acceptodds
Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

State-Constrained Continuous-Control Zero-Sum Dynamic Games with One-Sided Payoff Information

Abstract

We study , a -stage zero-sum dynamic game with continuous and simultaneous controls, one-sided payoff information, and public state constraints. arises in defense, sports, finance, among other agentic competitions. Nash equilibrium strategies in may mix over a continuum of controls, producing an intractable game tree. To this end, we introduce a pair of information-relaxing Stackelberg variants of where one player best responses to their opponent's next control, and prove that Nash leaders in these variants use at most control atoms at any information states. Hence the game tree complexity of these variants are at most . We then show that under sufficient game-theoretic and geometric assumptions, this pair of atomic leader strategies have vanishing exploitability in as the time grid refines. This result justifies a computationally tractable approximation of the Nash of via atomic strategy restriction and bounded control-atom insertion. Effectiveness of our method is demonstrated through an analytical Hexner's game and a car chasing game with nonlinear dynamics and nonconvex state constraints.

Primary area:
learning theory
Keywords:
Zero-sum games, incomplete-information games

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 27%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.00 over 3 reviews, above 27% of the others.
Reviewer_QkemOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
1
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The paper studies finite-horizon zero-sum continuous-control games with one-sided private payoff information and hard state constraints. It proves value existence, shows that leaders in two information-relaxed games require at most II control atoms, and argues that the resulting strategy pair becomes approximately unexploitable as decisions become more frequent. These results motivate a bounded atom-insertion solver. Validation uses analytical and constrained Hexner games, a synthetic history-encoding task, and a nonlinear car-chasing example, although the most realistic experiment is primarily qualitative and seems heavily simplified.

Critical strengths

One strength of the paper is that it provides a model for an important yet difficult combination of continuous control, asymmetric information, and hard state constraints. This is relevant to the literature and addresses the dynamic of private information and physical security in autonomous systems, which is crucial in applications like transportation and energy. The constraints are useful to reflect the limitations of feasible actions and imperfect information. This could lead to safer planning and equilibrium solving in certain multi-agent settings.

Critical weaknesses
  • Poor clarity and readability: The paper is extremely notation-dense, lacks a notation guide, introduces important definitions only briefly, and contains inconsistent writing and grammatical errors. This is critical to the reader's general understanding of the material.

  • Insufficient motivation: The game model GG and its modeling choices are not adequately justified through concrete research gaps or developed real-world examples. While the setting and model explored is well-motivated from a technical perspective, the introduction discusses motivation for four sentences before proceeding into model preliminaries, with a primary example from sports which feels underdeveloped, and then some vague gesturing at applications in defense, finance, cybersecurity.

  • Weak conceptual organization: The argument narrative is difficult to find/follow, particularly around the lower dual game, and does not clearly distinguish the exact theoretical results from the heuristic solver, or why some assumptions and modeling choices were changed when progressing from the existence of the atomic strategies to using neural solver.

  • Inadequate visual explanation: The figures are small and underdeveloped, while no schematic/diagram clearly explains the model/game, information flow, or relationship between the different formulations.

  • Limited empirical validation: The car-chasing experiment is heavily simplified and lacks convincing quantitative evidence of security, safety, or low exploitability. The results and analysis generally feel incomplete without dedicated space in the main text for unpacking the findings.

  • Central method is insufficiently demonstrated: The authors could not identify a setting in which P2 requires more than one atom, making it unclear when the proposed multi-atom insertion procedure is necessary or practically beneficial.

Questions for authors
  • Can the authors precisely explain which theoretical guarantees remain valid after introducing the neural model, local optimization, finite best-response archives, sampled constraints, and restricted strategy classes? Can the resulting approximation discrepancies/errors be quantified?

  • Can the authors provide a nontrivial experiment where P2 actually requires multiple atoms, together with exploitability and safety results demonstrating that atom insertion tangibly improves over the one-atom baseline?

  • Can the authors justify whether assumptions like repairability, viability-boundary, and Isaacs-type assumptions related to the vanishing exploitability actually hold in the car chasing setting? How are these conditions verified?

