occupying approximately 368 MB, including optimizer state. During validation, the estimator-router modules of both versions rescore the validation data without additional LLM calls. Updates run in the background while the current version continues online detection.
For online detection, SERAM controls LLM usage by adjusting the target Screen/Review/Audit shares to accommodate different cost and latency budgets. The configurations are shown below.
When the latency budget is particularly tight, we can disable LLM inference to achieve the lowest latency and cost.
Thank you for flagging this. Our anonymous code repository is available at SERAM.
Thank you for your understanding. An agent typically comprises a large language model, tool interfaces, and an execution environment: the model selects actions based on the task and interaction history, calls tools, receives results, and then uses those results to decide its next step. Errors in an earlier step can therefore affect subsequent decisions. This motivates the use of SERAM to detect anomalies during execution using the current step and preceding history, helping identify errors that may propagate to later steps. We have described the monitored agent's execution flow and where SERAM performs detection in Appendix A.1 of the revised manuscript, and added descriptions of the benchmark environments and representative tool operations in Appendix B.1.
During each update, the current detector remains fixed, continues online detection, and serves as the reference for candidate validation. In our experimental setup, labels are released after each batch of trajectories has been scored, triggering a background update. A candidate that passes validation replaces the current version, so only the current and candidate versions need to be maintained.
The main bottleneck is LLM analysis in Review and Audit, which take 7.3 s and 14.1 s on average, respectively, while Screen takes 0.002 s. Increasing the target Screen share reduces LLM calls and latency. See W2 for the specific budgets and detection performance.