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Paper summary
The authors propose PrivacyTrace, which evaluates user profile inference from Model Context Protocol (MCP) tool-call traces without access to user dialogues. Using 1,000 synthetic profiles with 17 attributes, it generates 4,000 agent trajectories and 67,950 tool calls across four domains with 25 MCP servers. Observed traces increase Attack Success Rate (ASR) from a prior baseline (a attacker using only prior knowledge) of 17.97% to 26.25% (single-domain) and 32.77% (linked cross-domain). Tool arguments alone reach 27.71% ASR, slightly outperforming full traces.
Critical strengths
- The paper identifies a novel privacy side-channel exposing user attributes directly from legitimate MCP tool-call traces.
- The benchmark provides a statistically calibrated dataset of 1,000 synthetic profiles and 4,000 real MCP agent trajectories.
- The paper offers systematic ablation studies across trace channels, observer scopes, task domains, and multi-stage attacker protocols.
Critical weaknesses
- The prior-based baseline in the current evaluation is potentially weak and confounded. While the prior attacker only sees the 17-attribute schema, trace attackers additionally observe implicit context such as the task domain, tool types, call volume, and parameters. Thus, the comparison merely proves that the observation trace as a whole is informative, rather than isolating the marginal privacy leakage driven specifically by tool arguments or returned results given a specific domain or server context.
- The paper fails to justify how accurately its synthetic benchmark reflects real-world user behaviors and agent trajectories. Although the authors apply Iterative Proportional Fitting (IPF) to align demographic attributes with official aggregate statistics, demographic alignment does not guarantee behavioral realism (at individual conversation/trajectory level). Because both the scenarios and user interactions are fully driven by LLM simulators, they inevitably introduce synthetic artifacts—such as unnaturally structured user prompts and overly explicit task parameters.
- The paper fails to distinguish between genuine latent attribute inference from behavioral side channels and direct text extraction from explicit tool parameters. In Section 4.1, both the scenario planner and user simulator are given access to the ground-truth profile to construct profile-conditioned tasks. Consequently, profile attributes or strong proxies are naturally converted into explicit task constraints and subsequently passed directly into tool invocation arguments () by the agent.
- Including strict personal identifiers (e.g., Name, Phone, Email, Govt ID, Birthplace) in the target attribute set is unmotivated and distorts the evaluation metrics. According to Section 4.1 and Appendix D.2, the benchmark's scenario generator explicitly sanitizes all personal identifiers from the task inputs given to agents. Consequently, the near-zero prediction accuracy for these attributes (e.g., only 35 correct identifier predictions out of 16,000 slots) is an obvious artifact of prompt design rather than an empirical discovery about tool-trace privacy.
- The paper omits any explanation for a prominent anomaly in Figure 5(a): for several target attributes—most noticeably Relationship Status, but also Mental Health and Sex—the schema-only prior-based baseline significantly outperforms the full-trace attack.
Questions for authors
- How do you account for the Metadata + Sequence condition yielding an ASR of 14.53%, which is lower than the schema-only prior baseline of 17.97%? Does this indicate that prompt complexity and input formatting introduce noise that degrades attacker LLM reasoning?
- Could you provide domain-conditioned and server-conditioned prior baselines to isolate the true marginal privacy leakage offered specifically by tool arguments and returned results?
- How do you validate that the micro-level conversational interactions generated by your LLM simulator reflect genuine human behavior rather than synthetic artifacts like over-engineered user prompts? Have you conducted any empirical validation comparing your synthetic agent trajectories against a dataset of consented real-user traces or human evaluators?
- Is there any human-verified guarantee for the benchmark ground truth?
- How much trace leakage remains if simple heuristic client-side sanitizers are applied to redact explicit entities in tool arguments prior to transmission?
