- Rating
- 3(+1)
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper investigates the joint problem of image privacy protection and compression under the Local Differential Privacy (LDP) framework. DP-DiPP integrates two components: (i) an approximate steplimited, candidatebounded Poisson Private Representation (PPR) method, which is claimed to provide a 2αε-LDP guarantee for encoding ε-LDP mechanisms; (ii) a modified diffusionbased compressor (DiffC), in which Laplace channels with momentmatching techniques replace conventional Gaussian reversestep targets to achieve provable pure LDP guarantees. Experiments are conducted on the CIFAR10 dataset with ResNet56 and the 512×512 Shenzhen chest X-ray dataset with DenseNet121. The baselines for comparison include the PNGcompressed Laplacemechanism, LDPSlicing, and Gaussian DiffC. Substantial bitrate improvements are reported across plotted privacyutility operating points. Variance analyses over three experimental runs are provided in Appendix H. The paper proves a general result for steplimited PPR (Theorem 3.1), with further implementation details given in Appendices B through J.
Critical strengths
- This paper addresses the challenge that the privacy guarantees of a mechanism cannot automatically extend to its stochastic encoding. The authors propose a step‑limited PPR approach, replace Gaussian diffusion targets with Laplace distributions, and develop a diffusion‑based compression method with formal LDP guarantees. Theorem 3.1 together with the privacy analyses in Sections 3‑4 and Appendices C‑D provide theoretical underpinnings for this design, making the contributions of this work go well beyond empirical improvements over existing compression methods.
- Experiments on CIFAR‑10 and high‑resolution chest X‑ray images demonstrate a substantial reduction in bit rate compared with the “privatize‑then‑compress” baseline and LDP‑Slicing. The paper additionally includes implementation details, experimental setups, and variability results across three runs in the appendices (Sections 5.1‑5.4; Appendices G‑J). These results suggest that DP‑DiPP is a promising approach for privacy‑preserving image compression.
Critical weaknesses
- Theorem 3.1 requires n≥2^{l_α(x)/β}, where the sampling budget depends on the KL‑divergence of each individual input. However, Appendix J.2 employs fixed per‑step KL budgets estimated from a calibration dataset. It remains unclear whether these fixed budgets satisfy the per‑image approximation guarantees, especially for images with large KL‑divergence values. Furthermore, there appears to be a gap in the proof given in Appendix C: Equation (17) upper‑bounds E[logKn], whereas Equation (18) applies Markov’s inequality to the untruncated index K. The authors should clarify this step and elaborate on the relationship between the theoretical approximation guarantees and the practically implemented encoder.
- Although the paper highlights fixed‑budget encoding and GPU parallelization, it does not report practical encoding/decoding wall‑clock time for high‑resolution images, peak GPU memory consumption, or the number of required PPR proposals. Appendix B discusses the efficiency of the original DiffC implementation but does not directly evaluate the computational cost of DP‑DiPP.
Questions for authors
Q1. Theorem 3.1 provides a total‑variation‑distance upper bound for step‑limited PPR, where the required sampling budget depends on the KL divergence between the target and proposal distributions. However, Appendix J.2 uses fixed per‑step KL budgets estimated from calibration data. Does this approximation upper bound still hold for images whose actual KL divergence exceeds the estimated average value?
Q2. This paper emphasizes the scalability of DP‑DiPP achieved via step‑limited PPR and GPU parallelization, yet it provides limited results regarding computational efficiency. Could the authors report the encoding‑decoding wall‑clock time and peak GPU memory usage, especially for high‑resolution chest X‑ray images, and compare them against vanilla DiffC and other baselines?
6 comments
Responses (part 2)
This paper emphasizes the scalability of DP‑DiPP […] yet it provides limited results regarding computational efficiency. Could the authors report the encoding‑decoding wall‑clock time and peak GPU memory usage […] and compare them against vanilla DiffC and other baselines?
Our claim of scalability mainly refers to the ability to scale the joint compression and privatization of high-dimensional data, which, to our knowledge, has not previously been made operational.