6 comments

Clarity, notation, and organization

“The paper is extremely notation-dense, lacks a notation guide, introduces important definitions only briefly, and contains inconsistent writing and grammatical errors.”

“The argument narrative is difficult to find/follow, particularly around the lower dual game.”

We have edited the narrative and organized it into four steps: define the simultaneous game; introduce its two information relaxations; prove atomicity in those relaxations and bound exploitability using their values; then show that the bound vanishes under time-grid refinement with vanishing tolerances. The lower-game discussion explains P2's typewise payoff guarantees before introducing the dual value.

 

Motivation and modeling choices

“The game model and its modeling choices are not adequately justified through concrete research gaps or developed real-world examples.”

We have made the car example explicit in the introduction. P1 privately knows which exit it intends to reach. P2 observes motion but not that intention. Steering and acceleration are continuous, while road, speed, turning, and separation constraints restrict feasible maneuvers. Concealing an exit intention can change P2's response, but the maneuver must preserve a feasible continuation. The example makes the interaction between information release and physical feasibility concrete.

 

Visual explanation

“The figures are small and underdeveloped, while no schematic/diagram clearly explains the model/game, information flow, or relationship between the different formulations.”

Figure 3 now highlights the interaction between the pursuer and evader's security strategies and includes the retained best responses found during training. Also see the animation of the same interaction.

Appendix D includes a visual comparison of the lower game G↓G^\downarrow, the simultaneous game GG, and the upper game G↑G^\uparrow. It shows who observes the current action before responding and how the three values bound one another.

 

What survives numerical approximation?

“Can the authors precisely explain which theoretical guarantees remain valid after introducing the neural model, local optimization, finite best-response archives, sampled constraints, and restricted strategy classes?”

Value existence, atomicity, and the vanishing result are mathematical properties of the stated games and remain valid independently of the numerical implementation. They justify the ideal atomic strategy class and motivate the training of policy networks with at most II control outputs along a game tree with at most IKI^K terminal branches per type against a pure response. The dual construction also supplies a recursive private-memory representation for P2, which motivates the solver's memory coordinate. The theory does not establish that a particular network and local optimizer recover the theoretical strategies.

“Can the resulting approximation discrepancies/errors be quantified?”

For a feasible strategy pair in a fixed game, exploitability equals the difference between its two exact opposing-response values:

=\sup_{\zeta'}J(\eta,\zeta')-\inf_{\eta'}J(\eta',\zeta).$$ The car study estimates these extrema using recorded responses. Its empirical exploitability decreases from 2.53 to 1.76. Note that the initial exploitability is measured on warm-started policies rather than random initialization, since the latter can easily violate state constraints.

 

Quantitative car evidence

“The car-chasing experiment is heavily simplified and lacks convincing quantitative evidence of security, safety, or low exploitability.”

The revised experiment reports evidence in three parts:

  • Security: We evaluate 54 P2 responses against the retained P1 strategy and 263 P1 response packages against the retained P2 strategy. Each package contains a P1 response for each of the three types. The gradient-based solves differentiate through safety corrections as well as the dynamics. One recorded full gradient of P1’s 102,036-parameter strategy against one P2 response took 770 seconds on eight CPU cores (GPU implementation showed little advantage for this particular task due to its long rollout). This measurement excludes prior constraint-matrix preparation and subsequent response audits; see recorded computation cost.

  • Safety: The solver applies a learned P1 continuation filter and a P2 stopping-safety filter for trajectory-correction routines. Separate audits checked 162 type histories from the P1 security solve for assigned-exit and P2 stopping continuations, and 789 type histories from the P2 security solve for stopping feasibility. The highlighted interaction is capture-free over its 3 s horizon. Appendix J.4 describes the safety filters, and the supplement reports the physical checks and numerical allowances.

  • Exploitability estimate: Using the same 54 P2 responses and 263 typewise P1 response packages, the empirical payoff gap decreases from 2.53 at initialization to 1.76 after training, a 30.7% reduction. The training comparison documents the model, checkpoints, and calculation. P1 is initialized from saved routes, and P2 from a previously trained base policy. Both use the current safety filters; neither is a completely random, unconstrained policy.

