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Paper summary
This paper studies defenses against memory poisoning after poisoned memories have entered an agent’s context. The authors use Natural Language Autoencoders (NLA) to verbalize hidden states and map the resulting descriptions into six local diagnostic states concerning constraints, objectives, and actions. They then investigate the relationship between these descriptions and agent behavior through activation interventions, and combine internal diagnoses with behavioral feedback to iteratively refine a natural-language defense policy in the agent harness. Experiments across five agent settings and four model backbones report substantial reductions in attack success rates. The central claim is that internal states are more useful as feedback for upstream defense refinement than as direct control targets.
Critical strengths
- The paper attempts to identify which component of the agent’s decision is affected and use that diagnosis to improve defenses. This is a worthwhile research direction.
- The paper goes beyond presenting natural-language explanations by investigating activation interventions and harness refinement. Although the current causal evidence remains limited, the attempt to connect internal analysis with practical defense design is appealing.
Critical weaknesses
- S0–S5 underpin the internal analysis, policy refinement, and defense evaluation, yet lack human validation, inter-annotator agreement, and cross-judge stability analysis. Differences in probe selection and the judge’s access to final responses may introduce bias.
- Although Ignore, Escape, and Sandwich have literature references, their implementations here are simple fixed prompting heuristics. Ours benefits from iterative optimization and a more elaborate prompt. Strong prompt baselines with matched optimization budgets, together with stronger defenses under the same threat model, are needed.
- The paper lacks a behavior-only ablation experiment matching the optimizer, examples, budget, and validation rules. Consequently, the gains may arise from simple prompt optimization.
- Accurate activation reconstruction does not guarantee faithful explanations, and behavioral changes after intervention do not directly validate the six-state semantics.
Questions for authors
See weakness.
3 comments
Official Comment for Reviewer DMeC (PART II)
These approaches provide complementary protection throughout the memory lifecycle. However, as attack strategies evolve, adversaries may adapt their injection channels and payloads to circumvent upstream defenses. Regardless of the injection route, the malicious information must ultimately enter the model's active context to influence its decisions. We therefore focus on a complementary model-side defense setting explicitly defined in our paper: poisoned memories have already been retrieved and incorporated into the agent's active context. Rather than assuming upstream filtering can always prevent such exposure, we leverage internal-state diagnoses as offline feedback to refine an external defense policy that mitigates the downstream influence of poisoned content.
Among existing approaches, A-MemGuard [6] provides the closest memory-specific comparison. We therefore additionally evaluate it on QA and StrategyQA using DeepSeek-V4-Flash, alongside our original prompt-level baselines.
| Method | StrategyQA ASR-r ↓ | ASR-a ↓ | ASR-t ↓ | QA ASR ↓ | QA ACC ↑ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A-MemGuard | 36.49 | 61.58 | 38.36 | 12.35 | 86.07 |
| Ours | 19.95 | 37.04 | 45.41 | 0.00 | 98.29 |
Our method achieves the best results on QA, with 0% ASR and 98.29% accuracy. On StrategyQA, it reduces ASR-r and ASR-a relative to A-MemGuard, although A-MemGuard achieves a lower ASR-t.
We further compare the computational overhead. A-MemGuard generates an independent reasoning path for each of the (K) retrieved memories before consensus validation, yielding:
=\sum_{i=1}^{K}c_i =O(K\bar c),$$ where $c_i$ denotes the token cost of each reasoning path. With $K=4$, A-MemGuard reports approximately 7.8K tokens on EHRAgent, compared with 3.6K for No Defense. In contrast, our NLA-based diagnosis is performed exclusively during offline policy refinement; deployment requires only a text-based guardrail, without additional NLA extraction or Judge calls. We will incorporate these additional comparisons and clarify the scope and deployment characteristics of our defense in the revised manuscript. [1] B. D. Sunil et al., "Memory Poisoning Attack and Defense on Memory Based LLM-Agents," arXiv:2601.05504, 2026. [2] T. Sharma, "SMSR: Certified Defence Against Runtime Memory Poisoning in Persistent LLM Agent Systems," arXiv:2606.12703, 2026. [3] N. Karamchandani et al., "Your Agent's Memories Are Not Its Own: Forged Reasoning Attacks on LLM Agent Memory and Defenses," arXiv:2607.05029, 2026. [4] D. Liu et al., "MIND: Lightweight and Effective Memory Injection Defense for LLM Agents via Intent-Aware Information Bottleneck," arXiv:2607.28103, 2026. [5] I. Gowda, "MEMSAD: Gradient-Coupled Anomaly Detection for Memory Poisoning in Retrieval-Augmented Agents," arXiv:2605.03482, 2026. [6] Q. Wei et al., "A-MemGuard: A Proactive Defense Framework for LLM-Based Agent Memory," ICML, 2026. [7] Z. Tan et al., "MemAudit: Post-hoc Auditing of Poisoned Agent Memory via Causal Attribution and Structural Anomaly Detection," arXiv:2605.23723, 2026. --- ### 3. Additional Value of Internal-State Feedback (W3) We thank the reviewer *DMeC* for highlighting the need to isolate the contribution of internal-state feedback. To directly quantify its additional value, we conducted a **controlled behavior-only refinement experiment**, keeping the optimizer, initial policy, training/validation samples, optimization budget, and policy selection criteria identical. The only difference is whether the optimizer additionally receives NLA-derived internal diagnostic feedback. The results demonstrate measurable benefits from internal-state feedback in **four of the five evaluated settings**. The following table reports the mean results across four backbones. |Benchmark|Metric|Behavior-only|Ours|Improvement (pp)| |---|---|---|---|---| |WebShop|ASR ↓|3.80|**1.20**|+2.61| |QA|ASR ↓|8.36|**0.48**|+7.88| |QA|ACC ↑|79.31|**88.15**|+8.84| |MIMIC-III|ASR ↓|32.79|**4.49**|+28.30| |EHR|ASR-t ↓|41.55|**28.45**|+13.10| |StrategyQA|ASR-t ↓|**34.90**|37.95|—| The improvements are particularly pronounced on **MIMIC-III (28.30 pp)** and **EHR (13.10 pp)**, where our method achieves lower ASR across all four backbones. On QA, our method also improves average task accuracy by **8.84 pp**, indicating improved robustness while preserving benign utility.Official Comment for Reviewer DMeC (PART III)
We observe an exception on StrategyQA, where behavior-only refinement achieves a lower average ASR-t (34.90% vs. 37.95%). This difference is largely driven by GLM-5.3-Flash, where behavior-only refinement already achieves strong performance (18.12% ASR-t and 81.88% ACC), compared with 42.36% ASR-t and 57.64% ACC for Ours. Interestingly, Ours achieves a lower ASR-r on this backbone (25.86% vs. 37.18%), but this does not translate into better downstream ASR-a or overall ASR-t. This suggests that the benefits of internal feedback depend on the backbone and task, particularly when behavior-only refinement already provides strong protection.
