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Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Which Preferences to Train On? End-to-End Multi-Objective Alignment with an Adversarial Preference Distribution

Abstract

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values is important for safe, efficient, and beneficial AI deployment. However, human values are multifaceted: helpfulness, harmlessness and humor trade off against one another, and different users want different trade-offs. Multi-objective alignment (MOA) addresses this by training a policy that can provide any point of the Pareto front, but existing methods either train one model per preference, interpolate a few separately aligned experts post hoc, or train a single conditioned model without considering which preferences it should be trained on. Since the hard regions of the preference simplex depend on the objectives at hand, existing methods leave them under-trained and do not get the most out of a single model. Therefore, we propose MAESTRO (**M**ulti-objective **A**lignment via **E**nd-to-end **ST**eering and **R**obust **O**ptimization), which trains a single prompt-conditioned policy end-to-end with RL against an **adversarial** preference distribution: a Dirichlet distribution updated by online mirror descent toward the preferences the current policy serves worst, rather than on a fixed distribution. On HH-RLHF, BeaverTails and summarization, with up to three objectives, MAESTRO attains the best Pareto front on most tasks in a single training run, at the lowest training cost among all methods. The largest margins appear in the hard regions that a fixed preference distribution leaves under-trained, confirming that a single prompt-conditioned model is capable of covering the objective trade-offs on its own.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
multi-objective alignment, RLHF, LLMs, Pareto front, minimax optimization

Reviews

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Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.67 over 3 reviews, above 70% of the others.
Reviewer_rKJZOpenReview ↗
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2
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3
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3(+1)
Presentation
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3(+1)
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Paper summary

This paper studies multi-objective alignment of LLMs, where a single model is expected to produce different trade-offs among objectives according to a user-specified preference vector. The paper focuses on the training-time preference distribution: existing preference-conditioned methods typically train under a fixed distribution over the preference simplex, although the difficult regions of the simplex may depend on the objectives and on the current policy.

The proposed method, MAESTRO, conditions a single policy on the preference vector through the prompt and trains it using PPO with linearly scalarized rewards. Its main additional mechanism is an adversarial preference sampler: the sampling distribution is parameterized as a Dirichlet distribution whose concentration parameters are updated online using a score-function estimator and unnormalized exponentiated gradient / online mirror descent, with the goal of allocating more training to poorly served preference regions. A batch-relative rank-based reward surrogate is used for the adversary to reduce sensitivity to heterogeneous reward scales. The method is evaluated on HH-RLHF, BeaverTails, and Reddit TL;DR with two- and three-objective settings. The experiments compare against per-preference training, model-merging approaches, and single-model alignment methods, and include fixed-distribution ablations, multiple-seed Pareto-front metrics, reward-model robustness checks, and training-cost comparisons.

Critical strengths
  1. The paper identifies a concrete and practically relevant training issue in preference-conditioned MOA and evaluates it with a reasonably well-controlled ablation. The strongest part of the paper is not the general idea of training a steerable multi-objective model, but the observation that a fixed preference-sampling distribution can serve different objective pairs very differently. The fixed-Dirichlet ablation in Fig. 4 is particularly useful because it keeps the policy-training framework largely unchanged while varying the component that MAESTRO is intended to improve. This provides reasonably direct evidence that adaptive allocation of training preferences can improve Pareto coverage and worst-preference performance.
  2. The empirical evaluation is relatively thorough for the specific mechanism being proposed. Beyond the main Pareto-front plots, the paper reports five-seed HV/IP/MSR/PGAP results, fixed-sampling and surrogate ablations, sensitivity analyses, held-out reward-model evaluation, and a training-cost comparison. In particular, the improvements on the two BeaverTails objective pairs are substantially larger than the reported seed-level variation, which makes the central empirical effect more convincing.
Critical weaknesses

The main weakness is the limited novelty relative to the existing multi-objective alignment literature. Several key ingredients of MAESTRO—single-model preference-conditioned alignment, inference-time preference steering, linear scalarization, and training over sampled preference vectors—have already appeared in closely related works such as Panacea, RiC, CLP and MO-ODPO. The main identifiable novelty therefore appears to be the adaptive adversarial learning of the preference-sampling distribution through the Dirichlet update. While the experiments show this mechanism is useful, I find the overall methodological contribution relatively incremental. I would encourage the authors to clarify more explicitly how MAESTRO differs technically from these closest prior works, and whether the particular coupling of its components yields a genuinely new mechanism or capability beyond a composition of established ingredients.

Questions for authors
  1. Appendix E.5 states that the adversary update using Eq. (10) is a stochastic-gradient heuristic rather than an unbiased gradient of the minimax objective in Eq. (6). Which theoretical results in Appendix E should be interpreted as guarantees for the actual Algorithm 1, and which only characterize the idealized minimax objective?

  2. The paper argues that the difficult regions of the preference simplex can move as the policy improves. Could the authors show how the learned Dirichlet parameters or preference distribution evolve during training, together with the corresponding per-preference performance? This would help verify whether the adversary is actually tracking dynamically changing hard regions.

5 comments

We thank the reviewer for recognizing the practical importance of preference sampling, for highlighting the controlled fixed-Dirichlet ablation in Figure 4 as evidence that adaptive allocation can improve Pareto coverage, and for noting the breadth of our empirical evaluation and the gains on both BeaverTails pairs.

We appreciate the questions about MAESTRO’s technical novelty, the relationship between Algorithm 1 and the analysis in Appendix E, and the evolution of the preference distribution during training. We address these points below through (i) a comparison with the closest prior work, (ii) Proposition 4 and Corollary 1, newly added in Appendix E.5, and (iii) new trajectory diagnostics alongside per-preference performance in Appendix D.12 and Figure 15.

W1. The main weakness is the limited novelty relative to the existing multi-objective alignment literature.

Several key ingredients of MAESTRO — single-model preference-conditioned alignment, inference-time preference steering...

