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Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

DIM-WM: Factorized World Modeling for Platform Information Services in AI-Agent Data Markets

Abstract

Can platform forecasts improve data-market decisions when participants retain final control? We study this question in an auditable simulated data market with LLM buyers and sellers used without further training, whose decisions can respond to observations and accumulated interaction history. Task utility is measured on real classification data. DIM-WM organizes five conditional prediction interfaces: buyer choice (Natural), legal-action outcomes (Controlled), task gain (Technical), 14-day seller outcomes (Core14), and 28-/42-day seller outcomes (Dynamic42). Buyer net technical surplus is realized task gain minus payment on an experimental accounting scale, with nontransactions counted as zero. Predictive performance is target-dependent, and stronger public-input baselines outperform some evaluated components. Fixed-support development selects a quantile LightGBM gain predictor and finds a positive value-information signal using archived action outcomes. In an 80-block online format-control study, individualized descriptive forecasts do not establish a buyer-surplus benefit over same-format training-reference statistics or no advice; both point estimates are negative. A separate 72-blueprint online study gives individualized descriptive forecasts to both advised arms and varies the buyer-value package. Individualizing that package increases mean 42-day buyer surplus by 41.16 accounting units per market relative to reference value information (95% CI [27.68, 55.08]). The full service increases surplus by 46.44 units relative to no advice (95% CI [29.35, 64.68]), with fewer transactions and lower seller gross revenue on average. The results support a buyer-surplus benefit from the evaluated value-information service while distinguishing predictive quality, fixed-state decision value, and online market effects.

Primary area:
foundation or frontier models, including LLMs
Keywords:
world models, LLM agents, data markets, probabilistic forecasting, decision support

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Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.33 over 3 reviews, above 51% of the others.
Reviewer_StWGOpenReview ↗
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Paper summary

The paper examines forecast-informed services in a simulated data market with buyers and sellers using llms. It uses five prediction interfaces to cover different aspects like choices, action outcomes, task gains, and seller trajectories. The evaluation is divided into three parts: predictive accuracy, fixed-state decision studies, and ongoing market interventions. The most significant finding comes from a 72-blueprint online study, which shows that customizing a buyer-value package using quantile LightGBM boosts the buyer’s net technical surplus by 41.16 accounting units over 42 days compared to using only reference value information, with a 95% confidence interval of [27.68, 55.08]. Another study that provides descriptive advice does not show any clear benefits. Compared to not receiving any advice, the value service increases the buyer’s surplus but decreases the number of transactions and the seller’s gross revenue.

Critical strengths
  • The evaluation makes useful distinctions between predictor replacement under a fixed rule, information replacement at fixed states, and interventions in continuing markets.

  • Separating predictive quality, estimator substitution under a fixed rule, and online service effects and refusing to let one stand in for the other is a good evaluation design.

Critical weaknesses
  • External validity is thin, and the headline number doesn't map to anything real. The buyers are LLM agents with no validation that their bargaining or purchase behavior resembles any market participant; task gain is logistic-regression loss reduction on small classification datasets; money sits on an "experimental accounting scale" initialized from training gains.

  • The prospective information-service implementation remains insufficiently verified. Historical temporal evaluation conditions on actual trajectory-arrival capacities, while their mapping to online temporal inputs is incomplete.

  • The paper studies the Bayesian persuasion setting without engaging the literature that defined it

Questions for authors
  • For the executed E3 runs, what are the exact post-purchase data-update, repeat-purchase, and utility-cache rules? Can a transaction-level trace establish which buyer snapshot each gain used, and clarify whether these rules affect the interpretation or ranking of the reported accounting totals?

  • How sensitive are the E3 surplus contrasts to that initialization — could the VIND advantage shrink or reverse under a different anchoring?

1 comment
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer StWG Part1

Thank you for recognizing the value of separating predictive quality, fixed-state decisions, and continuing-market effects. We have strengthened the revised manuscript with additional price-sensitivity experiments, cumulative-acquisition evaluations, execution audits, and a clearer discussion of economic interpretation and information design.