In Appendix O, we report the wall-clock time and GPU utilization of our method and all the baselines for both datasets. For the high-resolution CXR dataset, across privacy levels, DP-DiPP takes 1.1-6.1 s to encode (time increases with ) and 7.0-11.1 s to decode and denoise (time decreases with ). In comparison, these values are 0.78-4.6 s and 6.5-11.0 s for the DiffC baseline. For the Laplace baseline, encoding and denoising are done on the encoder side and take 0.029-6.2 s (time decreases with ), and decoding takes 0.002 s. For LDP-Slicing, encoding takes 0.047-0.07 s, and decoding takes 0.004-0.006 s. For the same dataset, the peak GPU memory usage for DP-DiPP is 6.56 GBs, the same as the DiffC baseline, while for the Laplace baseline (due to the utilization of the same ADM diffusion model for denoising) the value is 6.55 GBs, and for the LDP-Slicing baseline this value is 0.74 GBs.
Thank you again for your time and constructive feedback, and would be grateful if you could kindly reconsider the evaluation in light of the clarified results and strengthened empirical evidence.
Thank you for the detailed response. Some of my concerns have been addressed. However, the theoretical analysis in the appendix has only been supplemented with additional clarifications regarding its limitations, without substantively resolving the underlying issues. Therefore, I will maintain my original score.
Responses (part 1)
Thank you for your insightful comments, and for taking the time to review the appendix.
The apparent gap in the proof of the approximation bound arose from a typographical error, which we have now corrected. With this correction, Equation (17) establishes a valid upper bound on E[logK]. The rest of the proof follows as before.
We agree that the fixed KL budgets estimated from calibration data do not necessarily satisfy the sufficient condition for the per-image TV approximation guarantee in Theorem 3.1. When KL is hard-coded, the upper bound on the TV approximation error grows linearly with the actual KL divergence for a fixed sampling budget n, before being capped at 1. Thus, images with larger KL divergence may have weaker approximation guarantees. However, as brought to our attention by Reviewer 1, the bound already becomes vacuous even in the non-fixed KL budget scenario at the practical sampling budget used in our experiments (n≤216 per chunk), which we now state explicitly in the paper (L361–372).
Nevertheless, as our additional experiments demonstrate, the practical approximation error has only a limited effect on reconstruction quality in the evaluated settings, including images whose KL divergence exceeds the calibrated budget. Importantly, the vacuity of the TV bound does not invalidate the privacy guarantee of step-limited PPR.
To empirically investigate the effect of using step-limited PPR compared to exact sampling, in Appendix K, we replace every PPR-coded sample with an exact sample of the same reverse-step target on 50 random X-rays, keeping the initial noise, time-steps, and denoiser fixed. Before denoising, PSNR differs by at most 0.036 dB and SSIM by at most 0.0023. After denoising, exact sampling is at most 0.62 dB higher in PSNR, and SSIM differs significantly only at the two largest budgets (ϵ= 46.9 and 82, by 0.017 and 0.016, respectively) in favor of exact sampling. The gap does not grow with the number of encoding steps. This is expected from the algorithm's structure: at every step, the target q(xt−1∣xt,x0) is computed from the current state and the original image, so a deviation introduced at one step can be corrected at the next.
We further investigate the effect of hard-coding the KL budget in Appendix L.
We start by comparing each X-ray’s own KL with the hard-coded budget at every timestep transition, and we find that the budget exceeds the image’s total KL for all 662 images at every transition except the last two, where 7.3% and 45.8% of the images exceed it. Since only the two largest privacy budgets use these transitions, we test the worst case, ϵ = 82: the 50 images with the most chunks exceeding the budget are re-encoded with their own KL at every step. On these images, the rate increases by 0.0040 ± 0.0007 bpp (0.0636 → 0.0676 bpp). For the denoised images, PSNR increases by 0.16 ± 0.15 dB, and SSIM does not change significantly; for the noisy images, PSNR does not change, and SSIM increases by 0.001. We note that DP-DiPP hard-codes the budget because encoding with the image’s own KL would make the code depend on x0 beyond the certified ϵ.
References
[1] Vonderfecht, J.I., Liu, F., ”Lossy compression with pretrained diffusion models,” in ICLR 2025.