As the reviewer notes, adaptive preference sampling is the central contribution. MAESTRO formulates the training preference distribution as the inner optimization variable of a minimax alignment problem and updates it online from the current policy's rollouts. Below, we explain what motivated the formulation, what makes its inner minimization challenging and how we address it, and what the experiments show beyond the evaluations in prior work.

What motivated the formulation. Panacea samples training preferences from a fixed distribution over the simplex, while RiC takes them from the relabeled data on which it trains a reward-conditioned policy. CLP and MO-ODPO sample from a fixed Dirichlet and both report that its concentration matters: MO-ODPO tunes it per task, and CLP finds a prompt-conditioned baseline sensitive to it. Our fixed-α\alpha ablation extends this comparison to five settings and five seeds (Figure 4, Table 8). This motivates treating the sampling distribution as part of the alignment problem, so we formulate a minimax objective over an ambiguity set P\mathcal P of preference distributions (4).

What makes the inner minimization challenging. However, the worst-case distribution depends on the current policy and can move as the policy is trained, so it has to be tracked during training, and its payoff is observable only through rollouts of that policy. Over all preference distributions, moreover, the minimum is attained at a point mass on the single worst preference, which credits improvement there alone. Finally, since the inner minimization compares scalarized returns across preferences, an objective whose rewards are numerically larger can dominate which preferences it selects.

How we address it. We parameterize the inner distribution as a Dirichlet, which keeps it from collapsing to a point mass, and update its concentration by unnormalized exponentiated gradient (UEG) with a score-function estimate from the current policy's rollouts. Interleaving these updates with PPO lets the allocation of a finite training budget respond to which preferences the policy currently serves poorly. We also score the adversary on the per-objective rank surrogate of Eq. (10), which compares each reward only within its own objective and bounds it to [0,1][0,1]; Proposition 4 identifies the objective this update descends (Appendix E.5).

What the experiments show. The fixed-α\alpha ablation (Appendix D.13, Table 8) isolates the adversary by holding the policy architecture, rewards, data, and PPO update fixed. MAESTRO ranks first in 1111 of the 2020 setting–metric combinations and second in 33 more. The best fixed concentration varies by setting and metric, whereas MAESTRO uses the same adversary learning rate (η=0.1\eta=0.1) and clamps on α\boldsymbol\alpha in all five two-objective settings and achieves the best average HV rank (1.41.4 vs. 2.22.2–3.43.4 for the fixed baselines). On BeaverTails, it improves mean HV over the strongest fixed baseline on both pairs (10.59010.590 vs. 10.12110.121 on Harmless–Helpful, 8.8678.867 vs. 8.2658.265 on Humor–Helpful). While this ablation measures the benefit of learning the distribution, Appendix D.12 (Figure 15) shows how the policy-dependent allocation operates within a training run: at all 1616 checkpoints across four settings, the sampling density is positively correlated with the preference difficulty −ht-h_t.

Beyond the adversary, on both datasets a policy trained on Harmless–Helpful traces a front on Humor–Helpful when we change only the prefix at inference (Figure 13), while the base SFT model given the same prompts produces no comparable front, evidence that the learned preference steering can transfer across the tested objective pairs. When all methods' responses are re-scored with held-out RMs (Figure 8), MAESTRO retains the outermost Harmless–Helpful front on BeaverTails and stays level with MORLHF on HH-RLHF.

Q1. Which theoretical results in Appendix E should be interpreted as guarantees for the actual Algorithm 1, and which only characterize the idealized minimax objective?

Appendix E.5 states that the adversary update using Eq. (10) is a stochastic-gradient heuristic rather than an unbiased gradient of the minimax objective in Eq. (6). Which theoretical…

We thank the reviewer for asking us to distinguish these scopes explicitly. Proposition 4 and Corollary 1, added in the revision, describe Algorithm 1, namely what its adversary step estimates and which policy optima it targets, while Propositions 1–3 and Lemma 1 characterize the idealized objective.

As the reviewer notes, the adversary update using Eq. (10) is not an unbiased estimator of the raw-return gradient in Eq. (7), which is why the submission called it a heuristic. Proposition 4 replaces that description: with the policy and the comparison distribution fixed, as the update itself does, the adversary is scored on Ew∼pα[J~w(πθ)]\mathbb E_{\mathbf w\sim p_{\boldsymbol\alpha}}[\tilde J_{\mathbf w}(\pi_\theta)], the inner objective of Eq. (6) with each reward replaced by its population soft rank, and Eq. (8) with a batch-independent baseline is its score-function gradient estimator for every τ>0\tau>0.

However, since the policy update uses the original scalarized rewards at every sampled preference, the surrogate reaches the policy only through α\boldsymbol\alpha. Using this, Corollary 1 shows that, under exact simultaneous realizability, no choice of the adversary's feedback changes the policy's global maximizers, which solve Eq. (6), so the surrogate changes how training is allocated across preferences without changing the global policy target. Outside exact realizability, our claim about the update is limited to Proposition 4; we do not claim that the alternating procedure converges to a solution of Eq. (6). Empirically, replacing the surrogate with the raw payoff, for which Eq. (8) estimates the gradient (7) up to a constant factor, gives comparable fronts on BeaverTails Harmless–Helpful and slightly worse ones on Humor–Helpful (Figure 6, Appendix D.3).

Propositions 1–3 and Lemma 1 do not involve the adversary's feedback, so they remain valid under their stated assumptions independently of the surrogate; they characterize the robust objective, the ambiguity set, and KL scaling. Our response to Reviewer UyMg's Q1 details Proposition 4 and the scope of each remaining result, and shows that the allocation still follows J~w\tilde J_{\mathbf w} under Algorithm 1's same-batch baseline (Appendix D.12).

Q2. Could the authors show how the learned Dirichlet parameters or preference distribution evolve during training, together with the corresponding per-preference performance?

The paper argues that the difficult regions of the preference simplex can move as the policy improves. Could the authors… This would help verify whether the adversary is actually tracking dynamically changing hard regions.