 

When does P2 need multiple atoms?

“Can the authors provide a nontrivial experiment where P2 actually requires multiple atoms, together with exploitability and safety results demonstrating that atom insertion tangibly improves over the one-atom baseline?”

The two-stage Bayesian benchmark has two types, observed first-stage actions, and history-dependent second-stage responses. Its exact value is 4/34/3, while the best deterministic P2 strategy guarantees only 7/67/6. Paired with an optimal P1 strategy, deterministic P2 has exploitability 1/61/6; the recovered two-action P2 strategy has zero exploitability in exact arithmetic. Across 50 tie-breaking seeds, best-response-guided insertion recovers the optimum with five accepted local insertions and a maximum numerical residual below 4.45×10−164.45\times10^{-16}. This demonstrates both a need for P2 randomization and a measurable benefit from support insertion. The benchmark has no physical safety constraints. Its complete specification and reproduction code are available in the supplement, and a concise version can be incorporated into the paper.

 

Assumptions in the car setting

“Can the authors justify whether assumptions like repairability, viability-boundary, and Isaacs-type assumptions related to the vanishing exploitability actually hold in the car chasing setting? How are these conditions verified?”

The revised theorem avoids the earlier inward-pointing and boundary-persistence conditions. Its structural requirements include control-affine dynamics and convexity of P1's state-dependent control constraints. The bicycle equations satisfy the former, and the yaw constraint ∣wκ∣≤Ω|w\kappa|\le\Omega is convex in curvature at fixed speed. These facts can be checked directly from the equations.

In addition, the revised theorem requires (1) an initial state from which P1 can keep violations arbitrarily small against every admitted opponent throughout the horizon, and (2) control repairability at suitable positive tolerances. We tested numerical versions of these conditions in the car study.

For the first requirement, we select the initial state using players' safety filters (pre-trained based on their safety specifications), then check it through independent security-response searches.

For the second, we tested 3,840 candidate controls at 120 states, including 342 controls requiring a nonzero correction. All were successfully repaired under the numerical constraints and passed a doubled-resolution check. In the extended 1,024 state-perturbation tests, reducing the perturbation scale from 10−210^{-2} to 10−510^{-5} reduces the largest normalized correction from 0.03710.0371 to 0.00003380.0000338. All 1,024 corrections passed the doubled-resolution check. Thus the tests support local repair as stated in the assumption.

Thank you for your response. Your explanations do clear up some things and the quality of the revised paper is higher.

On clarity, thanks for addressing clarity and organization. Although still quite dense, I find the paper easier to parse now. The added figures are useful. Would it be possible to include a consolidated notation table in the appendix?

On motivation, thanks for developing the car example further and making edits to the introduction to this extent. I still think the real-world demand for this work could be developed further, with specific references to how your model better captures some aspects of reality that existing approaches fail to consider.

A couple of lingering thoughts:

On theory vs. implementation, I understand that the numerical implementations/neural representations and optimizers don't exactly inherit the equilibrium guarantees from the theory. This is of course to be expected in practical implementation and empirical evaluation. To address this specifically, I would be interested in some bound on implementation error if possible. Or what additional assumptions might be required to do this.

On empirical evaluation, could you clarify how to interpret the reduction in estimated exploitability from 2.53 to 1.76 relative to the scale of payoffs, and what evidence there is that supports the strength of the best deviations the searches found. For example would additional search effort or different initializations change things? (separately, this reduction seems like an important result to include in the paper itself, section 6.3 perhaps).

On the P2 atoms setting, thanks for going through this. I do suggest you incorporate this benchmark into the paper.

On the car assumptions, appendix f.4 reports 37 cases flagged by a second opponent search whose admissibility validation is incomplete. Have these cases been investigated, and can they also be repaired? Could you clarify how these outstanding checks might qualify the evidence for local repairability and the reliability of the numerical safety checks?