1. E3 execution and cumulative utility

We independently reproduced the original E3 buyer-surplus effects from saved market records: VIND − VREF = +41.16 (95% CI [27.68, 55.08]) and VIND − N0 = +46.44 ([29.35, 64.68]), both with Holm-adjusted p = 0.00002.

The expanded transaction-level audit confirms that recorded gains use fixed buyer–product lookup values, including repeated purchases. It also identifies the remaining limitations in historical buyer-state, delivered-data, and cache provenance. We now make the transaction-accounting interpretation explicit (Sections H.3–H.5).

To investigate actual acquisition outcomes, we additionally implemented explicit training-data and ownership updates, once-per-buyer product-version purchases, classifier refitting, and independent terminal evaluation (Appendix A). These new experiments provide complementary evidence on cumulative learning without conflating their endpoints with original E3 accounting.

2. Price initialization and sensitivity

We clarified the original price construction, which uses training-only positive task gains to initialize the experimental price scale (Section A.5).

We also conducted a new 48-root price intervention with three price worlds, each executing N0, VREF, and VIND under cumulative acquisition.

Table 1. Buyer-only price sensitivity: terminal net-surplus contrasts (Table G.3).

Price scaleVIND − VREF95% CIHolm-adjusted p
α = 0.5+2.01[0.52, 3.52]0.0179
α = 1.0+2.50[1.19, 3.90]0.0064
α = 2.0+2.16[0.73, 3.56]0.0130

Individualized information improves terminal surplus over references within all three evaluated buyer-only price worlds. However, the price-interaction contrasts do not pass their primary Holm-2 criterion (both adjusted p = 0.576). The lowest-price world also reaches the quote floor.

Importantly, these experiments vary prices in buyer-only acquisition markets, not the original E3 bilateral launch-price mechanism. They provide additional sensitivity evidence but do not establish price invariance or rule out a smaller or reversed original E3 effect under alternative initializations.

3. Prospective information delivery

We strengthened prospective implementation evidence through a new 72-root bilateral seller-information experiment.

The service uses frozen Core14/S1 models, public decision-time inputs, and arrival conditions sampled from the known mechanism rather than realized future events. A future-event perturbation check verifies invariant predictor inputs and outputs under fixed public information and prediction seeds (Section B.8).

Relative to training references, individualized seller forecasts reduce seller gross revenue by 7.14 and increase buyer terminal net surplus by 7.36 (both primary Holm-adjusted p = 0.0002). Most of the buyer-surplus improvement reflects lower payments, not an established learning improvement (Table 4).

The historical E3 temporal input-to-checkpoint bindings remain incomplete, and Controlled recovery supports partial member-level reweighting rather than full historical recalibration. The prospective experiment provides separately verified implementation evidence, not a retrospective reconstruction of the original execution.

4. Practical relevance and related work

Our target setting is data-market platforms serving autonomous software agents, rather than LLMs acting as validated proxies for human traders. Task utility is measured independently through classifier performance, while prices remain experimental accounting quantities rather than real monetary valuations.

We expanded acquisition evaluation to Bank Marketing and MAGIC with logistic regression and extra trees (Appendix G). The heterogeneous results, including negative net surplus and strong numerical-rule baselines, clarify the limits of generalization.

We also added the foundational Bayesian persuasion and information-design literature (Kamenica & Gentzkow, 2011; Bergemann & Morris, 2019). DIM-WM evaluates predefined forecast-information packages and observed agent decisions, rather than optimizing sender signaling or assuming Bayesian-optimal receivers (Section 6).

Overall, the revision preserves the original E3 findings while providing stronger evidence on price sensitivity, cumulative acquisition, prospective information delivery, and the boundaries of practical interpretation.

Reviewer_GfjZOpenReview ↗
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Paper summary

Data buyers often decide whether to purchase a product before knowing whether it will improve their own task, and gains depend on the buyer’s existing data. Can a data marketplace platform make forecasts that help buyers make better decisions? The authors study LLM buyers and sellers in a simulated data marketplace and how platform-provided forecasts can improve their decisions. Task utility is measured on four real classification datasets, via changes in a downstream logistic-regression model’s log loss. DIM-WM organizes five conditional prediction interfaces: buyer choice, legal-action outcomes, task gain, and 14-day + 28-/42-day seller outcomes.

