- Rating
- 1
- Confidence
- 4(+2)
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
- 1
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper studies a setting of LLM negotiation where agents represent users with private preferences and studies how much information about the users’ private preferences is revealed in order to reach agreement of a certain welfare level. The contributions are to give a lower bound on how much information must be revealed about user preferences to reach a agreement of a certain level of welfare, giving an audit to measure how much excess information negotiations reveal in practice, and empirical results auditing models in various negotiation scenarios.
Edit: I have read the rebuttal and maintain my assessment of the paper and score.
Critical strengths
This research question is quite interesting - I would be excited to read a draft of this paper that improved readability.
Critical weaknesses
A major weakness for this paper is clarity. The exposition is extremely obfuscated and the explanations and intuitions given use imprecise language, unexplained jargon, and makes claims without proper justification.
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The main paragraph describing contributions in the introduction: “We answer the question with a floor, an audit, and a check (Figure 1). The floor is the delegation frontier, the least information that any agreement of a given welfare must reveal about each user to the other users, counting what each counterpart already knows. The audit decodes each user’s preferences from the negotiation record and subtracts an upper bound on the frontier, so decoder error can only hide excess, never create it. The check enumerates every preference profile of a reduced bargaining game and computes the true disclosure exactly, so the decoder’s error is measured directly.”
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“Because the other side knows its own preferences, the frontier can exceed the classical rate–distortion floor.” What is the “classical rate-distortion floor”?
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Section 3.2 - what is a “briefing”? This word appears twice in adjacent sentences but is never explained. “For target i, the observer is the idealized coalition of the other principals. The coalition knows their types θ−i but not their agents’ full briefings (Section 6)”?
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What is “exposure”? “Side information changes exposure (Wyner & Ziv, 1976; Kimura & Uyematsu, 2008), even in a two-bit example.”
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The first main result uses information theoretic tools to quantify information leakage between random variables, but this is not sufficiently explained, only given a treatment of a few sentences in the second paragraph of Section 3.2.
Thank you authors for the detailed comment. You are showing that decoder error can only undercount the excess, and rankings are never based on decoded bounds. So, that resolve one of my main concern. I had a look at the new content added as well, but I would like to retain my previous scores for the paper.