Reviewer_Lkp9OpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
1
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper studies Nash equilibrium zero-sum dynamic games for continuous controls, one-sided payoff information, public state constraints and deterministic dynamics. First, the paper shows the existence of Nash equilibrium for such a game. However, this equilibrium requires mixing strategies over continuous spaces which can be intractable in general. Thus, the paper analyses the two stackelberg game relaxations of the Nash variant (one for each player as the leader and other as follower) corresponding to the security strategies of both players, and shows that the leader needs to consider at most II control atoms (where II is the cardinality of the payoff types) to find their security strategies. Further, the paper shows that in the limit when time discretization vanishes, the Nash gap corresponding to player's security strategies vanishes as well. Motivated by this, the game proposes a scheme to solve such games where players adaptively select upto I atoms. Finally, the paper validates their solver on two examples: a linear quadratic homing and a car chasing problem.

Critical strengths
  • The guarantee that players need to consider only a finite, known number of controls for equilibrium makes approximating Nash equilibrium tractable. This is quite useful for continuous-action games where existence of equilibrium is known but finding it is intractable in general.
Critical weaknesses
  • Presentation issues: With all due respect, the presentation of the paper makes it hard to follow. Several terms are used/prior results are cited abruptly without context, and I found myself having to read several sections repeatedly to understand them.
  • Related to above, the paper references [A] which is extremely relevant (solving the continuous-time game variant), but the paper never truly specifies how technically novel it is compared to [A]. My understanding is that [A] already introduces the dual game variant for player 2, and it is unclear to me whether the paper is merely an application of the same machinery to the discrete-time game variant or contains genuinely new technical machinery for analysis.

[A] State-Constrained Zero-Sum Differential Games with One-Sided Information. Ghimire et al., ICML 2024

Questions for authors
  1. What are the costs for the constrained car chasing example, is it also quadratic? If so, does the example use some sort of linearized unicycle dynamics?
  2. In eq 3, should the expectation be over ηi\eta_i or η\eta?
  3. What are the difficulties/novelties in extending the results of [A] referenced in the weaknesses section to the dynamic game setting?
  4. Can you make the algorithm 1 block more formal? Please write/point to the exact mathematical equations for each step.

Minor points

a. Please define GRU before usage.

b. In the statement of Theorem 4, please also cite [B] apart from mentioning it.

[B] On the state constraint problem for differential games. Koike, 1995.

2 comments

Presentation and technical novelty

“Several terms are used/prior results are cited abruptly without context.”

We have extensively edited the main narrative for readability. Section 3 now defines controls, observation timing, strategies, and safe-control sets before the analysis. The information-flow diagram compares the three games and their values.

“It is unclear to me whether the paper is merely an application of the same machinery to the discrete-time game variant or contains genuinely new technical machinery for analysis.”

“What are the difficulties/novelties in extending the results of [A] ... to the dynamic game setting?”

The advance is not simply a change from continuous to discrete time. The unconstrained comparison used in [A] bounds the payoff change caused by a small change in the trajectory. Under state constraints, that same change can make the trajectory unsafe or leave no safe continuation. The comparison must therefore establish safety before its payoff estimate can be used.

We establish value existence on a fixed grid and convergence under time refinement in separate steps. On each fixed grid, safe-control repairability gives the continuity needed for value existence and optimal strategies. Across refining grids, we construct a strategy using delayed averages of a lower-game strategy's controls. We prove that it remains safe at a slightly larger tolerance and that its payoff stays close. Selecting a common vanishing tolerance then makes the upper-lower value gap vanish. The earlier constrained formulation in Ghimire et al. (2024) does not provide this construction or the boundary comparison needed in its place.

 

Car dynamics and costs

“What are the costs for the constrained car chasing example, is it also quadratic? If so, does the example use some sort of linearized unicycle dynamics?”

