Measuring the Checker: Mutation Analysis for GPU-Kernel Benchmark Oracles
Abstract
Benchmarks for LLM-generated GPU kernels decide correctness with a few random inputs and a loose floating-point tolerance, and their verdicts now feed leaderboards and reinforcement-learning rewards. Recent work agrees these checkers are weak and patches them by hand—extra input distributions, fuzzing recipes, tighter tolerances—with no way to measure whether any patch suffices. We introduce mutation analysis as an adequacy metric for kernel-benchmark oracles: deterministic rules inject 10,303 compilable faults into verified CUDA implementations of 189 KernelBench problems, 7,384 of them with an independent kill witness; any test protocol is scored by the fraction it detects. The official check misses one in six witnessed faults (16.9%), deterministically, and the misses are skewed by family: 8.7% of arithmetic faults escape but 78.6% of precision faults do. The metric explains why (a tolerance blind band growing with reduction size; a measured ceiling on input aggressiveness set by legitimate floating-point variance), audits the strongest existing patch (KernelBench-Verified's gain splits into +4.0 points from hidden inputs and +4.5 from tighter tolerance, a split its authors could not compute), and exposes a published fuzzing recipe that rejects correct kernels 107 times. Optimizing suites over the kill matrix reaches 98.0% detection with two inputs per problem (94.8% held-out), and the measurement's fault taxonomy teaches a test generator more than the raw faults themselves. Across 48 whole architectures the blindness grows with scale, concentrating in deep homogeneous pipelines, and two problems prove unrefereeable: their official references violate the benchmark's own tolerance against fp64.
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