- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 3
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper proposes HoneyT2I, a proactive defense framework against jailbreak attacks on text-to-image models. The framework embeds artificial vulnerabilities, termed honeypots, into T2I models to attract jailbreak optimization toward detectable representation patterns. It then extracts honeypot and difference signatures through SVD to identify and mitigate jailbreak prompts during inference. Experiments demonstrate improvements in jailbreak robustness while largely preserving benign image generation quality.
Critical strengths
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Clear writing and well-organized presentation. The paper is well written and clearly presents the research motivation, proposed methodology, and experimental evaluation.
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Interesting detection and mitigation framework. HoneyT2I combines honeypot-based jailbreak identification with representation-level steering, enabling the detection and mitigation of adversarial prompts while preserving image generation capabilities.
Critical weaknesses
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Unclear necessity of the two concept-erasure objectives. Both and aim to suppress unsafe concepts, but additionally preserves other prompt semantics. Their optimization targets may differ even for the same prompt, potentially introducing conflicting supervision. The authors should clarify their complementary roles and provide independent ablations.
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Insufficient comparison with embedding-steering defenses. Beyond SAFREE, the paper omits relevant methods such as Responsible Diffusion Models via Constraining Text Embeddings within Safe Regions [1] and SteerDiff [2], which directly manipulate text embeddings to suppress unsafe generation. Comparisons with these methods would better demonstrate the advantages of HoneyT2I.
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Limited utility evaluation and potential training–evaluation overlap. COCO captions are used for both utility preservation during training and FID/CLIP evaluation, but it is unclear whether the samples overlap. Moreover, the evaluation lacks analysis of benign prompts related to erased concepts or incorrectly identified as jailbreaks and subjected to representation steering.
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Limited evaluation across models and unsafe concepts. The main experiments focus on SD v1.4 and nudity, leaving generalization to modern T2I models and other harmful concepts insufficiently established. Moreover, it remains unclear whether concept-specific steering directions can be combined or applied jointly without interference.
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Missing ablation on loss-weight sensitivity. The ablations examine trigger length, detection threshold, and steering strength, but omit the loss weights , , and . Their effects on jailbreak robustness, concept erasure, and generation utility remain unclear.
[1] Li, Zhiwen, et al. "Responsible Diffusion Models via Constraining Text Embeddings within Safe Regions." Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference (WWW), 2025.
[2] Zhang, Hongxiang, Yifeng He, and Hao Chen. "SteerDiff: Steering towards Safe Text-to-Image Diffusion Models." arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.02710, 2024.
Questions for authors
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Concept-erasure objectives. Could the authors explain the distinct roles of and and why both are necessary despite their potentially overlapping or conflicting objectives?
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Baseline comparison. Could the authors compare HoneyT2I with additional embedding-steering defenses, particularly Responsible Diffusion Models [1] and SteerDiff [2]?
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Utility evaluation. Are the COCO training and evaluation prompts disjoint? How does HoneyT2I affect benign prompts related to erased concepts or falsely detected as jailbreaks?
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Generalization and scalability. How does HoneyT2I perform on modern T2I models and other unsafe concepts? Can multiple concept-specific steering directions be combined without interference?
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Loss-weight sensitivity. How do different values of , , and affect jailbreak robustness, concept erasure, and generation utility?
[1] Li, Zhiwen, et al. "Responsible Diffusion Models via Constraining Text Embeddings within Safe Regions." Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference (WWW), 2025.
[2] Zhang, Hongxiang, Yifeng He, and Hao Chen. "SteerDiff: Steering towards Safe Text-to-Image Diffusion Models." arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.02710, 2024.
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