Critical strengths

The authors study an interesting setup of a data-buying marketplace in which data-buying decisions are measured through actual concrete outcomes — classification task gains.

The authors study many interesting questions, including the separate effects of predictive quality, fixed-state decision value, and online service.

Critical weaknesses

I am not sure how practically relevant these aspects of data market platforms studied by the authors actually are / will be. The description of data markets and these aspects is quite abstract, and would significantly benefit from a concrete case study or hypothetical where all the aspects are made more specific/tangible.

Beyond the underlying markets and platforms, I am not sure how realistic LLM decision makers are for understanding real data market participants.

Because of the above concerns, I am not sure whether the conclusions from this empirical study will have practical significance, beyond being interesting.

Overall the paper is not very clearly written and I did not understand a lot of it, many of the discussions are too abstract. For example, this paragraph is hard for me to understand:

Predictive rankings vary across targets and metrics, and E1, E2, and E3 use different outcome units and feedback settings. Reference arms are informative rather than empty: format-control M supplies training statistics, and E3’s VREF already contains individualized descriptive forecasts. The E3 contrasts therefore concern either a multi-field value package or the complete service, not a unique mechanism of advice adoption, bargaining, or low-value rejection.

Questions for authors

Can you articulate a concrete instantiation of a data market platform, and in this platform describe specific versions of these concepts:

  • estimator substitution under a fixed rule
  • information-source substitution at fixed states
  • paired service interventions in continuing markets
  • prediction quality
  • participant-controlled information use
  • online market effects

How can we feel confident that the conclusions of your study would transfer to this concrete/specific instantiation?

2 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer GfjZ Part1

Thank you for highlighting the need for a more concrete explanation and clearer practical motivation. We substantially revised the Introduction, experimental presentation, and supporting examples to clarify what DIM-WM evaluates and how its findings relate to autonomous data-market participants.

1. A concrete data-market example

Consider a platform where a buyer is training an electricity classifier and a seller offers an additional dataset at a quoted price.

The buyer must decide whether the new data is worth purchasing, although its actual contribution to the buyer's classifier is unknown before acquisition. Meanwhile, the seller must decide how to price the dataset without knowing future demand.

DIM-WM provides forecasts about purchasing behavior, transaction outcomes, task improvements, and seller sales. These forecasts inform decisions, but buyers and sellers retain final control over their actions.

Our experiments instantiate this setting with 16 LLM buyers, eight sellers, four real classification datasets, and independently measured downstream task gains. The revised Introduction (Sections 1–2) explains this example, while Figure 1 illustrates the framework and Figure A.1 shows a recorded acquisition trajectory.

2. Clarifying the six experimental concepts

We now distinguish the requested concepts using this same purchasing example:

ConceptConcrete interpretation
Estimator substitution (E1)Keep the offers and Gain–Price rule fixed; replace the predictor estimating the dataset's task gain.
Information substitution (E2)Keep the purchasing opportunity and available actions fixed; change the forecast information provided to the LLM buyer.
Paired market interventions (E3)Start from matched markets, vary the information service, and execute subsequent buyer–seller interactions.
Prediction quality (RQ2)Evaluate forecasts against observed choices, transaction outcomes, task gains, and seller trajectories using target-specific metrics.
Participant-controlled useForecasts are provided as information or nonbinding advice; participants still select their own legal actions.
Online market effectsMeasure the resulting transactions, buyer surplus, and seller revenue across continuing market trajectories.

Importantly, E1 and E2 evaluate fixed-state decisions using archived outcomes, whereas E3 evaluates continuing markets with newly executed interactions. Predictive accuracy is assessed separately and is not treated as evidence of downstream decision improvement (Sections 3–5).

3. What do the experiments establish?

The revised manuscript retains the original comparisons while adding cumulative-acquisition evaluations.

ExperimentMain result
E1: Fixed-rule estimator replacementQuantile LightGBM increases mean selected-action surplus from 2.37 to 2.67 relative to the original Technical estimator.
E2: Individualized value information+1.95 surplus units (95% CI [1.53, 2.39]) on shared fixed-state development support.
Original E3: Buyer-value package+41.16 buyer transaction-accounting units over reference values (95% CI [27.68, 55.08]).
Additional bilateral seller studyIndividualized forecasts change seller revenue by −7.14 and buyer terminal net surplus by +7.36 relative to training references.