3 comments
Response to Reviewer 9TNr (Part 2/2)
W3 & W4: literal recovery, latent inference, and strict identifiers
We audited 500 correctly predicted slots across 484 views for exact ground-truth string presence in the trace. The results are as follows:
| Attribute | Share with the ground-truth string present |
|---|---|
| Citizenship | 187/200 (93.5%) |
| Religious belief | 21/200 (10.5%) |
| Non-null physical condition | 100/100 (100%) |
While literal exposure is common for citizenship and physical condition, religious belief gains +18.51 pp in BA despite only 10.5% literal presence, showing semantic inference beyond exact copying. Similarly, in our two-stage experiment, conditioning only on previously inferred attributes (without traces) improves BA by +8.18 pp over schema-only guessing via cross-attribute correlations. For strict identifiers (W4), we included them to test whether prompt-level sanitization holds during execution, while our 10-attribute BA excludes them to avoid metric distortion. Of the 35 correct identifier predictions, only 2 names appear in plaintext (in BioMCP.think), whereas the rest have no literal match and reflect common-name collisions (Appendix C.10).
W5: the reversal on three attributes
Accounting for class imbalance via BA resolves the apparent ASR reversal on relationship status and mental condition, which was driven by schema-only guessing overwhelmingly predicting the majority class ("married" in 95.4% of views vs. 30.0% with traces; "None" in 100% vs. 84.4% with traces). Only sex remains lower under BA. The results are as follows:
| Attribute | Schema-only BA | Full single-domain BA | Difference (95% CI) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Relationship status | 19.76% | 20.07% | +0.31 pp [−0.89, 1.58] |
| Mental condition | 14.29% | 15.45% | +1.17 pp [0.37, 2.07] |
| Sex | 50.16% | 46.23% | −3.93 pp [−5.85, −2.05] |
Q4: verification of profile ground truth and the semantic judge
An item-by-item audit of 100 sampled synthetic profiles found 99 fully consistent (one had a birthplace mismatch with its government ID). Separately, in a manual audit of 300 stratified judge decisions, GLM-5.2 agreed with human labels on 292 cases (Cohen's ; Appendix C.11).
Q5: leakage remaining after pre-transmission redaction
Stripping only the BioMCP.think reasoning field from the 100 traces where it is non-empty lowers BA from 41.07% to 31.73%, which still exceeds metadata + sequence alone by +12.05 pp (retaining ~56% of the argument gain; Appendix C.9). Thus, standard functional arguments still carry substantial profile leakage. Because live pre-transmission redaction of task-relevant entities (e.g., medical terms or destinations) can alter tool outputs and degrade utility, we highlight evaluating online privacy-utility trade-offs in Section 6.
Reference
Brodersen, K. H., Ong, C. S., Stephan, K. E., & Buhmann, J. M. (2010). The balanced accuracy and its posterior distribution. In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Pattern Recognition (pp. 3121–3124). IEEE.
We wanted to kindly follow up before the discussion period closes. In response to your review, we added domain and server-conditioned priors (16.39% vs. 24.56% local-server BA), controlled channel ablations, a blinded human naturalness evaluation, a literal-presence audit separating inference from copying, a BA analysis resolving the Figure 5(a) reversal, and human verification of ground truth and the judge. We would greatly appreciate your feedback.
Response to Reviewer 9TNr (Part 1/2)
We thank Reviewer 9TNr for the thorough review and for recognizing the significance of this privacy channel, our calibrated benchmark, and our ablation studies. We have expanded our controls to separate prior knowledge from trace-content leakage, and all revisions have been incorporated into the revised manuscript with highlights.
W1 & Q1 & Q2: arguments, returned results, prompt framing, and server priors
To isolate the contribution of payload content, we hold tools, metadata, call count, and order fixed while adding arguments or returned results, evaluated via balanced accuracy (BA) [Brodersen et al., 2010]. The results are as follows:
W2 & Q3: behavioral realism of the synthetic benchmark
To complement IPF population calibration, we conducted a blinded human naturalness evaluation (1 to 5 rubric) on 50 paired inputs comparing original public-benchmark queries against our simulated users' first turns (Appendix C.11). The results are as follows:
Simulated first turns are nearly indistinguishable from original inputs on conversational weather and shopping tasks. The gap is larger on PubMedQA primarily because simulated users phrase requests as full conversational questions rather than terse retrieval queries.