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- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
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- Soundness
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Paper summary
This paper proposes Distribution-Aligned Reweighting (DAR), an in-training backdoor defense method that views backdoor poisoning as an adversarial distribution shift between the potentially poisoned training data and the underlying clean data. Unlike existing defenses that rely on differences in the learning dynamics of clean and poisoned samples, DAR leverages a small trusted clean reference set to guide sample reweighting. Specifically, the method first extracts feature representations of the training and reference samples, and then applies class-wise Kernel Mean Matching (KMM) to assign sample weights by minimizing the distribution discrepancy between the weighted training data and the clean reference data. The key intuition is to suppress or exclude samples that contribute to the discrepancy from the clean distribution. Under the overall KMM distribution-matching objective, samples assigned low weights are considered less useful for aligning the training distribution with the clean reference distribution.
Critical strengths
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The paper provides an intuitive perspective on backdoor defense by treating data poisoning as a distribution shift and mitigating it through distribution alignment.
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DAR is straightforward to implement and does not require modifications to the model architecture or training objective.
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The method achieves low attack success rates and competitive robust accuracy across multiple datasets, attacks, and poisoning ratios.
Critical weaknesses
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Sample reweighting techniques for backdoor defense are not novel compared to existing methods.
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Distribution alignment does not necessarily guarantee that poisoned samples receive lower weights. The paper lacks direct analysis of the learned weight distributions for clean and poisoned samples.
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The experiments only consider 5% and 10% trusted clean reference data, leaving performance under smaller or less representative reference sets unexplored.
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Lack of adaptive analysis, where the attacker knows the design of the proposed method.
Questions for authors
Thank you for submitting the interesting work to ICLR 2027, but I still have a major concern about the robustness of the proposed method against attacks without latent separability.
The proposed method implicitly assumes that poisoned samples induce noticeable distribution shifts in the feature space, allowing KMM to assign them lower weights. However, this assumption may not always hold, as previous studies have shown that poisoned and clean samples can have highly overlapping feature distributions, such as Adap-Blend[1] and Grond[2]. In such cases, poisoned samples may still receive high weights, potentially undermining the effectiveness of DAR. I encourage the authors to evaluate DAR against these attacks and analyze whether the learned weights can effectively distinguish clean and poisoned samples when their feature distributions overlap.
[1]Revisiting the Assumption of Latent Separability for Backdoor Defenses, ICLR 2023
[2]Towards Backdoor Stealthiness in Model Parameter Space, CCS 2025