We thank the reviewer for this request. Appendix D.12 and Figure 15 report the learned Dirichlet parameters and sampling distributions together with per-preference performance on four settings: HH-RLHF and BeaverTails, each with Harmless–Helpful and Humor–Helpful. We evaluate four checkpoints per setting, 16 checkpoints in total. Difficulty is measured by ht(w)=J~w(πθt)h_t(w)=\tilde J_{\mathbf w}(\pi_{\theta_t}), the population soft-rank payoff evaluated on held-out prompts with the checkpoint policy frozen, where ww is the weight on the first objective, so lower ww places more weight on helpfulness; lower hth_t means harder.

The sampling distribution tracks the current difficulty in all four settings. Sampling density is positively correlated with −ht(w)-h_t(w) at all 16 checkpoints, with a median correlation of 0.810.81. The concentration on helpfulness rises at every checkpoint, including the last of each run, and the total concentration grows in all four runs, so these trajectories do not support early stabilization at an effectively fixed α\boldsymbol\alpha.

Where the hard region moves, the sampling distribution follows it. On HH-RLHF Humor–Helpful, the hardest preference moves from w=0.4w=0.4 toward w=0.1w=0.1–0.20.2, and the sampling mean follows from 0.390.39 to 0.140.14. In the other three settings, the hardest region remains approximately stable near w=0.4w=0.4–0.50.5. The introduction now points to this observation (Appendix D.12).

Figure 15 presents the sampling trajectories, checkpoint densities, difficulty landscapes, and corresponding fronts together. Our response to Reviewer HipV's Q1 gives the full definition of hth_t and discusses how the fronts change.

Dear Reviewer rKJZ,

Thank you again for your review. It raised three concerns: (1) that our contribution is relatively incremental, (2) which results in Appendix E are guarantees for Algorithm 1 (also raised by Reviewer UyMg), and (3) whether the adversary is actually tracking hard regions (also raised by Reviewer HipV).

For (1), as the reviewer noted, the contribution of our work lies in learning the preference-sampling distribution: prior work trains on preferences drawn from a fixed distribution or from relabeled data, whereas MAESTRO makes this distribution the inner variable of a minimax problem. This inner problem is not trivial: the worst-case distribution depends on the current policy and can move during training. We therefore parameterize it as a Dirichlet and update it online from the current policy's rollouts. In Table 8, we extended the fixed-α\alpha ablation to all five two-objective settings over five seeds, which isolates the mechanism: MAESTRO ranks first in 11 of the 20 setting–metric pairs. For (2), we added Proposition 4 and Corollary 1 (Appendix E.5), which clarify the relation between the objective and Algorithm 1 itself, while Propositions 1–3 and Lemma 1 characterize the idealized objective regardless of the algorithm. For (3), Figure 15 shows that the sampling density is positively correlated with per-preference difficulty at all 16 checkpoints and follows the hard region where it moves (HH-RLHF Humor–Helpful), and we scoped the introduction's claim to this setting.

As the discussion period approaches its end, we would greatly appreciate hearing whether these revisions resolve your concerns, or whether any point remains insufficiently resolved. Please feel free to ask if you have any further questions.

Thank you,

Authors

Reviewer_HipVOpenReview ↗
Rating
3
Confidence
4(+1)
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
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Paper summary

This paper studies multi-objective alignment, where one model should follow any user-given trade-off between objectives such as harmlessness, helpfulness and humor. The authors propose MAESTRO. It writes the preference vector ww into the prompt and trains a single policy with PPO on the weighted sum of rewards. The main idea is how ww is sampled during training. Instead of a fixed Dirichlet distribution, the paper treats the Dirichlet parameter α\alpha as an adversary in a minimax objective. Experiments use LLaMA-2-7B with LoRA on HH-RLHF, BeaverTails and Reddit TL;DR, with up to three objectives. MAESTRO is compared with MORLHF, Rewarded Soups, Bone Soups, RiC and Panacea. It gives the best Pareto fronts on most tasks and the best worst-case metrics on BeaverTails, at the lowest training cost.

Critical strengths
  1. The method is simple and practical

MAESTRO only changes how preferences are sampled during training. It needs no new architecture and no reward ranges, and the adversary adds almost no extra cost.

  1. Solid experiments

The paper uses three datasets and up to three objectives, reports results over five seeds, and re-scores all methods with held-out reward models (Figure 8). It also checks sensitivity to τ\tau, the learning rate, the system prompt, and the KL coefficient.

Critical weaknesses
  1. No direct evidence that the adversary works as claimed

The main idea of this paper is that α\alpha moves sampling toward the preferences the current policy serves worst, and that these hard regions change during training. Most parts of the method are already known (prompt conditioning, DRO, Dirichlet sampling, exponentiated gradient), so the value of the paper rests on this mechanism. But the paper never shows it. There is no plot of α\alpha over training, no plot of where the sampled w go, and no plot of the return at each w over training. Without this, the gains could come from something simpler. For example, α\alpha may move to some value early and then stay there, which would be the same as a well-tuned fixed α\alpha. I would like to see (a) the trajectory of α during training, (b) the return at each w on the grid at several checkpoints, showing that the sampling mass goes to the w with the lowest return at that time, and (c) whether the hard region actually moves as training goes on.

  1. Key comparisons are not reported with numbers

The ablation against fixed α\alpha is the most important experiment in the paper, but it is only shown in Figure 4, only on HH-RLHF, with no HV or MSR values and no seeds reported. I would like to see MAESTRO against fixed α ∈ {0.5, 1, 5} on all tasks, over five seeds, with HV, IP, MSR and PGAP. In the same way, MORLHF is missing from Tables 5 and 6, even though the paper says MAESTRO matches or beats it. Adding MORLHF to the tables would make both claims checkable.

Questions for authors
  1. Can the authors show that the adversary really moves sampling toward the preferences the policy serves worst?

  2. How does MAESTRO compare with fixed α\alpha on all tasks?

  3. Can MORLHF be added to Tables 5 and 6, so that the claim that MAESTRO matches or beats it can be checked with numbers?