Overall, these controlled comparisons provide direct evidence that internal-state diagnoses contribute measurable benefits beyond behavioral feedback alone, particularly for action-level attacks and cross-setting robustness. While these benefits are not universal, they demonstrate the complementary value of structured internal feedback in refining agent defenses.
4. Faithfulness of NLA Interpretations and Behavioral Relevance of Activation Steering
We thank the reviewer DMeC for raising this concern. We clarify that NLA provides local semantic interpretations of hidden states rather than exact transcriptions of internal computations. To examine their correspondence with observable reasoning, we compare six selected cases (three successful and three failed attacks), together with the additional comparison case C01. For example, S01 highlights historical strategy reuse, S02 captures persistence toward an unrelated substitute, and S03 makes abandonment of the original request explicit. Importantly, F02 also illustrates a speculative NLA interpretation that is not fully supported by visible reasoning. We include these side-by-side comparisons in Appendix A.6 to illustrate both the interpretive value and limitations of NLA.
We further evaluate behavioral relevance through activation steering. As shown in Fig. 4, steering along NLA-derived semantic directions produces measurable behavioral changes, with stronger interventions generally improving resistance to poisoned intent but potentially degrading output executability. Additional experiments in Appendix B reinforce this observation: single-position interventions achieve only 2.08%–6.24% attack failure with 100% executability, whereas multi-position interventions increase attack failure to 18.15%–28.34%, with 82.32%–92.08% executability. Stronger replacement reaches 31.21% attack failure but reduces executability to 50.97%.
These results support the behavioral relevance of NLA-derived semantics, while not implying that every verbalization perfectly recovers the underlying computation. We have clarified this distinction in the revised manuscript.
We believe the above clarifications and additional evidence further strengthen the empirical foundation of our work. Collectively, these efforts reinforce our central contribution: leveraging structured internal-state diagnoses as offline feedback to improve practical post-retrieval defenses for LLM agents. We sincerely thank the reviewer DMeC for the constructive suggestions, which have helped us substantially improve the experimental analysis and presentation. We hope these revisions adequately address the reviewer DMeC’s concerns and provide further grounds for a more favorable assessment of our work.
Official Comment for Reviewer DMeC (PART I)
We appreciate the reviewer DMeC’s in-depth examination of the technical foundations and empirical evidence of our approach. We are encouraged by the reviewer DMeC’s recognition that identifying the specific components of agent decisions affected by memory poisoning, and translating such insights into practical defense mechanisms, is a worthwhile research direction.
We understand that the reviewer DMeC’s concerns mainly center on the following aspects:
1. Reliability and Faithfulness of Internal Diagnoses (W1)
We appreciate the reviewer DMeC’s concerns regarding the reliability of S0–S5 and the faithfulness of NLA interpretations. We emphasize that our diagnostic pipeline follows a carefully designed and consistent procedure, rather than relying on unconstrained LLM-based classification. Specifically, probe positions are selected around task-relevant linguistic boundaries, with neighboring tokens retained to capture local representations. Hidden states are extracted from a fixed layer, and NLA verbalization uses a fixed configuration with deterministic decoding. The Judge (GPT-5.6-Sol, temperature = 0) then maps each NLA summary to the predefined CAO states, using the current task as the alignment reference and evaluating each description independently. We further implement structural checks on case correspondence and label validity, with invalid outputs triggering retries.
To further assess the semantic reliability of the labels, we conducted a human–AI agreement analysis on successful and failed WebShop cases.
The average human–AI agreement and human-majority support are 87.5% and 80.0%, respectively.
We also removed the agent’s final response and re-evaluated the same 752 paired windows (3,760 labels). Although fine-grained labels exhibit some variation, the dominant non-S0 CAO category remains unchanged across all six dataset–outcome groups.
Constraint = S1+S2; Objective = S3+S4; Action = S5.
The exact six-state label agreement is 61.3%, while the S0/non-S0 agreement is 70.0%. Thus, we do not claim complete fine-grained label invariance; rather, the dominant functional patterns are preserved across the six groups.
2. Strength of Defense Baselines (W2)
We appreciate the reviewer DMeC’s suggestion to broaden the defense comparisons. Existing research has explored diverse strategies for protecting persistent memory in LLM agents, which can be broadly categorized according to their intervention stages: