- Rating
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- Confidence
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- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
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- Soundness
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Paper summary
The paper models the collusion formation process in peer review as an extensive form game and uses game theory to characterize equilibria in that game. Having modelled the game theoretically, the paper then analyses how certain parameters of the game affect the sustainability of collusive outcomes as the equilibrium of the game. The paper also simulates the game which is partially calibrated to real data.
Critical strengths
The paper addresses an important problem and tries to offer insights that can serve as a basis for designing real solutions to that problem.
Critical weaknesses
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There seems to be a serious flaw in Theorem 4, which propagates through the rest of the analysis. The grim-trigger strategy in Theorem 4 conditions on “observed betrayal”, which, as far as I understand the game, is not observable. Reviews are anonymous, so an honest (non-inflated) review from an assigned partner (i.e. playing H in the stage-4 game) looks the same as the partner not being assigned or never bidding. The only observable trigger is the absence of an inflated review. Therefore, the strategy described in Theorem 4 is not valid. The same applies to Proposition 5. I think it should be possible to reformulate the theorems and propositions in terms of a strategy that depends on the observable state, but all the results should be checked.
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I think there is a problem with the statement on line 483: “Our model says the arrangement should not form at all, and that what sustains it is enforcement rather than incentives.” Firstly, as the paper rightly shows, the lack of collusive arrangement is implied by the one-shot game, not the repeated game, which is a well-known result among game theorists and collusion theorists. Which one of the two is a better representation of the real world is a separate question. Arguably, it is the repeated version that is more representative, which the paper also seems to argue. In light of this, I think the statement is not justified. The one-shot game is a useful benchmark, but it does not imply what “should” or “should not” be observed in the real world.
Questions for authors
- In light of my comment above, the authors should either clarify how the betrayal state is observable, which I think is not, or the all the formal statements need to be redone from Theorem 4 onwards. I think it should be possible to reformulate the theorems and propositions in terms of a strategy that depends on an observable state.
- A presentation point: I think the paper would benefit from showing the extensive form game on a graph, so that it is clear what happens at each stage. Section 2.2 does that in words, but I think a graph would help, especially because the texts focuses on particular paths of the game.
Thank you for the review
You are right. This was the most important comment we received, and we thank you for it. Under anonymous review an author cannot attribute an honest review to the partner. "Observed betrayal" is therefore not observable, and the grim trigger in the submitted Theorem 4 was not a valid strategy. As you suggested, we re-derived Theorem 4 onwards on the observable state and checked every result downstream (revised PDF, changes in blue).
1. The observable signal. After a round, i observes only yi=1{i’s paper received j’s inflated review} (Eq. 3). yi=1 with probability ρ if j bid and inflated when assigned. yi=0 if j withheld the bid, bid and lost, or was assigned and reported honestly. Because j knows its own bid and assignment, yi is known to both parties, so the pair plays a repeated game with imperfect public monitoring (Green & Porter 1984; Abreu, Pearce & Stacchetti 1990). Two consequences follow:
Verifiable disclosure of one's assignment would not help, because withholding is confounded with a lost bid either way. Bid screenshots are not commitments, because bids can be revised until the deadline.
2. Revised results (full proofs in App. A).
3. What survives. Every comparative static keeps its sign, and the main conclusions become sharper rather than weaker:
We also played the repeated game on the conference simulator, with only the anonymous signal observable (App. C.8). Free-riding pays where the revised Theorem 4 predicts, in all 22 cells where the payoff gap is significant.
4. Line 483 ("should not form at all"). Agreed: the one-shot result is a benchmark, not a prediction of what is observed. We removed "should" from the conclusion and the abstract and reframed Sec. 3.1. Lemma 2 holds for every payoff magnitude, so the benchmark shows that observed stranger collusion cannot be explained by the size of the prize; it requires repetition and a monitoring signal. Sec. 3.2 then asks how much of each peer review supplies: repetition is cheap, monitoring is weak.
5. Game tree. Added as Fig. 2. It shows the information sets (genuine responder or sting; hidden bids) and what each party observes after Stage 4.
If you have time, we would be grateful if you could check the revised proof in App. A.3. It is short.