The dynamics are control-affine but not linearized. Each car has position (X,Y)(X,Y), heading θ\theta, speed ww, and controls acceleration aa and curvature κ\kappa:

\dot\theta=w\kappa,\qquad \dot w=a-\gamma w.$$ The terminal loss penalizes P1's lateral deviation and velocity error relative to its intended exit. It also penalizes how far P1 remains short of the target, with no penalty for passing it. The corresponding lateral and velocity terms for P2 enter with the opposite sign. Finally, the term $-\|r_1-r_2\|^2/64$ rewards separation for P1, which minimizes the loss, and encourages pursuit for P2, which maximizes it. Collision avoidance is enforced separately for P1 as a constraint. The loss is not quadratic in the state variables $(X,Y,\theta,w)$. Together with the nonlinear dynamics and nonconvex constraints, this is not a linear-quadratic game. Appendix J.4 now gives the complete equations and terminal loss.   ### Expectation in Equation 3 > “In eq 3, should the expectation be over … or …?” Equation 3 writes the expectation explicitly as $\mathbb E_{i\sim p,\eta_i,\zeta}$. It averages over the type drawn from the belief at the start of the subgame and over both players' strategy randomization. #### Mathematical specification of Algorithm 1 > “Can you make the algorithm 1 block more formal? Please write/point to the exact mathematical equations for each step.” Appendix J.5 now specifies the optimization objective, response search, candidate score, insertion rule, and acceptance test. Algorithm 1 references the corresponding equation at each step. Section 5.2 points directly to both Algorithm 1 and Appendix J.5.   ### Minor points > “Please define GRU before usage.” We now write “gated recurrent unit (GRU)” at first use. > “In the statement of Theorem 4, please also cite [B] apart from mentioning it.” The revised proof uses delayed controls and vanishing constraint tolerances instead of Koike’s boundary argument. It therefore avoids the earlier smooth-boundary and strict-inward-direction requirements adopted from Koike's.

I thank the authors for their reply and the revised manuscript. I have no further questions for the authors

Reviewer_Nxd4OpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
3
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

In this paper, the authors study GG, a K-satge zero-sum dynamic game with continuous, simultaneous control, one-sided payoff information, and public state constraints. Given the intractability of Nash equilibrium of G, the authors introduces a pair of information-relaxation Stackelberg variants of G where one player move first and the other player best-respond. The authors prove that the Nash leaders in these variants use at most I control atoms at any information states, and show that under sufficient game-theoretical and geometric assumptions, the pair of atomic leader strategies have vanishing exploitability in G which enabling approximation to the Nash via atomic strategy restriction and bounded control-atom insertion.

Finally, the authors demonstrated their method in a Hexner's game and a car chaging game.

Critical strengths

-The problem itself is very challenging and the technical contribution is solid in my opinion. The paper studies a class of games that combine four challenges: (1) continuous action spaces, (2) asymmetric information between players, (3) continuous dynamic evolvement of the state, and (4) hard state constraints. These ingredients make the problem itself very challenging, but I think the model definition is clean despite the complexity. The idea of using two information relaxation games is not novel in this paper, but I still think it's a very elegant framework, and the technical analysis seems to be solid. The authors present P1 and P2 I-atomicity, convergence toward Nash, relaxation-width certificate, bounded atom insertion and safety-aware solver, which seem to be coherent and sound results.

Critical weaknesses

My main concern is the technical contribution of this paper compared against the prior works of Ghimire et al. (2026) and Ghimire et al. (2024). Ghimire et al. (2026) established atomic primal–dual strategies and their convergence toward Nash equilibrium in unconstrained differential games with one-sided information, and Ghimire et al. (2024) developed a framework for state-constrained games with one-sided information. Thus, to me this paper may seems to combine the techniques used in both papers. Therefore, I would really appreciate if the authors can better clarify the theoretical advances of this paper beyond these two prior results? In particular, which steps of the convergence argument in Ghimire et al. (2026) fail under state constraints, and which new technical ideas are essential to overcome those difficulties? Are those ideas presented in Ghimire et al. (2024) already? I feel this matters for my evaluation for the novelty and technical contribution for the paper, and if the author can clarify considerable technical contributions beyond the two existing papers, I would love to increase my rating.