These results illustrate why forecast services should be evaluated through decisions rather than prediction scores alone. They also show that benefits depend on the information provided, the decision process, and the measured outcome.

For clarity, the original E3 comparison concerns an individualized buyer-value information package, not task-gain prediction alone. Both advised arms receive the prescribed individualized descriptive forecasts; VREF uses reference value information, whereas VIND uses individualized value information. The separate descriptive-service study does not establish a buyer-surplus improvement (Section 5.4).

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer GfjZ Part2

4. Practical relevance and transferability

Our intended setting is a platform serving autonomous software agents as buyers and sellers, rather than using LLMs as validated substitutes for human traders.

The practical motivation is that an agent can receive platform forecasts before purchasing data or revising a quote, while the platform evaluates whether providing that information changes actual decisions and downstream task performance.

To strengthen the evaluation, we added experiments where purchases update training datasets, task classifiers are refitted, and learning is independently measured at the end of the market. We also extended buyer-side acquisition experiments to Bank Marketing and MAGIC with logistic regression and extra trees.

These extensions reveal heterogeneous outcomes, including negative net surplus and strong numerical-rule baselines. We therefore interpret transferability at the level of the information-service framework and evaluation methodology, rather than claiming universal gains or validated commercial-market behavior (Sections 5.5 and 7; Appendix G).

Overall, the revision makes the original research question and experimental distinctions more concrete, preserves the original findings, and adds evidence on actual data acquisition and bilateral market outcomes.

Reviewer_GggYOpenReview ↗
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Paper summary

The paper studies forecast and value-information services in a simulated data market with LLM buyers and sellers, using classification performance to measure task gains. Five prediction interfaces cover choices, transaction outcomes, task gains, and seller trajectories. Fixed-support development studies select a quantile LightGBM value predictor and evaluate information-dependent choices. An 80-block descriptive-advice study does not establish a buyer-surplus benefit; a separate 72-blueprint online study reports a 41.16-unit gain from an individualized value package over reference-value advice, with study-specific transaction and revenue tradeoffs.

Critical strengths
  1. Separating predictive quality, fixed-state action value, and continuing-market effects is methodologically valuable. It prevents prediction accuracy or archived-outcome reuse from being presented as evidence of an online market benefit.

  2. The online comparisons retain informative reference arms, no-advice controls, and unfavorable outcomes. Reporting buyer surplus alongside transaction counts and seller gross revenue helps assess the distributional consequences of the service rather than treating one favorable endpoint as universal improvement.

Critical weaknesses
  1. The central utility dynamics remain unresolved. Appendix A.2 does not establish whether purchases update buyers’ datasets, repeated purchases are prevented, or utility caches track the evolving data state. Summed transaction gains can therefore differ substantially from accumulated learning benefit. Labeling the result as accounting is appropriate, but does not establish that the reported surplus improvement represents useful sequential data acquisition.

  2. Prospective implementability and reproduction are incompletely established. Temporal evaluations condition on realized arrival capacities, their mapping to online inputs is not fully recovered, and the completion-weighted conditional-mixture correction was not propagated through the reported historical predictions (Appendix B). The E3 LightGBM value predictor does not resolve the provenance and conditioning of the accompanying descriptive service.

Questions for authors
  1. Clarification of the measured benefit: Can you provide the executed buyer-state update, repeat-purchase, and cache-key rules, and determine whether E3’s effect persists when gains are measured against each buyer’s updated dataset? Li, Yu, and Koudas, “Data Acquisition for Improving Machine Learning Models” (PVLDB/VLDB 2021), not cited in the manuscript, explicitly treats acquisition as improving the model trained on accumulated data. That distinction is essential to interpreting your market outcome.

https://www.vldb.org/pvldb/vol14/p1832-li.pdf

  1. Clarification of the information boundary: For the exact E3 checkpoints, were all seller temporal inputs generated using only information available at the decision time, or did they contain realized future-arrival capacities? Please supply the input-to-checkpoint mapping and identify which deployed components retain the uncorrected conditional mixture. If the mapping cannot be recovered, which online-service claims remain verifiable?
2 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer GggY Part1

Thank you for recognizing the layered evaluation and informative controls. Your comments motivated us to strengthen the verification of original E3 and introduce additional experiments on cumulative data acquisition and prospective information delivery.