5 comments

We thank the reviewer for the careful and constructive review, and for recognizing that MAESTRO is simple and practical, changing only how preferences are sampled during training, without new architecture or prescribed reward ranges and at almost no extra cost, and that the experiments are solid, covering three datasets and up to three objectives over five seeds, with sensitivity analyses and evaluation under held-out reward models.

We appreciate the requests for direct evidence that the adversary works as claimed, for a fixed-α\alpha comparison on all tasks, and for MORLHF in Tables 5 and 6. We address them below with new trajectory diagnostics alongside per-preference performance in Appendix D.12 and Figure 15, the fixed-α\alpha comparison on all five two-objective settings over five seeds with all four metrics in Appendix D.13, and a numerical comparison with MORLHF in Appendix D.14 (Table 9), reported as a single-seed reference.

W1. No direct evidence that the adversary works as claimed.

The main idea of this paper is that α\alpha moves sampling toward the preferences the current policy serves worst…

We agree that this mechanism is the paper's central claim. In MAESTRO, the preferences the policy trains on depend on the current policy: the Dirichlet concentration is the variable of the inner problem and is updated by unnormalized exponentiated gradient during training. Our response to Reviewer rKJZ (W1) discusses how this differs technically from prior work, and we examine the mechanism directly through the requested trajectories, preference-wise returns, and hard regions below.

Q1. Can the authors show that the adversary really moves sampling toward the preferences the policy serves worst?

We report this analysis in Appendix D.12 and Figure 15 of the revised paper. Throughout, w=(w,1−w)\mathbf w=(w,1-w) with ww the weight on the first objective, so lower ww means more weight on helpfulness in every pair. We score a preference by the quantity the adversary is scored on, evaluated on held-out prompts with the policy frozen at checkpoint tt: ht(w)=Ex,y∼πθt(⋅∣x,w)[wr~(1)+(1−w)r~(2)]=J~w(πθt),h_t(w) = \mathbb E_{\mathbf x,\mathbf y\sim\pi_{\theta_t}(\cdot\mid\mathbf x,\mathbf w)}\bigl[w \tilde r^{(1)} + (1-w) \tilde r^{(2)}\bigr] = \tilde J_{\mathbf w}(\pi_{\theta_t}), with r~(m)\tilde r^{(m)} the population soft rank of Eq. (10) against responses drawn at w′∼Dir(αt)\mathbf w'\sim\mathrm{Dir}(\boldsymbol\alpha_t); lower is harder. This evaluates the fixed-comparison surrogate objective characterized by Proposition 4 in Appendix E.5, using the same feedback signal as the adversary update.

For each setting, Figure 15 plots the preferences actually sampled from Dir(αt)\mathrm{Dir}(\boldsymbol\alpha_t) against the update index, the sampling density at each checkpoint, the difficulty ht(w)h_t(w) over the preference grid with the sampled trajectory overlaid, and the front at each checkpoint. It covers four settings (HH-RLHF and BeaverTails, each with Harmless–Helpful and Humor–Helpful) at four checkpoints each, 16 checkpoints in all, on the fixed held-out prompts of Section 4.

Whether α\boldsymbol\alpha becomes effectively fixed. Every run starts from the uniform α0=(1,1)\boldsymbol\alpha_0=(1,1). The concentration on helpfulness rises at all 16 checkpoints, including the last checkpoint of every run, and the total concentration grows in all four runs, so the distribution both sharpens and shifts. These trajectories do not support early stabilization at a well-tuned fixed α\boldsymbol\alpha.

Whether the sampling mass moves toward the worst-served preferences. In every setting, Dir(αt)\mathrm{Dir}(\boldsymbol\alpha_t) shifts toward the policy's weakest preferences as identified by ht(w)h_t(w): harder preferences are sampled more often, with the sampling density positively correlated with −ht(w)-h_t(w) over the grid at all 16 checkpoints (0.600.60–0.890.89, median 0.810.81), and the expected hth_t under Dir(αt)\mathrm{Dir}(\boldsymbol\alpha_t) is lower than under the uniform distribution at every checkpoint. The policy improves where the mass goes (bottom row of Figure 15). On BeaverTails Humor–Helpful, the helpfulness return rises at every preference on the grid while the humor return at w=1w=1 rises slightly rather than falling, so the final front dominates the one at the first checkpoint. Both Harmless–Helpful fronts also expand. On HH-RLHF Humor–Helpful, where the hard region itself moves toward helpfulness, the front shifts the same way, tracing a front with a similar hypervolume.

Whether the hard region itself moves. On HH-RLHF Humor–Helpful, the hardest preference shifts from w=0.4w=0.4 to w=0.1w=0.1–0.20.2, and the sampling mean follows from 0.390.39 to 0.140.14. In the other three settings, the hardest preference stays at w≈0.4w\approx0.4–0.50.5, and the sampling mean stays on its helpfulness side, with a final E[w]\mathbb E[w] between 0.260.26 and 0.400.40. We have scoped the introduction's statement about moving hard regions to this observed setting dependence.

W2-(a). The ablation against fixed α\alpha is the most important experiment in the paper, but it is only shown in Figure 4, only on HH-RLHF, with no HV or MSR values and no seeds reported.

I would like to see MAESTRO against fixed α∈0.5,1,5\alpha \in \\{0.5, 1, 5\\} on all tasks, over five seeds, with HV, IP, MSR and PGAP.

Q2. How does MAESTRO compare with fixed α\alpha on all tasks?

The table below (Table 8 in Appendix D.13) with the fronts in Figures 4 and 16, compares MAESTRO against fixed Dir(α1)\mathrm{Dir}(\alpha\mathbf{1}) for α∈{0.5,1,5}\alpha\in\{0.5,1,5\} on all five two-objective settings over five seeds, with all four requested metrics. Everything other than the sampling distribution is held fixed.

Table. MAESTRO against fixed Dir(α1)\mathrm{Dir}(\alpha\mathbf{1}) on all two-objective settings (mean ±\pm std over five seeds).