Questions for authors
  • Does the state-constrained convergence theorem establish something genuinely beyond what can be obtained by directly combining the Ghimire et al. (2026) and Ghimire et al. (2024) results?
  • Are Assumptions 2–5 sufficiently general and verifiable that the theorem meaningfully covers interesting constrained games?
4 comments

New contributions over Ghimire et al. (2024, 2026)

“Which steps of the convergence argument in Ghimire et al. (2026) fail under state constraints, and which new technical ideas are essential to overcome those difficulties?”

To show that the upper and lower values become close, the proof must turn a strategy for one information pattern into a strategy for the other without substantially changing its payoff. Under state constraints, the resulting strategy must also keep the state feasible throughout the remaining horizon against every admitted opponent. Closeness of the two trajectories does not ensure this: a small displacement can violate a constraint or reach a state from which P1 can no longer avoid a later violation. This is the additional step that the unconstrained payoff estimate does not establish. The successor-state estimate in Ghimire et al. (2026), Appendix C, Equation 28 and the following calculation does not establish either of these safety requirements.

“Are those ideas presented in Ghimire et al. (2024) already?”

Ghimire et al. (2024) introduce the constrained primal–dual formulation, but their Appendix A concludes that the upper and lower values coincide by invoking an unconstrained comparison theorem. Cardaliaguet's comparison theorem, Theorem 5.1, is stated on the full state space, not a constrained one. In the constrained game, a finite continuation value is available only at states from which P1 can satisfy the constraints for the rest of the game against every opponent. This set is the viability region. At its boundary, arbitrarily nearby states can lie outside that region, where P1 cannot guarantee a feasible continuation. The comparison theorem must therefore account for this boundary. Its full-space statement cannot simply be applied on the viability region. The 2024 proof does not establish a comparison principle with the required boundary conditions. Thus its formulation does not supply the missing constrained convergence argument.

“Does the state-constrained convergence theorem establish something genuinely beyond what can be obtained by directly combining the Ghimire et al. (2026) and Ghimire et al. (2024) results?”

Yes. We prove that the constructed strategy satisfies the constraints, up to a vanishing tolerance, throughout the remaining horizon against every admitted opponent. Start with a P1 strategy in the lower game, where P1 observes P2's current action before choosing its own. This strategy generates a reference trajectory. To construct P1's strategy in the upper game, where P1 must act first, we average reference controls from an earlier time window and hold that average until the next decision. The average uses only completed observations, so it respects the upper game's information rules.

We then prove that the two state trajectories remain close. The constructed trajectory satisfies the constraints at a slightly larger tolerance, and its payoff differs by a vanishing amount. Backward induction shows that each chosen control leads to a state from which P1 can continue satisfying the constraints against every admitted opponent. Finally, we select a common tolerance, tending to zero with the time grid, at which the upper–lower value difference vanishes. Appendix E gives the construction. This argument supplies the safety step missing from a direct combination of the earlier results. The fixed-grid value proof uses classical minimax and backward-induction methods, see Sion (1958). Our new contribution there is the explicit repairability condition that makes these methods applicable to the state-dependent safe-control sets. The exploitability vanishing result is an additional new result from this paper.

Generality and verification of assumptions

“Are Assumptions 2–5 sufficiently general and verifiable that the theorem meaningfully covers interesting constrained games?”

The revised Theorem 4 replaces the earlier Assumptions 3–5. It permits coupled control-affine dynamics, nonconvex or nonsmooth state constraints with Lipschitz defining functions, and state-dependent control constraints convex in P1's control. It no longer requires a smooth viability boundary or a strict inward direction. In exchange, its conclusion concerns a sequence of games whose allowed constraint violation tends to zero, rather than convergence in the hard-constrained game.

Beyond its regularity and convexity hypotheses, the theorem requires two safety conditions. First, from the given initial state, P1 can keep every violation arbitrarily small over the entire horizon against every opponent. A safe strategy against every admitted opponent is sufficient. Second, the repairability condition used in Theorem 1 (Assumption 2) must hold at suitable positive tolerances: a held control with a small safety residual must admit a small correction that makes the entire hold and its successor feasible.

