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- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
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- Soundness
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Paper summary
This paper examines whether an agent responsible for a multi-agent failure can shift blame to a preselected innocent peer by editing only its own audit narrative, while the execution record and ground-truth responsibility remain fixed. To study this setting, the authors formalize blame integrity and evaluate ownership-constrained narrative edits on Who&When and TraceElephant traces. They also compare how different LLM judges respond to these edits and evaluate audit-interface defenses, including their effects on clean attribution.
Critical strengths
The paper presents a clear setting for targeted blame manipulation, where an agent can edit only its own narrative to shift blame onto a preselected innocent peer. Under Qwen-Max All-at-Once, named-F1 raises the targeted blame success rate over matched noise by +0.59 on HC, +0.38 on AG, and +0.41 on TE. Susceptibility varies considerably across judges, while the defense experiments report clean attribution accuracy and judge-query costs for HC.
Critical weaknesses
Gaming the Judge already demonstrated that rewriting agent reasoning can change judge verdicts while actions and observations remain fixed. Victim preselection and field-ownership constraints define a more specific attribution setting, but it remains unclear what new scientific insights arise specifically from these constraints. Table 5's “Fixed failure?” comparison is also ambiguous, as it does not clearly distinguish the execution outcome from the judge's verdict.
The claim that blame shifts arise from peer accusations rather than fabricated events remains insufficiently validated. In particular, Table 18 flags possible fabricated-event claims in some F1 rationales, and no human validation is reported for the subset unflagged by both automatic auditors.
The supplementary evaluations raise concerns about sample handling and comparability with the main evaluation. Table 10's caption refers to all 50 AG traces, although only 47 have admissible victims in the main targeted evaluation. The treatment of the remaining three cases in the targeted-lift calculation is not specified. Separately, Table 16 scores the blind attack against a writer-selected victim, limiting direct comparison with the preassigned-target setting.
The theoretical treatment does not fully account for the implemented lexical filter. Definition 3(ii) retains or drops entire narratives, whereas Appendix D removes selected lines. This difference raises questions about the applicability of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 to the implemented filter.
The table captions are consistently placed below the tables, contrary to the ICLR 2027 formatting guidelines.
Questions for authors
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What new finding depends specifically on victim preselection and field ownership beyond Gaming the Judge? In Table 5, does “Fixed failure?” refer to the execution outcome or the judge's verdict?
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Please provide human validation for a sample of the Table 18 rationales that neither automatic auditor flagged, or revise the abstract's fabrication claim to reflect what the automated screening actually supports.
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Table 10 states that both axes use all 50 AG traces, whereas Table 1 excludes three traces without admissible victims from the main evaluation. How is targeted lift defined for these three traces?
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Appendix N dismisses peer-name filtering, while Table 15 reports detection results without evaluating this specific filtering defense. Why would removing peer names from agent-written narratives prevent attribution using trusted records? Has the effect on clean attribution accuracy or susceptibility to adaptive attacks been evaluated?