- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 3
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper uses agents to perform a large-scale scan for potential reward hacking across multiple benchmarks and validates the candidate attacks with a deterministic verification framework. Across 567 environments from 18 benchmark families, the authors validate 1,116 attacks in 79.9% of the environments and then use an LLM to categorize these attacks.
Critical strengths
The paper runs audits on 567 environments from 18 benchmark families and validates 1,116 attacks in 79.9% of the environments through paired execution. Of 25 attacks tested on the original SWE-bench evaluation, 17 reproduce, indicating that the findings do not depend solely on the audit environment and can provide benchmark developers with concrete evidence of vulnerabilities.
Critical weaknesses
- The method relies only on agent auditing and paired testing to identify tasks that may contain reward hacking, and its outputs lack human verification, so the overall novelty is limited.
- The hacking behaviors found in Harbor environments are difficult to verify in the original test environments, and the existing validation is limited to SWE-bench, so whether these behaviors transfer remains undetermined.
Questions for authors
- Could the authors discuss how well the hacking issues they identify transfer to other benchmarks?
- Could the authors disclose the models and agent frameworks used in the audit, along with the associated costs?