Empirical test of Assumption 2: For car chasing, the expanded repair audit tests 3,840 candidate controls at 120 states and four tolerances. All were repaired under the implemented constraints, including the learned successor condition. A further 1,024 tests perturb states around active controls; the largest correction decreases as the state perturbation shrinks. The tests support local repair in the numerical model. They do not certify Assumption 2.

Thank you for the detailed responses and additional experiments. My concern about the novelty of the technical contributions is mostly addressed.

However, I still have one remaining concern about the revised Theorem 4. If I understand correctly, it now establishes vanishing exploitability only for a sequence of relaxed-constraint games rather than the original hard-constrained game. Does the result provide any guarantee that these approximately feasible strategies can be converted into admissible, asymptotically Nash-optimal strategies for the original game? If not, I think this is an important limitation of the revised convergence guarantee.

Yes, your understanding of the revised Theorem 4 is correct. The theorem establishes vanishing exploitability in the discrete-time games GΠn,dnG_{\Pi_n,d_n}, together with the uniform constraint bound cj(x(t))≤dnc_j(x(t))\le d_n throughout the horizon, where dn→0d_n\to0.

For algorithm development, this limitation does not prevent enforcing safety during strategy optimization. Our car implementation already checks constraints much more frequently than players choose controls. Controls are held for every 0.50.5 seconds, while the reported P1 training evaluates safety over 2,048 subintervals per hold, with additional bounds on road position and separation between samples. P2 response searches use 4,096 subintervals, increased to 8,192 in selected follow-up checks. These checks approximate the requirement that constraints hold throughout each control interval, rather than only at decision times. Safety corrections are included during policy evaluation and training.

We note that separating performance optimization from safety enforcement is an established practice in control and robotics. For example, Ames et al. (2017) enforce control-barrier-function conditions through quadratic programming for adaptive cruise control and lane keeping. Wabersich and Zeilinger (2021) use a predictive safety filter to check and modify a proposed control. These methods provide safety guarantees during physical deployment. Our implementation follows this separation of roles.

The difficulty towards a more elegant theorem is preserving equilibrium performance when removing the constraint tolerance. A small constraint violation does not alone guarantee an exactly feasible strategy with a similar worst-case payoff. Correcting an action can change the subsequent trajectory, the opponent’s observations, and its responses. Our repairability assumption (Assumption 2) controls how much a stage action must change to satisfy the constraints at a fixed tolerance. It does not establish that strategies feasible with positive tolerance can be converted into hard-feasible strategies while preserving their security payoffs as the time grid is refined. A stronger result would require a repair construction that guarantees both exact feasibility and a vanishing change in security payoffs. Such a result is possible for particular dynamics, constraints, and payoffs, but is not yet established for the scope of games we study here.

Finally, Theorems 1–3 are established for the hard-constrained game without introducing constraint slack.

Comments on the paper

1 comment
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Executive summary

We thank the reviewers for recognizing the difficulty of combining continuous controls, private payoff information, nonlinear dynamics, and state constraints. We have revised the paper around reviewers' questions. Changes in the revision are highlighted in blue.

New theoretical contributions. Our theoretical advances beyond existing work are threefold: (1) an explicit repairability-based proof of value existence on each time grid for games with one-sided payoff information and state constraints, (2) a sharper optimal lower-game support bound for P2, from I+1I+1 to II actions at each information state, and (3) a new constrained convergence argument proving vanishing exploitability of the resulting security pair along finer time grids with a selected constraint tolerance tending to zero. These results justify approximating equilibrium through direct security-strategy optimization. Our solver optimizes strategies against best responses, without approximating the value over the entire time–state–belief space used in Ghimire et al. (2024), and extends the strategy-solving approach of Ghimire et al. (2026) to constrained games. Lean verifies the value, atomicity, and vanishing-gap proofs for the auxiliary games used in the analysis. The formal-verification section links the declarations.

Computational contribution. We provide a practical solver for an eight-state nonlinear car-chasing game with three private exit intentions, nonconvex road and separation constraints, and actuator limits. Figure 3 and the matching animation show the retained security pair together with responses found during training.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

Related papers

Loading the map…

Discussion (0)

Sign in to comment.