- Rating
- 2(+1)
- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2(+1)
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Paper summary
The manuscript proposes intent laundering, an LLM-based prompt rewriting method for evaluating adversarial safety datasets and performing black-box jailbreak attacks. It combines connotation neutralization to replace harmful expressions with neutral alternatives and context transposition to reformulate real-world scenarios into fictional contexts while preserving malicious intent. It further incorporates an iterative revision-regeneration mechanism to refine failed attacks. Experiments on AdvBench, HarmBench, and StrongREJECT across ten LLMs report increased attack success rates after intent laundering and subsequent revisions.
Critical strengths
The manuscript investigates the influence of harmful prompt formulations on safety evaluation across multiple datasets and LLMs. However, several concerns remain regarding the experimental design, and methodological contribution.
Critical weaknesses
1. Questionable Motivation Regarding Existing Safety Benchmarks
AdvBench, HarmBench, and StrongREJECT primarily provide harmful requests as target behaviors for evaluating jailbreak attacks, rather than realistic jailbreak prompt themselves. Therefore, the prevalence of explicit harmful expressions does not necessarily indicate a fundamental flaw in these benchmarks. Evaluating such requests without considering the jailbreak attacks they are designed to support does not sufficiently justify the manuscript's broader claims about the unreliability of existing safety evaluations.
2. Insufficient Validation of the Effect of Triggering Cues
Intent laundering simultaneously modifies harmful expressions, contextual framing, and prompt detail. However, the manuscript lacks ablation studies separating connotation neutralization and context transposition, as well as comparisons with simpler rewriting baselines. Consequently, it remains unclear whether the reported ASR improvements are specifically attributable to removing triggering cues rather than other changes introduced during prompt rewriting.
3. Limited Novelty and Missing Comparisons with Existing Jailbreak Methods
The proposed approach relies on LLM-based prompt rewriting and iterative regeneration, which overlap with existing jailbreak strategies. Although the manuscript explicitly presents intent laundering as a standalone jailbreak method, it does not compare against existing jailbreak attacks under comparable settings. This makes it difficult to assess its methodological novelty and effectiveness relative to prior work.
Questions for authors
Please see the weaknesses above.
2 comments
Official Rebuttal by Authors (2/2)
- Limited Novelty and Missing Comparisons with Existing Jailbreak Methods: The proposed approach relies on LLM-based prompt rewriting and iterative regeneration, which overlap with existing jailbreak strategies. Although the manuscript explicitly presents intent laundering as a standalone jailbreak method, it does not compare against existing jailbreak attacks under comparable settings. This makes it difficult to assess its methodological novelty and effectiveness relative to prior work.
Thank you for your input. We would like to clarify that our primary contribution is not a new jailbreaking method, but a systematic evaluation of the quality of widely used adversarial safety datasets. Four of our five contributions concern these datasets and the safety evaluations built on them (lines 120–132). Its use as a standalone jailbreaking technique (lines 111–117) is an adaptation of intent laundering, and excluding it would not affect the core content or claims of the paper. In other words, prompt rewriting is our tool, not our finding. To the best of our knowledge, no prior jailbreaking study examines the quality of safety datasets or traces model refusals back to how these datasets are constructed.
Regarding comparisons with existing jailbreak attacks, intent laundering already achieves ASR values of 90.00–100.00% across all tested models and datasets (Tables 1–3, lines 366–369), including models known for strong safety, such as Gemini 3 Pro and Claude Sonnet 3.7. With performance already close to saturation, comparisons with other jailbreaking methods would not add meaningful insight.
Finally, we appreciate the opportunity to discuss our work in depth and are thankful for your valuable input. We hope our responses have effectively addressed your concerns, and we remain open to further discussion.
References:
[1] Probabilistic Machine Learning: An Introduction (Murphy, MIT Press 2022)
[2] Reflections on Trusting Trust (Thompson, Communications of the ACM 1984)
[3] The Art of Deception: Controlling the Human Element of Security (Mitnick & Simon, Wiley 2002)
[4] Red Teaming Language Models to Reduce Harms: Methods, Scaling Behaviors, and Lessons Learned (Ganguli et al., arXiv 2022)
[5] Adversarial Classification (Dalvi et al., KDD 2004)
[6] Can Machine Learning Be Secure? (Barreno et al., ASIACCS 2006)
[7] Intriguing Properties of Neural Networks (Szegedy et al., ICLR 2014)
[8] Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networks (Carlini & Wagner, IEEE S&P 2017)
[9] Novelty Detection and Neural Network Validation (Bishop, ICANN 1993)
[10] A Review of Novelty Detection (Pimentel et al., Signal Processing 2014)
[11] A Baseline for Detecting Misclassified and Out-of-Distribution Examples in Neural Networks (Hendrycks & Gimpel, ICLR 2017)
Official Rebuttal by Authors (1/2)
Thank you for recognizing our investigation of how harmful prompt formulations influence safety evaluation across multiple datasets and LLMs. We appreciate your detailed feedback. We address your concerns below in the same order they are listed.
Thank you for your input. We respectfully disagree with the view that "the prevalence of explicit harmful expressions does not necessarily indicate a fundamental flaw in these benchmarks." As with any dataset, the purpose of a safety dataset is to approximate the real-world distribution of the data it is meant to evaluate; otherwise, it cannot support meaningful conclusions. This is a basic premise of machine learning: evaluation data must represent the distribution a model faces in the real world. As stated by Murphy, whose textbooks have long served as standard references in machine learning, the test set is used "to estimate future performance (the population risk)", i.e., the expected loss under "the true (but unknown) distribution" of the data [1, Section 1.2.3]. In AI safety, this distribution consists of real-world adversarial attacks (lines 36–40).
As discussed in Section 2 (lines 136–145), such attacks have three long-established characteristics, each grounded in decades of security and machine learning research:
Data points that state malicious intent through overt triggering cues contradict these characteristics, regardless of whether they serve as direct requests or as target behaviors for jailbreak attacks. Our results show the consequence: once triggering cues are removed while the malicious intent is preserved, the mean ASR rises from 3.86% to 87.54% on AdvBench, from 10.55% to 79.10% on HarmBench, and from 3.54% to 88.06% on StrongREJECT (Tables 1–3). Therefore, the safety measured by these datasets largely reflects the detection of triggering cues rather than robustness to malicious intent, which supports our conclusions about the reliability of existing safety evaluations.
Thank you for your input. We would like to clarify that the rewriting performed by intent laundering and the removal of triggering cues are not two separate factors. Intent laundering consists of two complementary components, which are applied together (lines 96–100 and 276–285): in connotation neutralization, triggering expressions are replaced with neutral/positive or descriptive alternatives; in context transposition, real-world scenarios and referents that can act as triggering cues are mapped to non-real-world contexts. Since both components serve one single purpose—abstracting away triggering cues while preserving the malicious intent—their impact is combined by nature. Therefore, the increase in ASR is attributable to the removal of triggering cues, which is the core objective of intent laundering.