- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 3
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Paper summary
The paper presents RePAIR which is a post-hoc, label-free defense against backdoor attacks on semantic segmentation models. It infers the relation between victim and target semantic classes and uses an observation that backdoor attack effects appear to be more prominent in the pixel classifier head than in the internal representations. The authors propose approaches for CNN- and Transformer-based architectures and demonstrate the results for corresponding image segmentation models on multiple datasets.
Critical strengths
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The paper addresses an important problem of backdoor attacks on segmentation models which poses a threat for safety-critical applications where the class of important objects can be switched causing problems in downstream processes.
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The proposed method appears to provide significant robustness improvement over state of the art (see Table 1) on both CNN and Transformer architectures without modifying the potentially compromised segmentation model.
Critical weaknesses
No critical weaknesses were identified.
- Minor writing issues:
- line 033: proving -> providing?
- line 291: "which differs architectures." - the phrasing seems to be incorrect.
- Minor formatting issue: consider increasing the font in the Figure 2 to improve readability since it is much smaller than the main text font.
Questions for authors
- Have you tested the method in the untargeted backdoor attack setting i. e. modifying the predicted class to any other class, which is simpler for the attacker and more difficult for the defender?
- Does "sim" in the line 295 mean cosine similarity?
- Why are some numbers in Table 1 underlined?
3 comments
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Dear reviewer WVYM,
please take part in the discussion. time is running out.
thank you your ac
Thank you
Thank you for the rebuttal. I only had minor concerns and they were addressed. I am keeping my score.
We thank Reviewer WVYM for the positive assessment, in particular for acknowledging the practical importance of backdoor defenses for safety-critical segmentation and the improvement over the state of the art.
W1/W2. We thank the reviewer for pointing out these minor issues. All suggested changes have been addressed in the revised manuscript. Line 033: changed "proving" to "providing" / line 291: rephrased the sentence to "which differs between architectures" / Figure 2: enlarged the font to improve readability and match the main text.
Q1. To the best of our knowledge, existing work on backdoor attacks in semantic segmentation has focused on targeted attacks. RePAIR is likewise designed for this setting, in which triggered victim-class pixels are redirected toward a specific target class. Its repair mechanism explicitly exploits and reverses this directed victim-to-target transport. We have not evaluated untargeted backdoor attacks and have clarified this scope in the Limitations.
Untargeted attacks, in which victim-class pixels are redirected to multiple possible classes, would be an interesting and more challenging setting. In this case, probability mass may leave the victim class in multiple directions, preventing pair discovery from identifying a single dominant victim-to-target direction. The builder would therefore be expected to abstain rather than apply an unreliable repair. Extending RePAIR to this setting would require generalizing the single-target formulation to a set of target classes, i.e., a victim-to-multiple-target transport. We consider this an interesting direction for future work.
Q2. Yes, "sim" denotes cosine similarity. We have now explicitly defined it at its first occurrence in the revised manuscript.
Q3. Underlined entries indicate the second-best result in each column, while bold entries indicate the best. We have added this clarification to the table caption.