- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper shows how humans can be affected by contaminated information with four biases (anchoring, fallacy, pro-jargon, verbosity). Through LLM debate trajectories, the authors make several scenarios and inject some biases into the process of debate. This makes the humans affected by the injected biases and favor the rhetorical one.
Critical strengths
- The evaluation is clear.
- The approach to testing hypothesis looks structured.
- Human subject research requires IRB and they report about all information clearly.
- The content is easy to follow and interesting.
- I like the topic of how the AI-based system will influence to human society and this paper deals with it.
- This paper is easy to follow for non-expert reader in this area.
Critical weaknesses
- I like this kind of paper, which study about ai-system with human being, however this paper lacks novelty fitted to ICLR.
- As introduced in abstract and Introduction section, human like rhetorical phrase in someway, so it is obvious that human will be affected by the 4 biases (anchoring, fallacy, pro-jargon, verbosity).
- And there are works stating similar claim (Language Models Learn to Mislead Humans via RLHF, Wen et al., 2025 ICLR; Deceptive Explanations by Large Language Models Lead People to Change their Beliefs About Misinformation More Often than Honest Explanations, Danry, 2025 CHI).
- Results and Analysis Section is narrow.
- It looks clear that humans are influced by rhetorical phrases seeing Table 1, but no more results in main page without Table 1 makes the results less interesting.
- I want to know whether the human evaluators are experts about the detective mysteries or not. If they are the experts on them, their judgement could be different by the expertise regardless of four interventions.
Questions for authors
- Are the human evaluators experts on the detective scenario?
- How does adjudication change if LLM judge on same debate trajectories?
5 comments
Responses to Questions (Reviewer A7es)
Q1: Are the human evaluators experts on the detective scenario?
Please see table below and the commentary regarding expertise above.
| Self-reported measure | Mean (SD) | Low, n (%) | Moderate, n (%) | High, n (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Detective-story and mystery-puzzle familiarity | 4.13 (1.63) | 71 (19.2) | 212 (57.5) | 86 (23.3) |
| Debate-judging experience | 3.33 (1.70) | 122 (33.1) | 205 (55.6) | 42 (11.4) |
| Debate-participation experience | 3.31 (1.75) | 141 (38.2) | 183 (49.6) | 45 (12.2) |
*Low, moderate, and high denote ratings of 1–2, 3–5, and 6–7, respectively.
Q2: How does adjudication change if LLM judge on same debate trajectories?
The original manuscript reported the adjudication prompt and decisions of six LLM judges on the same debate trajectories in Appendix A.4.2 (Tables 30–31). We will add Appendix C.7 to compare these decisions with human judgments.
Weighting dialogues equally, baseline accuracy is similar for humans and LLMs (53.9% and 54.2%). On manipulated dialogues, the average shift toward the manipulated side is +9.0 percentage points for humans and +25.3 for LLMs. When the manipulation supports the culprit, LLMs achieve higher accuracy than humans (78.1% versus 61.4%), but when it supports the innocent rival, LLMs achieve lower accuracy (27.6% versus 43.4%). Overall accuracy on manipulated dialogues is similar (52.9% for LLMs versus 52.4% for humans).
The LLM judges were used to select the generated dialogues, rather than for an independent evaluation. Dialogues were regenerated unless at least one of six LLM judges shifted toward the manipulated side and none shifted away. The larger shift among LLMs is therefore expected from our selection procedure and should not be interpreted as evidence that LLMs are more susceptible than humans. Our human study tests whether manipulations selected using LLM judgments also influence human adjudication; our results show that they do.
Thank you for the detailed response. The clarification on related work is helpful, but some concerns remain. Compared with prior work on human susceptibility to persuasive responses and on judge biases in debate and oversight [1, 2, 3], the contribution still feels incremental to me. In addition, the opponent’s turns are reused from the baseline and never respond to the manipulated rhetoric, so the claim that the biases survive adversarial debate is not fully supported. The expertise analysis also reports only accuracy, not whether expertise changes the intervention effect. Finally, the main results still rely mostly on Table 1, where no bias-specific effect is significant. For these reasons, I will keep my current score.
[1] Sharma, M., et al. Towards Understanding Sycophancy in Language Models. ICLR 2024. [2] Rahman, S., et al. AI Debate Aids Assessment of Controversial Claims. NeurIPS 2025. [3] Recchia, G., et al. Confirmation Bias: A Challenge for Scalable Oversight. AAAI 2026.
Responses to Weaknesses (Reviewer A7es)
Thank you for your thoughtful review.
We agree that human susceptibility to rhetorical influence is well established in general, in the field of cognitive science, human decision-making, and beyond. Our contribution’s novelty comes from studying implications for human adjudication in debate settings for training AI systems. We address the two points separately below.
1. Human susceptibility in AI debate is not obvious and requires further empirical investigation.
Debate has been proposed as a way to improve human supervision for training AI systems. The idea is that competing agents present arguments and counterarguments to help a judge distinguish correct from incorrect answers, and the judge relies on the facts to adjudicate. This motivation makes it important to test whether human adjudication remains sensitive to bias-targeted interventions within such a structure. Prior evidence that people can be influenced by rhetoric motivates this hypothesis, but does not establish whether, or to what extent, these interventions shift judgments when people evaluate competing evidence-based arguments and rebuttals in the debate setting.
Our study directly examines this question under a controlled debate protocol. We find that, pooled across the four intervention types, judgments shift toward the manipulated side. We provide empirical evidence of susceptibility in the debate protocol studied, which is, to our knowledge, a novel contribution.
2. How our contribution differs from Wen et al. and Danry et al.
We appreciate these relevant references and will incorporate them into the related work with an explicit discussion of the distinctions. Most importantly, neither paper empirically tests human adjudication of competing arguments and rebuttals in an AI debate setting. Their findings establish important concerns about misleading AI outputs more generally, but they do not directly examine whether bias-targeted interventions influence human judgments in debate.
The treatment of bias also differs. Wen et al. examine misleading behavior emerging through RLHF and identify strategies such as subtle causal fallacies, but do not experimentally vary the four bias-targeted interventions we study. Danry et al. compare honest and deceptive AI feedback and examine how the logical validity of explanations relates to their credibility. Our study instead operationalizes anchoring, fallacy oversight, pro-jargon, and verbosity through explicit intervention rubrics and compares manipulated debates against their unmanipulated baselines.
We apply these interventions to both the truthful and untruthful sides of the debate. This allows us to test whether the manipulations shift judgments toward the targeted side, independently of whether that side is correct. Together, our controlled interventions and corpus of 68 debates provide evidence about the susceptibility of human adjudication in AI debate to cognitive bias manipulations, a question that was not directly examined by these prior studies.
We measured participants’ self-reported familiarity with detective stories and mystery puzzles. Among the 369 participants in our analysis sample, 19.2% reported low familiarity (1–2 on a seven-point scale), 57.5% moderate familiarity (3–5), and 23.3% high familiarity (6–7).
The original submission examined the relationship between self-reported expertise and adjudication in Appendix C.5. In particular, participants reporting high detective familiarity achieved 42% accuracy (n = 86), compared with 58% among those reporting low familiarity (n = 71). Thus, we did not find evidence that greater familiarity with detective stories improves adjudication accuracy, although this comparison is exploratory.
We agree that this finding deserves greater visibility. We will highlight it in Section 6.2 and add aggregate familiarity statistics to Appendix C.5, while keeping more detailed participant-level background responses private.