SettingSamplingHV ↑\uparrowIP ↑\uparrowMSR ↑\uparrowPGAP ↓\downarrow
HH-RLHF Harmless–Helpfulα=0.5\alpha=0.57.997 ± 0.1831.231 ± 0.0600.483 ± 0.0391.763 ± 0.101
α=1\alpha=18.388 ± 0.2881.287‾\underline{1.287} ± 0.0750.530‾\underline{0.530} ± 0.0571.681‾\underline{1.681} ± 0.082
α=5\alpha=58.388 ± 0.2801.059 ± 0.0930.234 ± 0.2411.588 ± 0.175
MAESTRO8.251 ± 0.3931.372 ± 0.0470.603 ± 0.0481.831 ± 0.102
HH-RLHF Humor–Helpfulα=0.5\alpha=0.57.641‾\underline{7.641} ± 0.8331.512 ± 0.1501.204 ± 0.1780.817 ± 0.132
α=1\alpha=17.390 ± 0.8991.545‾\underline{1.545} ± 0.1561.250‾\underline{1.250} ± 0.2690.685‾\underline{0.685} ± 0.258
α=5\alpha=56.357 ± 0.9961.422 ± 0.1851.077 ± 0.3060.675 ± 0.253
MAESTRO8.138 ± 0.3681.647 ± 0.0591.345 ± 0.0941.118 ± 0.101
BeaverTails Harmless–Helpfulα=0.5\alpha=0.59.852 ± 0.2491.328‾\underline{1.328} ± 0.0540.659 ± 0.0401.626 ± 0.047
α=1\alpha=110.121‾\underline{10.121} ± 0.2171.375 ± 0.0440.743 ± 0.0391.498 ± 0.120
α=5\alpha=59.671 ± 0.2081.107 ± 0.0330.782 ± 0.0260.714 ± 0.039
MAESTRO10.590 ± 0.2211.320 ± 0.0400.760‾\underline{0.760} ± 0.0291.161‾\underline{1.161} ± 0.016
BeaverTails Humor–Helpfulα=0.5\alpha=0.57.956 ± 0.3201.375 ± 0.0570.867 ± 0.0451.203 ± 0.033
α=1\alpha=18.265‾\underline{8.265} ± 0.5011.426‾\underline{1.426} ± 0.0920.956 ± 0.0911.059‾\underline{1.059} ± 0.077
α=5\alpha=57.847 ± 0.3061.342 ± 0.0531.114 ± 0.0690.623 ± 0.019
MAESTRO8.867 ± 0.2791.505 ± 0.0391.084‾\underline{1.084} ± 0.0361.110 ± 0.055
TL;DR Summary–Faithfulα=0.5\alpha=0.51.465‾\underline{1.465} ± 0.0270.667 ± 0.024−0.407‾\underline{−0.407} ± 0.0342.729 ± 0.064
α=1\alpha=11.206 ± 0.0310.636 ± 0.031−0.531 ± 0.0712.514 ± 0.047
α=5\alpha=51.107 ± 0.0250.663‾\underline{0.663} ± 0.027−0.587 ± 0.0222.469‾\underline{2.469} ± 0.084
MAESTRO1.478 ± 0.1110.604 ± 0.041−0.282 ± 0.0282.153 ± 0.214

Bold and underline‾\underline{\text{underline}} mark the best and second-best mean per setting and metric, with the HV tie on HH-RLHF Harmless–Helpful marked best for both. HV uses the same reference point as Tables 5 and 6.

What the table shows. MAESTRO ranks first in 11 of the 20 setting–metric combinations and second in another three, while the fixed choices α=0.5,1,5\alpha=0.5,1,5 rank first in one, two, and seven, counting the HV tie for both. MAESTRO attains the highest mean HV in four of the five settings; the exception is HH-RLHF Harmless–Helpful, where α=1\alpha=1 and α=5\alpha=5 lead by 0.1370.137. Wherever a fixed choice is ahead of MAESTRO on HV or MSR, the gap is within one seed standard deviation.

The strongest fixed choice changes with the setting and metric. On HV, it is α=1\alpha=1 on both BeaverTails pairs and α=0.5\alpha=0.5 on HH-RLHF Humor–Helpful and on summarization; on MSR, each of the three is the strongest in some setting. MO-ODPO reports the same for its own concentration parameter, whose best value differs between its two benchmarks. A fixed distribution therefore needs a per-task search that grows with the number of objectives, whereas MAESTRO uses one adversary configuration on all five settings, η=0.1\eta=0.1 with the same clamps on α\boldsymbol\alpha.

W2-(b). In the same way, MORLHF is missing from Tables 5 and 6, even though the paper says MAESTRO matches or beats it.

Adding MORLHF to the tables would make both claims checkable.

Q3. Can MORLHF be added to Tables 5 and 6, so that the claim that MAESTRO matches or beats it can be checked with numbers?

We thank the reviewer for this request. We have added an explicit numerical comparison on all five two-objective settings in Table 9 of the revised paper, in the new Appendix D.14 (“MAESTRO Against MORLHF”) and reproduce it as the table below. The comparison uses the same metric definitions and HV reference points as Tables 5 and 6.

MORLHF trains a separate policy for each preference, requiring eleven policies for the evaluated grid, and cannot serve preferences outside it, so we treat it as a per-preference oracle rather than as a competing baseline. In addition, completing its comparison over the remaining four seeds would require approximately 4,000 GPU hours, which we could not accommodate within the rebuttal period. We therefore report single-seed MORLHF results alongside MAESTRO's five-seed means and standard deviations in a separate table, and will add the five-seed MORLHF results to Tables 5 and 6 as a separately marked oracle row in the next revision.

Table. MAESTRO against MORLHF on all five two-objective settings.

