- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper studies privacy-preserving audio-visual deepfake detection. The authors propose separate audio and video anonymizers, which are trained against a proxy privacy attacker while preserving deepfake detection performance. The key component is a feature suppression block (FSB) that suppresses features within each token instead of dropping entire tokens. Experiments show that the proposed method reduces attribute leakage with little loss in detection performance.
Critical strengths
- The paper is well motivated: Deepfake detection often requires access to facial videos and speech, which may also expose sensitive information about the user. I find it practically useful to study how this information can be protected while keeping the detector effective. This is especially relevant when users submit their recordings to a third-party detection service.
- The proposed method achieves an encouraging privacy-utility balance, in terms of privacy cMAP and detection AUC in Tab. 1.
Critical weaknesses
- The scope of privacy protection could be clearer: The paper measures demographic (i.e., gender, ethnicity, age) leakage, but does not directly test identity leakage that whether a person can still be recognized from the outputs. I understand that the authors cannot cover every privacy risk; However, identity is relevant to the threats mentioned in the paper’s introduction (e.g., identity theft).
- The method is intuitive, but its novelty and analysis seem relatively limited: Adversarial privacy learning (against a proxy attacker model) is already widely established, and FSB mainly adds feature-wise gating. The ablation supports its benefit, but does not explain what it learns to remove or preserve.
Questions for authors
- Could the authors clarify whether the privacy goal includes hiding identity? If so, a face or speaker recognition test would be helpful. If the goal is limited to the evaluated attributes, I would suggest making this clearer in the paper’s introduction.
- Could the authors discuss the performance drop on KoDF relative to NFFP? It would also be useful to know whether the privacy benefit remains when the attacker is trained on anonymized KoDF data.
- A common concern with adversarial privacy learning is that the protection may depend on the chosen proxy attacker. I appreciate that the authors retrain the attacker after freezing the anonymizers. However, the attacker still uses the same architecture. Could the authors test an alternative privacy attacker to see whether the learned protection transfers?
Summary for AC
Dear Reviewers,
We thank all reviewers for their careful reading and constructive feedback. We hope our responses and revisions have addressed the concerns raised.
Dear Area Chair and Meta-Reviewer,
Thank you for handling our submission. Below, we summarize the key reviewer concerns, our responses, and the corresponding manuscript revisions.
Major Concerns
1. Privacy Suppression Against Different Attacker Architectures
Concern: Whether privacy suppression generalizes beyond the attacker architecture used during training.
Our response:
2. Identity Leakage Through Face and Speaker Recognition
Concern: Whether PPDD suppresses identity information beyond the attributes used during training.
Our response:
3. Methodological and Task-Level Novelty
Concern: Limited methodological novelty given existing adversarial privacy learning and feature suppression techniques.
Our response:
Additional Concerns
4. Cross-Dataset Privacy Generalization
Concern: Whether privacy suppression transfers to a different dataset.
Our response:
5. Cross-Dataset Detection Performance Drop
Concern: The 4.2 percentage-point AUC reduction is not negligible.
Our response:
6. Attribute-Level Privacy Suppression
Concern: Privacy suppression across individual attributes and comparison with random-choice baselines.
Our response:
Closing Remarks
Across the reviews, several key concerns centered around the generalization of the learned anonymization beyond the original privacy attributes (identity suppression), attacker architecture, and dataset. We have addressed these through additional experiments and incorporated the findings into the revised manuscript.
We have also clarified our methodological and task-level novelty and acknowledged the cross-dataset detection limitation.
We thank the reviewers, Area Chair, and Meta-Reviewer for their time and consideration. We hope this summary is helpful in assessing our revised submission.