- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper proposes a benchmark and cross-evidence framework that combines agent traces with OS-level provenance for computer-use-agent safety evaluation. It complements the existing method that mainly relies on the observation in the agent-level with system-level audit records such as process lineage, processes, files, and sockets. Evaluation results across 53 executions show that AgentXRay improves safety detection in the primary GPT-4.1 evaluation, with the largest improvement on prompt injection.
Critical strengths
- The paper identifies an important limitation in existing AI-agent safety evaluations that agent trajectories, tool calls, and model responses do not necessarily reflect what actually happens in the underlying operating system. And the proposed framework addresses this discrepancy by combining agent-level and system-level evidence.
- The paper presents a new evaluation benchmark consisting of 53 controlled executions across deliberate user misuse, prompt injection, model misbehavior, and benigh activities, each of which contains agent trajectories, OS audit traces, and independently produced human annotations.
Critical weaknesses
- The main technical contribution of AgentXRay is to associate agent-level actions wth OS-level events through the proposed Agent-System Evidence Graph. However, both system-provenance graph construction and the integration of heterogeneous execution logs across agent-level and system-level have been investigated in prior literature. In particular, AgentSight (2025) [1] proposed to address the semantic gap between agent intentions and their system effects by using eBPF to associate kernel events with agent activities, which can be deployed for security monitoring, including prompt injection detection.
- The effectiveness of the proposed ASEG representation appears largely confined to prompt-injection scenarios, where aligning agent trajectories with underlying system effects is particularly well suited to identifying deviations from legitimate user instructions. However, the method shows little to no improvement in other safety categories, such as deliberate user misuse and model misbehavior. This narrow scope of empirical gains raises concerns about the broader applicability and significance of the proposed approach. Without demonstrating benefits across a wider range of safety scenarios, ASEG appears more like a task-specific engineering solution for problems like prompt-injection detection than a broadly applicable methodological contribution to agent safety research.
[1] Zheng, Yusheng, et al. "Agentsight: System-level observability for ai agents using ebpf." Proceedings of the 4th Workshop on Practical Adoption Challenges of ML for Systems. 2025.
Questions for authors
- Why does it have 30 unsafe and 23 safe cases among 53 executions (line 368)? The authors mention early in the paper that the benchmark contains 14 deliberate-user-misuse, 14 prompt-injection, 15 model-misbehavior, and only 10 benign executions.
- The Threat Model section has repeated text (line 181-189).
Thanks for your response, which resolves part of my concerns. I'm inclined to maintain my original score.