SettingMethodHV ↑\uparrowIP ↑\uparrowMSR ↑\uparrowPGAP ↓\downarrow
HH-RLHF Harmless–HelpfulMORLHF8.5591.2170.7021.473
MAESTRO8.251 ± 0.3931.372 ± 0.0470.603 ± 0.0481.831 ± 0.102
HH-RLHF Humor–HelpfulMORLHF8.8191.7431.5760.573
MAESTRO8.138 ± 0.3681.647 ± 0.0591.345 ± 0.0941.118 ± 0.101
BeaverTails Harmless–HelpfulMORLHF8.3191.2980.4471.848
MAESTRO10.590 ± 0.2211.320 ± 0.0400.760 ± 0.0291.161 ± 0.016
BeaverTails Humor–HelpfulMORLHF5.5221.1920.4701.849
MAESTRO8.867 ± 0.2791.505 ± 0.0391.084 ± 0.0361.110 ± 0.055
TL;DR Summary–FaithfulMORLHF1.2570.604−0.2801.962
MAESTRO1.478 ± 0.1110.604 ± 0.041−0.282 ± 0.0282.153 ± 0.214

MAESTRO is reported as mean ±\pm standard deviation over five seeds. MORLHF uses one seed per preference, yielding eleven per-preference policies for the evaluated grid. Bold marks the better reported value within each setting and metric, including ties at the reported precision.

One shared policy against a per-preference oracle. On both BeaverTails pairs, MAESTRO leads on all four reported metrics. Its HV is 10.59010.590 against 8.3198.319 on Harmless–Helpful and 8.8678.867 against 5.5225.522 on Humor–Helpful, alongside higher IP and MSR and lower PGAP. On summarization, MAESTRO attains higher HV, 1.4781.478 against 1.2571.257, and matches the reported IP of 0.6040.604. Its MSR and PGAP are slightly worse, with both differences smaller than MAESTRO's across-seed standard deviation.

On HH-RLHF, MORLHF leads on MSR and PGAP for both objective pairs. The HV gaps are 0.3080.308 on Harmless–Helpful and 0.6810.681 on Humor–Helpful, where MAESTRO is close to them by 0.8 and 1.9 times its seed standard deviation, while MAESTRO achieves higher IP on Harmless–Helpful, 1.3721.372 against 1.2171.217.

These results show that one shared policy stays level with or ahead of the per-preference oracle on three of the five settings and within seed-level distance of its front quality on the other two, while identifying the HH-RLHF worst-case metrics as a remaining gap. MAESTRO serves all eleven evaluated preferences with one policy rather than eleven separately trained policies.

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Paper summary

This paper studies how training preferences should be selected when aligning a single language model with multiple objectives. Existing methods either train separate policies for different preferences, combine multiple objective specific experts, or train a preference conditioned model using a fixed sampling distribution. The authors argue that a fixed distribution may underrepresent preference regions that are difficult for the current policy. The paper proposes MAESTRO, which represents preference weights through natural language prompts and trains a single conditioned policy with PPO. The training preferences are sampled from a Dirichlet distribution whose parameters are updated online. The update is intended to shift probability mass toward preference regions where the current policy performs poorly. The paper evaluates the method on HH RLHF, BeaverTails, and Reddit TLDR using two and three objective settings. The reported results show strong Pareto front coverage, favorable worst preference performance, and lower training costs than methods that train multiple policies or experts.

Critical strengths

The paper identifies an important and underexplored problem in single model multi objective alignment. The preference regions that require more training may depend on the objective combination and the current policy, which can make a fixed training distribution inefficient. This perspective is practically relevant and potentially applicable to a broad range of preference conditioned alignment settings.

The proposed framework is simple and practically appealing. It requires no architectural modifications and serves different preference trade offs through a single prompt conditioned policy. The comparison with natural prompting shows that the policy learns to respond to preference signals through end to end training. This design reduces the training and deployment costs associated with maintaining separate policies or multiple experts while achieving strong Pareto front coverage.

Critical weaknesses

The theoretical formulation and the implemented adversary are not fully aligned. Equation 7 derives a score function gradient using the scalarized return, while Algorithm 1 updates the Dirichlet parameters using a batch relative rank surrogate that also depends on the other sampled rollouts. Appendix E.5 acknowledges that this update is a biased stochastic heuristic. As a result, the theoretical analysis of the minimax objective provides limited support for the actual training algorithm. Additional justification is needed to establish the relationship between the surrogate update and the stated robust optimization objective.

The interpretation of the reported Pareto fronts is limited by the reward models used to define the objectives. The paper motivates the task in terms of balancing human values, while the experiments measure trade offs among several imperfect reward model proxies. The paper’s own held out evaluation reveals that the HH RLHF harmlessness reward can favor refusals to harmless questions. The humor classifier also appears to reward brevity and casualness in addition to humor, and the summarization objectives exhibit relatively weak conflict. These properties make it difficult to determine whether the reported improvements reflect more effective alignment with the intended objectives or more effective optimization of the particular reward models. The claims should be calibrated to the operational definitions used in the experiments.

Questions for authors

Could the authors clarify the relationship between the batch relative rank surrogate used in Algorithm 1 and the minimax objective in Equation 4? In particular, does the resulting update estimate the gradient of a well defined alternative objective, and which theoretical claims remain applicable when this surrogate replaces the scalarized return?

How should the reported Pareto front improvements be interpreted given the identified limitations of the reward models, particularly the tendency of the HH RLHF harmlessness reward to favor unnecessary refusals and the humor classifier’s sensitivity to response style? Could the authors clarify which conclusions they believe generalize beyond the specific reward models used in training and evaluation?

6 comments

We thank the reviewer for the detailed and technically precise feedback, and for recognizing that the preference regions needing more training depend on the objective combination and the current policy, and that our single prompt-conditioned framework is simple and practical, with strong Pareto front coverage at lower training cost.

We particularly appreciate the reviewer's comments on the relationship between the rank-surrogate update in Algorithm 1 and the minimax objective, and on the scope of our conclusions given the reward models used in the experiments. We address these points below with two new results in the revised Appendix E.5 (Proposition 4 and Corollary 1), a surrogate-free ablation, an analysis of how the training and held-out harmlessness reward models score refusals, and corresponding revisions to the text.

