- Rating
- 3(+1)
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
The paper shows that a model with an ordinary static backdoor can be activated by many alternative triggers without changing its weights. SBDT mines such triggers and assigns them to inputs based on feature responses plus balancing terms, so the triggered inputs look less uniform. ASR stays reasonable on CIFAR-10, GTSRB and Tiny-ImageNet. In the CIFAR-10 BadNets setting, BBCaL and SCALE-UP TPR drop to almost zero, while NC, NAD and SAU still work.
Critical strengths
1.The core observation is interesting and practical. Whether a backdoor is "static" or "dynamic" doesn't only depend on how it was trained, since a frozen static-backdoored model can be triggered dynamically afterwards. Table 1 shows this for several trigger types and datasets.
2.The paper is upfront about limits. Table 2 and Appendix G show that model-level defenses still catch or remove the backdoor, so the claim is clearly about runtime detectors.
Critical weaknesses
1.The detection results seem tied to one specific setting. The headline runtime numbers come only from CIFAR-10 BadNets in Table 2. For the feature-level detectors, the main setting (β=0.35, γ=0.25) in Table 12 gives AC 0.069 and BEATRIX 0.008, but every nearby value gives AC 0.13 to 0.88 and BEATRIX around 0.10. Table 13 looks the same for K. The authors call this sweep post-hoc. Appendix E.1 describes a held-out selection that picked β=0.70, γ=0.50, but no results are reported for that configuration. So I'm not sure how much of the result survives without tuning.
2.It's unclear whether response-aware assignment is what drives the evasion. Table 5 compares random and full assignment but leaves out BBCaL and SCALE-UP, which are the headline detectors. For TeCo, random assignment is actually a bit better. Maybe most of the effect comes just from having a pool of alternative triggers.
Questions for authors
1.What are the ASR and detector TPRs (including BBCaL and SCALE-UP) for the held-out configuration in Appendix E.1? (clarification)
2.Could you report BBCaL and SCALE-UP for other datasets and backdoor types, and add random assignment to Table 2? (suggestion)
3.The 5.43 minutes in Table 4 excludes candidate mining. What's the total cost, including mining (e.g. the 1,500 Blended candidates)? (clarification)
If the held-out results in Q1 still show big runtime TPR drops, that would mostly address my soundness concern. If not, I’d see the main claim as tuning-dependent.
7 comments
2. Independent Contribution of Response-Aware Assignment, Random Assignment, and Cross-Setting Evaluation
We thank the reviewer for pointing out the absence of assignment-strategy ablations on BBCaL and SCALE-UP in the original manuscript. We further supplemented the direct comparison between Random Assignment and Full SBDT, as well as component ablations of response modeling, route-level balancing, and trigger-level balancing.
2.1 Direct Comparison between Random Assignment and Full SBDT
First, Random Assignment and Full SBDT use the same candidate trigger pool, with ASRs of 83.54% and 83.72%, respectively, differing by only 0.18 percentage points. This comparison therefore allows us to examine the effects of different assignment strategies on detection performance under nearly identical attack success rates.
The additional detection results are presented below:
| Metric | Random Assignment | Full SBDT |
|---|---|---|
| ASR | 83.54% | 83.72% |
| AC TPR | 88.10% | 6.90% |
| SCAn TPR | 32.90% | 25.50% |
| SS TPR | 21.10% | 19.50% |
| BEATRIX TPR | 10.60% | 0.80% |
| TeCo TPR | 9.40% | 10.40% |
| BBCaL TPR | 0% | 0% |
| SCALE-UP TPR | 0.491% | 0.735% |
| STRIP TPR | 66.85% | 66.40% |
As shown above, under nearly identical ASRs, Full SBDT reduces the TPRs of AC and BEATRIX from 88.10% and 10.60% to 6.90% and 0.80%, respectively, while also achieving improvements on SCAn and SS. These results indicate that response-aware assignment changes the sample-level usage patterns of candidate triggers and further affects the response statistics observed by certain feature-based detectors.
Full SBDT achieves lower observed TPRs than Random Assignment on five of the eight evaluated detectors (AC, SCAn, SS, BEATRIX, and STRIP), with particularly pronounced reductions on AC (from 88.10% to 6.90%) and BEATRIX (from 10.60% to 0.80%). Random Assignment yields lower TPRs on TeCo and SCALE-UP, while the two strategies perform comparably on STRIP and both achieve 0% TPR on BBCaL. Although response-aware assignment does not outperform random assignment against every detector, it achieves lower observed TPRs for five of the eight evaluated detectors, particularly AC and BEATRIX, while maintaining a comparable attack success rate (83.72% vs. 83.54%).
2.2 Component Ablations of Response Modeling and the Two-Level Balancing Mechanism
To further investigate the contributions of individual components in the complete assignment mechanism, we compare Full SBDT, Random Assignment, and three ablated variants that respectively remove response modeling, route-level balancing, and trigger-level balancing.
| Assignment Strategy | ASR | SCALE-UP TPR | BBCaL TPR |
|---|---|---|---|
| Full SBDT | 83.72% | 0.735% | 0% |
| Random Assignment | 83.54% | 0.491% | 0% |
| w/o Response Modeling | 83.54% | 18.30% | 0% |
| w/o Route Balance | 83.54% | 16.84% | 0% |
| w/o Trigger Balance | 83.56% | 16.50% | 0% |
As shown above, removing response modeling, route-level balancing, or trigger-level balancing increases the SCALE-UP TPR to 18.30%, 16.84%, and 16.50%, respectively, substantially higher than the 0.735% achieved by Full SBDT. The corresponding ASRs are 83.54%, 83.54%, and 83.56%, respectively, remaining close to the 83.72% ASR of Full SBDT.
