- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 3
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper proposes a new large language model fingerprinting scheme, which can be robust to fine-pruning operations. First, they create the fingerprinting pair. Then they find the most similar input-output pair from the normal corpus and constrain the gradient similarity between the normal pair and the fingerprint pair. This makes the fingerprinting pair hard to be forgotten by model fine-pruning. Experiments show the effectiveness of the fingerprinting design.
Critical strengths
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This paper's logic is easy to follow, and the problem formulation is very clear.
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The fingerprinting design is reasonable and intuitive, simple but effective.
Critical weaknesses
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I have concerns about the reported 0% false positive rate. Since Cambium uses semantic embedding similarity for verification, clean models may also produce responses similar to the target fingerprint. Particularly, fingerprint gradient are aligned with some normal tasks.
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Section 3.1 could be clearer by explicitly defining the threat model, like the attacker's knowledge and capabilities.
Questions for authors
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Could clean models produce semantically similar fingerprint responses and pass the verification threshold?
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Please clarify the threat model in Section 3.1 to improve the paper's clarity.
2 comments
Dear Reviewer 6Amw,
Thank you again for your encouraging assessment and thoughtful feedback. We greatly value your comments and would appreciate hearing whether our responses have satisfactorily addressed your concerns.
We have approached this research with great care and have given the same careful attention to the points you raised. If our responses have resolved your concerns, we would appreciate it if you could take these clarifications into account in your final assessment.
We would be happy to provide any further clarification you may need. Your feedback is very valuable to us. Thank you again for your time and consideration.
Best regards, The Authors
Thank you for your thoughtful review and for recognizing the clarity and rationale of Cambium. We sincerely appreciate your suggestions and the opportunity to clarify your concerns. We respond to each point below.
W1 / Q1. Can a clean model pass semantic verification?
Thank you for raising this question. We would like to clarify that although Cambium selects target tokens from the model's natural output distribution, it excludes the highest-probability tokens at each step after the first token. Repeatedly selecting these less likely tokens makes the complete target fingerprint response unlikely to be generated naturally by the clean model. Table 1 provides evidence that clean-model responses also remain far from the target responses in embedding similarity. Across four models on two task datasets, the mean embedding similarities range from 0.1273 to 0.2006, well below the default verification threshold of 0.7.
We further expanded the evaluation to test whether models without the fingerprint could pass semantic verification. For each of four source models, we selected 100 additional fingerprint pairs using Cambium's generation procedure and queried the corresponding clean model and each of the other three models 100 times per prompt. At the default threshold of 0.7, no false positives were observed across 160,000 queries. These results provide further evidence that responses from clean and unrelated models are unlikely to pass semantic verification against the target fingerprint responses under the evaluated conditions.
In the revision: Appendix A.3 and Table 5 report the evaluation and clarify that the observed 0% FPR applies to the evaluated pairs and models. Section 5.4 links it to the default verification settings.
W2 / Q2. Attacker knowledge and capabilities
Thank you for your suggestion to clarify the threat model. We agree that the attacker's knowledge and capabilities should be clearly specified.
Section 3.1 focuses on the central problem studied in this paper: the damage to embedded fingerprints caused by fine-pruning during model deployment. Due to space constraints, we discuss malicious attacks aimed at weakening or removing fingerprints in Appendix A.6. This appendix details the attacker's knowledge and capabilities, the specific attacks considered, and their experimental evaluation. The attacker has white-box access to the model and may know the fingerprinting algorithm, training procedure, and verification rule, but does not know the owner's secret fingerprint prompts or target responses. We evaluate continued fine-tuning, model merging, quantization, and fingerprint overwrite attacks.
In the revision: Section 3.1 clarifies the deployer's access, confidentiality of the pairs, and fingerprint embedding before fine-pruning. Appendix A.6 explicitly describes adversarial knowledge and capabilities.