W1. The theoretical formulation and the implemented adversary are not fully aligned.

Equation 7 derives a score function gradient using the scalarized return, while Algorithm 1 updates the Dirichlet parameters using a batch relative rank surrogate that also depends on the other sampled rollouts. Appendix E.5 acknowledges that this update is a biased stochastic heuristic. As a result, the theoretical analysis of the minimax objective provides limited support for the actual training algorithm. Additional justification is needed to establish the relationship between the surrogate update and the stated robust optimization objective.

We thank the reviewer for this comment. We address the three parts of Q1 regarding W1 below. Proposition 4 and Corollary 1, added in the revised Appendix E.5, clarify the relationship between the rank-surrogate update and the minimax formulation.

Q1-(a). Could the authors clarify the relationship between the batch relative rank surrogate used in Algorithm 1 and the minimax objective in Equation 4?

The surrogate deliberately changes the payoff with which the adversary ranks preferences, and Proposition 4, described in Q1-(b), characterizes the resulting objective. Below, we clarify the relationship between the surrogate in Algorithm 1 and the minimax objective (4) by examining whether the surrogate changes the set of optimal policies.

In the paper, Proposition 1 establishes the connection between per-preference optimality and minimax optimality under exact simultaneous realizability, i.e., Eq. (14) with ε=0\varepsilon=0. Building on this result, we have added Corollary 1 in the revised Appendix E.5, showing that all admissible Dirichlet distributions share the same global policy maximizers, and these maximizers solve the minimax objective (6), which is the Dirichlet instance of (4). Under this assumption, the surrogate can therefore change how training is allocated without changing the global policy target.

We used “heuristic” in the submission since the rank-based adversary step is not an unbiased estimator of the original raw-return gradient of the inner minimization (7) as the reviewer notes, and equivalence with the original minimax problem is not established outside the exactly realizable regime. The revised Appendix E.5 now separates these issues: Proposition 4 characterizes the fixed-comparison surrogate objective and its estimator conditions, while Corollary 1 establishes when changing the adversary’s feedback preserves the global policy target. We detail the fixed-comparison and baseline conditions in Q1-(b).

Turning to training dynamics. In finite-budget training, the surrogate determines how the adversary allocates updates across preferences. Eq. (10) compares each reward only with the other rewards of the same objective in the batch, so it removes each objective's level and bounds its contribution to [0,1][0,1], which keeps an objective with numerically larger rewards from dominating the adversary's step (Section 3.2). The revised Figure 6 (Appendix D.3) now tests this choice on BeaverTails by replacing the surrogate with the raw payoff Rj=wj⊤rjR_j=\mathbf w_j^\top\mathbf r_j, for which Eq. (8) is an unbiased estimate of the raw-return gradient (7) up to a constant factor. The raw payoff gives comparable fronts on Harmless–Helpful, where the two rewards span similar ranges, but slightly worse ones on Humor–Helpful, while min–max normalization, which needs each reward's bounds in advance, stays close to the surrogate. The results therefore do not hinge on the departure from Eq. (7), and the surrogate reaches them without requiring each reward's range.

Q1-(b). Does the resulting update estimate the gradient of a well defined alternative objective?

Yes. Section 3.2 already reads Eq. (10) as a smoothed empirical CDF of objective mm within the batch, and Proposition 4, added in the revised Appendix E.5, makes this precise by replacing the batch with the distribution it is drawn from.

Fix the policy πθ\pi_\theta and the distribution of the comparison rollouts at the current pαp_{\boldsymbol{\alpha}}, as the update does, i.e., the comparisons enter RjR_j only as given samples. The population counterpart of Eq. (10) defines a reward vector r~\tilde{\mathbf r}, with J~w(πθ)\tilde J_{\mathbf w}(\pi_\theta) denoting its return. Then,

E[Rj∣wj]=J~wj(πθ),\mathbb E[R_j\mid\mathbf w_j] = \tilde J_{\mathbf w_j}(\pi_\theta),

so the adversary is scored on

\left[\tilde J_{\mathbf w}(\pi_\theta)\right].$$ This is the inner objective of Eq. (6) over the same ambiguity set, with the original rewards replaced by their soft-rank counterparts. With a batch-independent baseline, Eq. (8) is its score-function gradient estimator in the sense of Eq. (7). This is the characterization established by Proposition 4 for every $\tau>0$. Algorithm 1 uses the same-batch mean as its baseline, which mixes a $1/B_{\mathrm{adv}}$-weighted cross term into this objective (Appendix E.5), and the resulting sampling density is positively correlated with $-\tilde J_{\mathbf w}$ (Appendix D.12). As discussed in Q1-(a), the surrogate shapes the feedback that allocates training across preferences, while under exact simultaneous realizability it leaves the global policy target unchanged (Corollary 1). ### Q1-(c). Which theoretical claims remain applicable when this surrogate replaces the scalarized return? Propositions 1–3 and Lemma 1 **remain valid** under their stated assumptions, independently of the surrogate update, since none of them involves the adversary's feedback. They characterize the objective rather than Algorithm 1: Proposition 1 holds for a policy satisfying Eq. (14), Lemma 1 motivates the worst-case objective, Proposition 2 motivates the KL-scaled variant of Appendix D.7, and Proposition 3 relates the Dirichlet ambiguity set to the pointwise worst case without asserting that the learned $\boldsymbol\alpha$ attains the inner optimum. Proposition 4 and Corollary 1 connect these statements to the update in Algorithm 1. ### W2. The interpretation of the reported Pareto fronts is limited by the reward models used to define the objectives. > The paper motivates the task in terms of balancing human values, while the experiments measure trade offs among several imperfect reward model proxies. The paper's own held out evaluation reveals that the HH RLHF harmlessness reward can favor refusals to harmless questions. The humor classifier also appears to reward brevity and casualness in addition to humor, and the summarization objectives exhibit relatively weak conflict. These properties make it difficult to determine whether the reported improvements reflect more effective alignment with the intended objectives or more effective optimization of the particular reward models. The claims should be calibrated to the operational definitions used in the experiments. We thank the reviewer for asking us to clarify the scope of the reported Pareto fronts. Judgments about human values such as harmlessness and humor can vary across people and contexts. Each reward model operationalizes one interpretation of an attribute, shaped by its training data and labels. We have revised Appendix C.2 to make explicit how these definitions delimit the interpretation of our results. Below, we examine how the properties of each reward model affect the interpretation of the results.

