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- Confidence
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- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
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- Soundness
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Paper summary
This paper investigates how video temporal reasoning capabilities can be exploited to jailbreak multimodal large language models. It proposes VCST, which disperses harmful instructions across video segments and embeds their reconstruction within temporal localization and cross-segment reasoning tasks. Experiments across multiple models show higher attack success rates than existing baselines, including in thinking mode, while also examining defense robustness and video-oriented detection strategies.
Critical strengths
- Important and timely video safety problem.
- Effective and computationally inexpensive attack design.
- Extensive comparisons across models and reasoning modes.
Critical weaknesses
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The novelty of VCST is insufficiently established against closely related multimodal jailbreak methods that also distribute harmful information and require its reconstruction.
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The central capability-safety mechanism is not convincingly isolated, and the defense evaluations do not adequately establish robustness against stronger video-aware safeguards.
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The attack evaluation lacks sufficient statistical validation, while the absence of released code and several implementation ambiguities limit reproducibility.
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The paper has ethical concerns regarding inconsistencies in human-subject involvement, insufficient disclosure of annotator protections, and unclear responsible disclosure procedures for affected model providers.
Questions for authors
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The novelty of VCST is insufficiently established against closely related multimodal jailbreak attacks. [1] already distributes harmful information across visual components and guides the model to reconstruct the underlying request, while [2] similarly decomposes harmful queries across multiple images. Moreover, TempJail (2026), which is cited but not discussed, also exploits temporal arrangements of adversarial information in videos. What is the fundamental technical distinction between VCST and these approaches beyond arranging fragmented harmful content temporally? The authors should provide a more rigorous novelty discussion and include comparisons with directly related methods, particularly HIMRD.
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The proposed capability-safety trap is not sufficiently isolated by the ablation experiments. Table 6 shows that removing temporal splitting reduces average ASR only from 81.7% to 78.8%, while the unsplit variant still outperforms MCV. Furthermore, the VCST prompt in Figure 19 contains linguistic framing similar to the strategies criticized in Section 3.2.1. Could the authors separately evaluate the VCST prompt with an unsplit typographic image, remove the contextual framing from the prompt, and apply the VCST prompt to MCV videos? These controls are important for determining whether the improvement comes from exploiting video temporal reasoning or from a stronger textual jailbreak prompt.
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The defense evaluation does not adequately establish robustness against stronger video-aware safeguards. Figure 3 relies on a random single-frame filter, which is particularly favorable to an attack that places harmful content in only a small fraction of the video. Table 7 already shows considerably higher detection rates under key-frame inspection. Could the authors evaluate multi-frame sampling, video-wide OCR, and key-frame filtering under different inspection budgets? In addition, the proposed tri-step defense achieves relatively low VCST detection rates in Table 4. Please report its actual post-defense ASR and false-positive rates on benign text-bearing videos to establish whether it provides meaningful protection.
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The attack success evaluation requires stronger validation. The binary safety judge includes policy categories such as legal, financial, and health advice, which do not necessarily correspond to actionable harmful content. Appendix A.1 also includes reasoning traces in safety evaluation, whereas Section 4.2 discusses improvements in final-response safety under thinking mode. Could the authors report final-response-only ASR and use a graded harmfulness metric, such as StrongREJECT [3], to distinguish actionable harmful outputs from broad policy violations? Category-level results would further clarify whether the reported improvements hold for clearly harmful behaviors.
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The experimental reliability and generality need stronger evidence. VCST randomly selects natural video contexts and insertion positions, but the main results do not report variation across independent attack constructions or random seeds. Some ASR improvements over competing methods are also relatively small. Could the authors provide confidence intervals and statistical significance tests across multiple runs? The closed-source results should also be interpreted more carefully, since DMN outperforms VCST on Gemini-3.1-Pro and Claude-Sonnet-5 frequently produces generic restart responses. Evaluation on a video-native safety benchmark such as Video-SafetyBench would further strengthen the generality of the conclusions.
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The paper does not provide the implementation code, substantially limiting reproducibility. VCST involves several implementation-sensitive components, including harmful-query decomposition, typographic rendering, temporal splitting, random clip insertion, prompt construction, and safety evaluation. Without the code, it is difficult to verify whether the baselines follow comparable protocols or reproduce the reported attack success rates. The paper should also clarify the exact splitting orientation and position, which are described inconsistently across Figure 4, Figure 19, and Appendix A.2.
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Minor: Several presentation and bibliography issues require correction. Figure 3 uses inconsistent y-axis ranges, Figure 15 contains the typo "FLM-4.6V-Flash", and some appendix figure references are incorrect. The bibliography also contains inaccurate publication information, such as the venue detail for VRSA (should be CVPR finding). There misses a space before page range.
[1] Ma, Teng, et al. "Heuristic-Induced Multimodal Risk Distribution Jailbreak Attack for Multimodal Large Language Models." ICCV. 2025.
[2] Yang, Zuopeng, et al. "Distraction is All You Need for Multimodal Large Language Model Jailbreaking." CVPR. 2025.
[3] Souly, Alexandra, et al. "A StrongREJECT for Empty Jailbreaks." NeurIPS. 2024.