- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper proposes StyleUAE, a method that uses CNN, diffusion inversion and style transfer techniques to generate AEs that transfers to MLLMs. Experiments show its effectiveness on imagenet.
Critical strengths
- Pratical attack setting. This attacks is black-box and targets frontier MLLMs.
- Strong Transferability. The reported ASR on eight MLLMs is 79.7% on average, compared with 62.0% of MABA
Critical weaknesses
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Missing baselines. The paper’s evaluation remains limited to the conventional ImageNet classification setting and omits several recent baselines, including M-Attack (NeurIPS 2025), FOA-Attack (NeurIPS 2025), and MPCAttack (CVPR 2026). These baselines are more related to your threat model (MLLMs). Some your selected baselines, e.g., APA, were not originally designed to target MLLMs !!
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A major gap in image quality. The paper does not report reference-based metrics such as SSIM or LPIPS. No-reference metrics can assign high scores to natural-looking images even when their content has changed substantially from the original !!! These scores therefore provide insufficient evidence that the adversarial examples preserve the original image content.
Questions for authors
See weaknesses. Weakness 2 is the most serious issue. More: Can u explain why the proposed design produces more transferable adversarial examples.
2 comments
Thank you again for your reviews.
Thank you for your comment. All concerns have been answered as follows.
Q1. Weakness 1.1: Evaluation remains limited to the conventional ImageNet classification setting.
A1. The proposed evaluation is not limited to the conventional setting. Besides ASR on CNNs and ViTs, we also define ASR on zero-shot VLMs and ASR on MLLMs following Chain of Attack (CVPR 2025), which proposed an LLM-based ASR. Please see Appendix I.1.
Q2. Weakness 1.2: Missing baselines against MLLMs.
A2. In the experiments of the original manuscript, we have compared our method with recent baselines against MLLMs, including MABA (USENIX Security 2026) and VEAttack (ICLR 2026). We did not compare with M-Attack, FOA-Attack and MPCAttack for the following reasons: (1) Our method is an untargeted attack, whereas these attacks are designed for targeted attacks. Improperly modifying them to suit the untargeted attack may lead to unfair comparisons. (2) Our method is an unrestricted attack, whereas these methods are perturbation-restricted attacks.
In Tables 13–15 of Appendix K.6, we add the comparisons with them. M-Attack and FOA-Attack are modified for untargeted attacks following MPCAttack, and the untargeted version of MPCAttack is used. Tables 13 and 14 show that our method achieves the highest average ASRs. Table 15 shows that our method achieves the best scores on no-reference image quality metrics. The results of ours and MPCAttack (the second-best) are shown below. For more results, please see Appendix K.6.
Table 13. ASR (%) of black-box attacks on CNNs and ViTs.
Table 14. ASR (%) of black-box attacks on open-source and commercial MLLMs.
Table 15. No-reference image quality assessment comparison.
Q3. Weakness 1.3: Why include baselines that were not originally designed to target MLLMs?
A3. Besides tests on MLLMs, we also test the transferable performance when attacking CNNs and ViTs, so the baselines (e.g., APA) targeting small models are selected. These baselines and ours rely on small CNN-based surrogate models to generate AEs. We want to check whether these similar low-resource methods can fool MLLMs, so we add them to comparisons of attacks on MLLMs.
Q4. Weakness 2: Image quality assessment.
A4. Considering that clean images are not available as references in some applications, we select no-reference metrics to evaluate image quality of UAEs. The metrics used, such as MUSIQ-AVA and NIMA-AVA, are usually employed for aesthetic evaluation. It means that UAEs with high scores of no-reference metrics won't arouse people's suspicion, and will probably evade human supervision to launch attacks. According to the definition, UAEs are allowed to change substantially from the original image, as long as UAEs retain visible cues of the original class for human inspection. Based on the definition, our method's preservation of the original image content does not mean preserving fine details, but preserving image structure, shape, etc., that are related to human recognition clues. We have reported the reference-based metrics SSIM and LPIPS in Table 18 of Appendix K.7. Although our attack does not obtain better results, it generates satisfactory UAEs which can be recognized by humans. Please refer to the randomly selected 80 pairs of clean images and UAEs in Figure 15 of Appendix N.6.
Q5. Explain why the proposed design produces more transferable adversarial examples.
A5. We enhance the transferability via jointly (1) disturbing the semantic features of CNN surrogate models in latent space, (2) destroying discriminative cues in cross-attention maps, and (3) injecting style to induce semantic disruptions. The benefits of each enhancement are supported by the ablation study in Table 4 of the manuscript, with the results reproduced below.