Q2-(a). How should the reported Pareto front improvements be interpreted given the identified limitations of the reward models, particularly the tendency of the HH RLHF harmlessness reward to favor unnecessary refusals and the humor classifier's sensitivity to response style?

Within each setting, we compare trade-off coverage and training cost under a shared objective specification. Each reward model operationalizes a particular interpretation of an attribute by capturing aspects of it reflected in the training data and labels. The reported improvements show how well MAESTRO covers the trade-offs defined by that specification with a single preference-conditioned policy.

The HH-RLHF examples below illustrate how two RMs that score the same attribute can rank responses differently. For the harmless question, the training RM ranks the refusal above the answer, while the held-out RM prefers the answer. Both RMs prefer the refusal for the harmful request. These rankings suggest that the training RM emphasizes the absence of harmful content in the response itself, while the held-out RM is sensitive to whether a refusal is warranted, a criterion that overlaps with helpfulness on benign requests.

QuestionResponseTraining (Ray2333)Held-out (Kluge)
Harmless request (“What are some good ideas for a field trip?”)Refusal (wharmless=1w_\text{harmless}=1)+2.83+2.83−3.62-3.62
Harmless requestAnswer (wharmless=0w_\text{harmless}=0)+1.72+1.72+2.88+2.88
Harmful request (“...residential address for...”)Refusal (wharmless=1w_\text{harmless}=1)+2.33+2.33+2.28+2.28
Harmful requestAnswer (wharmless=0w_\text{harmless}=0)−4.56-4.56−5.19-5.19

Likewise, as Appendix C.2 states, the humor objective rewards brief, casual replies over long expository ones, so improvements on the humor axis are improvements under that definition. On summarization, the reported results characterize trade-off coverage in a setting where the two objectives exhibit relatively weak conflict (Appendix D.11, Figure 14).

In short, as in prior work, we use RMs to operationalize particular aspects of human values for training and evaluation. Q2-(b) examines which conclusions carry over when the same attributes are operationalized differently.

Q2-(b). Could the authors clarify which conclusions they believe generalize beyond the specific reward models used in training and evaluation?

Our main claim is that MAESTRO improves how a single policy covers the trade-off surface defined by a given objective specification. We believe three conclusions generalize.

(i) Trade-off coverage under held-out RMs. Re-scoring the same Harmless–Helpful responses with held-out RMs extends the front comparisons in prior work such as RiC and Panacea, which evaluate only with their training RMs. We test whether the relative advantage carries over when the same attributes are operationalized differently (Figure 8). MAESTRO retains the outermost front on BeaverTails and stays level with MORLHF on HH-RLHF, while RiC’s front falls well inside those of the RL-based methods. This suggests that MAESTRO’s advantage extends beyond the specific RMs it was trained on.

(ii) Preference steering across objective pairs. In Figure 13 (Appendix D.10), a MAESTRO policy trained on Harmless–Helpful still traces a front on Humor–Helpful with only the prefix changed, and the reverse direction transfers partially. The base SFT model given the same prompts produces no comparable front. This indicates that the learned preference steering transfers to a new objective pair, including to an objective whose RM the policy never saw in training. Since MAESTRO's prefix specifies both the objectives and their relative weights, the objective pair can be changed at inference, whereas RiC conditions on numerical targets for its training rewards and Panacea embeds weights for its training objectives.

(iii) Adaptive sampling across settings. With the reward specification, backbone, and data held fixed, the ablation isolates the effect of adaptive preference sampling (Figure 4, Table 8). Across both datasets and both objective pairs, sampling density is positively correlated with preference difficulty, measured by −ht-h_t, at all 1616 evaluated checkpoints (Appendix D.12).

In conclusion, these results suggest that MAESTRO can retain its advantage in trade-off coverage under held-out reward models; that its learned preference steering can transfer from Harmless–Helpful to Humor–Helpful by changing only the prefix; and that the adversary directs training toward the preferences the policy serves poorly in every setting we tracked.

Comments on the paper

1 comment

Dear Reviewers and AC,

We thank all reviewers for their constructive feedback. We have uploaded a revised paper in which changes made in response to the reviews are shown in red. The table below lists the main changes and the questions they address.

RevisionWhereAddresses
Dirichlet trajectories: learned distribution, per-preference difficulty and fronts at 16 checkpoints across four settingsApp. D.12, Fig. 15; Sec. 3.2HipV W1/Q1, rKJZ Q2
Hard-region claim scoped: the hard region moves in one of the four settingsSec. 1, Sec. 3.2HipV Q1, rKJZ Q2
Fixed-α\alpha comparison, α∈{0.5,1,5}\alpha\in\lbrace 0.5,1,5\rbrace, on all five two-objective settings (five seeds, four metrics)App. D.13, Table 8, Fig. 16; Sec. 4.3HipV W2-(a)/Q2
MORLHF comparison in numbers on all five two-objective settingsApp. D.14, Table 9; Sec. 4.1HipV W2-(b)/Q3
Proposition 4 and Corollary 1: what the adversary's update estimates, and why its feedback cannot change the policy optima under exact realizabilityApp. E.5; Sec. 3.2UyMg W1/Q1, rKJZ Q1
Raw-reward variant added to the surrogate ablationApp. D.3, Fig. 6; Sec. 4.3UyMg Q1-(a), rKJZ Q1
Claims scoped to the reward models used, and why the training and held-out harmlessness RMs disagree on HH-RLHF refusalsSec. 2, Sec. 4.2; App. C.2, D.5UyMg W2/Q2

Best regards,

Authors

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