1. Buyer-state updates and cumulative learning

Original E3 verification. We independently reproduced the original E3 accounting effects, confidence intervals, and Holm-adjusted tests from saved market records. The expanded audit identifies fixed buyer–product gain lookup, including repeated transactions. We now clarify these accounting semantics and document the remaining historical data-state, cache, and execution-provenance limitations (Sections H.3–H.5).

Table 1. Original E3: 42-day market-level transaction accounting (72 paired roots).

ConditionTransactionsTask gainBuyer surplusSeller revenue
N039.5898.3026.7671.54
VREF24.6076.5532.0544.51
VIND28.19126.3573.2053.14

The primary buyer-surplus contrasts remain VIND − VREF = +41.16 (95% CI [27.68, 55.08]) and VIND − N0 = +46.44 ([29.35, 64.68]), both with Holm-adjusted p = 2 × 10⁻⁵.

New cumulative-acquisition experiments. We implemented explicit training-data and ownership updates, at most one purchase per buyer–product version, task-classifier refitting, and separate feedback and terminal evaluation pools. The new bilateral study additionally verifies state-bound cache identities and saved classifier outputs (Sections A.3–A.4). We also incorporated the suggested Li, Yu, and Koudas (2021) reference.

Table 2. Additional experimental evidence on cumulative acquisition and information services.

Study / EndpointComparisonMean difference95% CIHolm-adjusted p
Buyer-only / Terminal surplusVIND − N0+10.68[6.74, 15.01]0.00002
Buyer-only / Terminal surplusVIND − VREF+0.88[−0.09, 1.85]0.0828
Source–advice factorial / Terminal surplusValue-source effect+2.45[1.49, 3.49]0.00003
Bilateral seller study / RevenueSIND − SREF−7.14[−10.76, −3.48]0.0002
Bilateral seller study / Terminal surplusSIND − SREF+7.36[3.78, 10.95]0.0002

All intervals are ordinary paired-bootstrap 95% CIs. Each study retains its own paired units, intervention, endpoint, and multiplicity-adjustment family; effects are not pooled across studies.

These experiments show that forecast information can influence outcomes under actual cumulative acquisition. The initial buyer-only study establishes an improvement over no service, while its incremental advantage over reference information remains uncertain. The neutral-label factorial identifies a positive value-source effect without a clear additional advisor effect (Tables G.1–G.2).

The new bilateral study further demonstrates that individualized seller forecasts can improve buyer terminal net surplus while reducing seller revenue. The surplus improvement is primarily associated with lower payments rather than an established increase in terminal learning; all three mean buyer terminal net surpluses remain negative (Table 4; Section H.4). These studies extend the evaluation of forecast services to cumulative learning and bilateral outcomes under explicitly specified acquisition protocols, complementing the original E3 transaction-accounting evidence.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer GggY Part2

2. Decision-time information and reproducibility

We expanded the historical execution audit to clarify the information boundaries of the original prediction services. Exact E3 input-to-checkpoint bindings remain incomplete, and the historical temporal benchmarks condition on recorded arrival capacities. Recovered Controlled outputs support member-level completion reweighting, while full arrival-mixture reconstruction, recalibration, and historical decision replay remain unavailable (Sections B.3–B.6 and I).

To strengthen prospective implementability, we additionally executed a seller-information study using frozen Core14/S1 models, decision-time public inputs, and arrival conditions sampled from the known mechanism rather than realized future events. A future-event perturbation check verifies invariant predictor inputs and outputs under fixed public information and prediction seeds (Section B.8). This establishes information isolation for the tested new service contract, separately from historical E3 provenance.

Appendix I now distinguishes saved-record reanalysis of original E3, endpoint reconstruction in cumulative-acquisition studies, and probability-level verification of the new bilateral experiment. These provide complementary forms of verification without conflating the historical execution with newly implemented services.

