- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications and are typically trained on large-scale datasets collected from the internet. Such datasets may contain unsafe or harmful content, which can subsequently be propagated to downstream applications. Given a pretrained VLM, two main paradigms exist for mitigating these issues: (i) fine-tuning the model on safe/unsafe datasets to steer its behavior, and (ii) post-hoc weight manipulation or activation steering methods that do not require additional training data. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages. Fine-tuning-based methods generally achieve stronger safety performance but risk degrading the model's general-domain capabilities, while parameter-free steering methods tend to preserve more knowledge but usually provide weaker safety improvements. This paper proposes a middle-ground approach that is neither fully training-based nor purely based on weight or activation manipulation. The key idea is to leverage interpretability techniques through sparse autoencoders, identify safety-related features using a calibration set, and modify unsafe activations at inference time on a per-instance basis during downstream tasks. The method is evaluated on CLIP-L and across four downstream tasks.
Critical strengths
- The problem is relevant and well motivated. The paper addresses an interesting gap between existing fine-tuning-based and steering-based approaches.
- The downstream evaluation is reasonably comprehensive, covering multiple tasks and usage scenarios for vision-language models.
Critical weaknesses
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Evaluation on a single VLM is a significant limitation for a largely empirical paper. It is difficult to assess how well the method generalizes across architectures and model scales.
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The proposed feature-scoring mechanism appears relatively simple. While intuitive, it is not clear how effectively it addresses the issue of polysemantic features. The authors acknowledge this concern, but its impact is neither thoroughly discussed nor experimentally investigated.
Questions for authors
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Can the method be evaluated on additional models beyond CLIP-L? The current experimental validation is limited to a single architecture. A more convincing evaluation would include models of different scales and potentially different VLM families.
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What is the training cost of the proposed approach, particularly the sparse autoencoder training stage? How does this cost compare to methods such as SafeCLIP?
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How sensitive is the method to the sparse autoencoder training data? The current SAE is trained on CC3M, what happens if it is trained directly on ViSU or another dataset?
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Does the approach generalize to previously unseen unsafe concepts that are not represented in the calibration set? Why is UWM not included as a baseline for the VQA and image-generation experiments?
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Some reported improvements, particularly on COCO, appear relatively small and may fall within the expected variance of the evaluation. Could the authors report confidence intervals or statistical significance estimates?
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The presentation of the tables could be improved. Rather than reporting only the delta for the proposed method in a separate row, it would be easier to compare approaches if the corresponding deltas were reported inline for all baselines and best-performing values should be highlighted consistently across columns. Also the color coding in Table 2 appears confusing (or potentially inverted?). For example, in MM-SafetyBench (where lower is better), lower values are highlighted in red, whereas in MMBench (where higher is better), lower values appear highlighted in green.
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Does the method require paired safe/unsafe examples in the calibration set? If so, how restrictive is this requirement in practice? Discussing this limitation more explicitly, or outlining possible relaxations as future work, would strengthen the paper.