For BBCaL, the TPR remains 0% across all the above settings. Therefore, we do not attribute the BBCaL results to any individual assignment component, but rather consider them part of the overall performance of the dynamic candidate-trigger usage mechanism.
Although Random Assignment yields a slightly lower TPR on SCALE-UP than Full SBDT, both strategies achieve TPRs below 1% (0.491% vs. 0.735%), with an absolute difference of only 0.244 percentage points. In contrast, removing response modeling, route-level balancing, or trigger-level balancing increases SCALE-UP's TPR from 0.735% to 18.30%, 16.84%, and 16.50%, respectively, while the corresponding ASRs remain close to that of Full SBDT (83.54%, 83.54%, and 83.56%, respectively, versus 83.72%).
2.3 Comparison with Individual Alternative Triggers
Furthermore, to rule out the possibility that the detection evasion results arise solely from a particular alternative trigger, we supplemented the evaluation with individual detection results for four candidate triggers.
Among them, Triggers #2 and #4 achieve ASRs of 84.06% and 82.01%, respectively, which are close to the 83.72% achieved by Full SBDT.
| Metric | Trigger #2 | Trigger #4 | Random Assignment | Full SBDT |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASR | 84.06% | 82.01% | 83.54% | 83.72% |
| BBCaL TPR | 66.32% | 89.93% | 0% | 0% |
| SCALE-UP TPR | 99.26% | 99.54% | 0.491% | 0.735% |
As shown above, although Triggers #2 and #4 achieve ASRs close to that of Full SBDT, they still exhibit high detection rates on BBCaL and SCALE-UP. In contrast, both Random Assignment and Full SBDT achieve substantially lower TPRs on these two detectors.
These results indicate that simply selecting an alternative trigger with a high ASR is insufficient to achieve the same detection performance as dynamically using multiple triggers. Combined with the component ablation results, our findings suggest that the contribution of SBDT lies not only in discovering multiple effective alternative triggers, but also in organizing and assigning these configurations at the sample level, thereby changing their overall usage patterns.
2.4 Cross-Dataset and Cross-Backdoor-Type Evaluation
We adopt a hierarchical experimental design to investigate the effectiveness of SBDT from two perspectives: trigger-response generalization and its impact on runtime detection.
First, at the level of trigger-response generalization, we evaluate three backdoor attacks with different trigger mechanisms, namely BadNets, Blended, and FTrojan, across datasets including CIFAR-10, GTSRB, and Tiny-ImageNet. Specifically, BadNets involves spatial position variations, Blended involves blending-pattern and region transformations, and FTrojan involves frequency-coordinate variations. Through candidate trigger search and response analysis across different datasets and trigger mechanisms, we investigate whether frozen backdoored models retain exploitable trigger configuration flexibility after training. Figure 1 and the related experimental results demonstrate that this trigger-response generalization phenomenon is not limited to a single dataset or backdoor mechanism.
Second, at the runtime detection level, we use CIFAR-10/BadNets as a representative experimental setting to systematically evaluate different black-box detectors. We further conduct comparative experiments involving individual alternative triggers, Random Assignment, Full SBDT, and ablations of individual components. This setting is selected for in-depth analysis to control experimental variables under a consistent dataset, backdoored model, and trigger configuration, thereby systematically investigating the effects of candidate-trigger organization and sample-level assignment on different detectors.
In terms of the overall findings, our cross-dataset and cross-backdoor-type experiments primarily demonstrate that static backdoors retain exploitable trigger configuration flexibility after training. The in-depth experiments on CIFAR-10/BadNets further reveal how organizing this flexibility through sample-level dynamic assignment affects different runtime detection mechanisms. We will further clarify the objectives and scope of these two experimental aspects in the revised manuscript, avoiding the extrapolation of detection results obtained under a representative setting to all datasets and backdoor types.
We thank the reviewer for the constructive comments regarding experimental reliability, the response-aware assignment mechanism, and computational overhead. We agree that the independence of parameter selection, the contributions of different assignment strategies, and the cost of candidate trigger mining require further clarification. In response, we provide the following explanations based on additional experiments and historical execution records.
1. Held-out Parameter Selection and Experimental Results
We thank the reviewer for pointing out that although Appendix E.1 describes an independent parameter selection procedure, the corresponding Held-out results were not reported. We have supplemented these results and further clarified the independence between parameter selection and final evaluation.
Specifically, we equally divided 5,000 attack samples into a validation set and a Held-out set, each containing 2,500 samples. The validation set was used to select the hyperparameters of the assignment mechanism, including β, γ, the number of candidate triggers K, and the number of outer-loop iterations. Importantly, no backdoor detector outputs were used during this parameter selection process, and no parameters were selected based on detector TPRs.
The final selected configuration was β = 0.70, γ = 0.50, K = 8, and two outer-loop iterations. After determining these parameters, we fixed the configuration and evaluated it on the independent Held-out set.
The corresponding experimental results are presented below:
These results demonstrate that SBDT maintains an ASR of 98.99% on the independent Held-out set without using detector outputs for hyperparameter selection. Meanwhile, the TPRs of BBCaL and SCALE-UP are both 0%, while those of TeCo and BEATRIX are 6.40% and 8.38%, respectively.
The responses of different detectors to parameter variations are not consistent. Under the Held-out configuration, the TPRs of AC and SCAn are 53.94% and 37.52%, respectively, which are higher than their corresponding values under the main experimental configuration. This indicates that independent parameter selection does not guarantee the lowest TPR for every detector. Nevertheless, without using detector feedback for parameter selection, SBDT still maintains relatively low detection rates against several runtime detectors.
We believe that this additional experiment helps distinguish detector-independent parameter selection from detector-specific optimization and further clarifies the actual performance of SBDT across different detection mechanisms.