Overall, the revision preserves the original E3 findings and five-interface framework, while adding direct evidence on cumulative acquisition, clearer prospective information contracts, and more detailed reproducibility audits.

Comments on the paper

1 comment
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Summary of Manuscript Revisions and Core Supplementary Materials

We thank the reviewers and Area Chair for their constructive feedback. This comment summarizes the changes from the original submission and introduces the accompanying supplementary materials. The revision retains the original research question, five prediction interfaces, RQ1–RQ3 structure, and E1/E2/E3 findings. The additions strengthen the evaluation and clarify its scope rather than replace the original study. All section and table references below refer to the revised manuscript.

1. Clearer setting, terminology, and presentation.

We revised Sections 1–4 around a concrete electricity-data purchasing example, explicitly distinguishing estimator replacement under a fixed decision rule, information replacement at a shared purchasing opportunity, and service interventions in continuing markets. Predictive accuracy is evaluated separately from these decision and market effects.

We also clarified “factorized world modeling” as target-specific conditional prediction rather than a jointly trained full-market simulator, revised the framework and experimental figures, and added a recorded acquisition example. Related work now includes Li, Yu, and Koudas (2021), Bayesian persuasion, and information design.

2. Original findings and expanded verification.

The original E3 effects remain +41.16 buyer transaction-accounting units over reference information (95% CI [27.68, 55.08]) and +46.44 over no added service ([29.35, 64.68]). The separate descriptive-service study found no clear buyer-surplus improvement from individualized forecasts over same-format reference information or no added service.

Sections H.3–H.5 expand the saved-record audit, documenting fixed buyer–product gain lookup, repeated transactions, advisor fallback, and remaining execution-binding limitations. This makes the interpretation and verification scope of the original findings more explicit.

3. Added cumulative-acquisition and diagnostic experiments.

The revision specifies actual training-data and ownership updates, once-per-buyer product-version acquisition, task-classifier refitting, and separate feedback and terminal evaluation pools (Section 2.2; Appendix A).

In the initial buyer-only study, individualized service improves terminal net surplus over no service by 10.68, while its 0.88 increment over reference information remains uncertain (95% CI [−0.09, 1.85]). A separate neutral-label source–advice factorial finds a +2.45 value-source effect ([1.49, 3.49]) without a clear additional advisor benefit.

Additional state, instruction, price, and numerical-rule comparisons, together with Bank Marketing and MAGIC evaluations using logistic regression and extra trees, characterize heterogeneous outcomes (Appendices F–G). These studies complement the original E3 evidence under distinct interventions and endpoints. In particular, the buyer-only price experiments provide sensitivity evidence for their evaluated acquisition settings, rather than testing alternative bilateral E3 launch-price mechanisms.

4. Added prospective seller-information evaluation.

A new 72-root bilateral study varies seller forecasts while keeping the buyer model, instructions, and value service common across conditions. Purchases update training data and ownership, and terminal evaluation is performed after all formal branches are completed.

The seller service uses decision-time public inputs and arrival conditions sampled from the known mechanism, rather than the realized future event tape. A future-event perturbation check evaluates information isolation under this new service contract (Section B.8).

Relative to same-format training references, individualized seller forecasts change seller gross revenue by −7.14 and buyer terminal net surplus by +7.36, both passing the study’s primary Holm-2 criterion. Most of the surplus improvement reflects lower payments; the learning change is descriptive, and all three mean buyer terminal net surpluses remain negative (Table 4; Section H.4). This study adds prospective bilateral evidence while retaining its distinct intervention and execution identity.

5. Supplementary code and experimental records.

The accompanying Supplementary Material.zip contains selected core model and market implementations, experimental configurations, saved market outcomes and transaction records, and scripts for checking the saved results. The materials cover original E3 and the added cumulative-acquisition, price-sensitivity, and seller-information studies. An accompanying README describes the package structure, available materials, and their verification scope.

Overall, the revision makes the original contribution more concrete and easier to inspect, while adding evidence on cumulative acquisition, information use, and bilateral market outcomes. Detailed responses to individual reviewer questions are provided separately.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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