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- Informativeness
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- Presentation
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Paper summary
Motivated by mammalian cognitive map representations, this paper gives a simple linear model to learn a map representation that reflects the task structure and shows some analyses on the resulting representation, with discussion relating these to biological facts. The task includes navigation through 2D or 3D space or a family tree.
Critical strengths
None
Critical weaknesses
The presented model is overly simplistic so that it does not give sufficient insight into the biological system. The model is essentially a linear model (though the authors emphasize ANN), where state transition is stipulated as linear addition of state and action vectors. Path integration is built in so that state indices are predefined. In such setting, representation learning and transfer are rather trivial and the presented results contain little surprise. Comparison with biology is only conceptual with no quantitative assessment.
Questions for authors
The actual mammalian hippocampal formation has various complex components like hippocampus and entorhinal cortex (grid cells). How do these compute and interact to give rise to cognitive maps and cross-domain generalizations?
What are quantitative relations between the obtained results and the experimental data? Sec 3.2 claims biological consistency, which is unclear.
I would not think that the family tree example works for larger scales. It is because nodes in deeper positions must be represented more densely so that displacements with the same type of relation depend on the depth. Is there any way to solve this problem in this framework?
What are relationships with previous studies: Sorscher et al (2023), Iyer et al (2025), Hosoya (2024), Gao et al (2021)?
== Minor comments ==
Sec 2.1 needs more informal explanation. What's the meaning of Definition and Theorem.
Sec 2.2. Why do you assign 1-dimensional coordinate to each state?
8 comments
Response (Part 2)
Q2. What is the quantitative relationship between the model and experimental data?
We agree that the wording in Sec. 3.2 was too strong. The present analysis does not directly fit neural recordings. Quantitatively, the model predicts that using shared rather than environment-specific actions reduces the task-determined dimensionality from five to three: two relational dimensions are aligned across environments, while one dimension distinguishes environment identity. This is qualitatively consistent with the reported preservation of environment identity in hippocampal representations and stronger cross-environment alignment in prefrontal representations, but it is not yet a quantitative account of those data.
Q3. Can the family-relation example scale to deeper and more densely branching trees?
We respectfully disagree that increasing tree depth requires relation displacements to become depth-dependent. This concern applies to drawing a growing tree within a bounded two-dimensional region, whereas our coordinates are neither bounded nor required to uniquely encode every individual. A parent–child increment can remain constant as the generation coordinate extends with depth. Importantly, this result is non-trivial: the network receives only categorical state and action identities, without predefined family coordinates. Global consistency across alternative relational paths reduces five nominal inverse-relation pairs to three independent dimensions, from which generation- and sex-related structure emerges. Thus, the geometry is derived from the action-labeled graph rather than imposed by the visualization.
Q4. How does the framework relate to Sorscher et al., Iyer et al., Hosoya, and Gao et al.?
These studies and ours address complementary questions. They primarily investigate the neural mechanisms or learning processes through which grid-cell-like and relational representations emerge. In contrast, we ask how a given state–action task structure constrains the geometry and dimensionality of its minimal representation. Thus, their work concerns how cognitive maps may be learned or implemented, whereas ours characterizes what representation geometry is implied by the task structure.
Q5. What is the informal meaning of the definition and theorem in Sec. 2.1?
Informally, Definition 2.1 selects, among all networks realizing the required next-state predictions, those that use the smallest combined hidden-representation and readout norm. This provides a precise notion of a minimal predictive representation. The following theorem states that, although different solutions may rotate this representation across hidden units, they all preserve the same intrinsic distances and PCA geometry. Thus, the individual neurons are not uniquely determined, but the population-level geometry relevant to our analysis is.
Q6. Why is a one-dimensional coordinate assigned to each state in Sec. 2.2?
A scalar function represents one candidate axis of the cognitive map, not the complete representation of a state. For example, horizontal and vertical position are two separate scalar coordinates. The space contains all scalar coordinates whose changes are consistent with the action labels, and a basis of its nonconstant part supplies the multiple axes of the full representation. Starting with scalar coordinates therefore allows us to count the number of independent representational dimensions without assuming that the cognitive map itself is one-dimensional.
Reply to the authors
I thank the authors for clarification. I carefully read through the comments. However, although the authors stress that the goal of the study is representational insight rather than biological relevance, the gained insight seems still simple and it is not clear how much these are significant in the presence of the raised list of prior studies.
Regarding the family relation example, even though the model manages to learn a linear representation for such relations, it is not clear whether such representation gives us meaningful insight. I imagine that the nodes deep in the tree can be overlapping to each other, and it may not show any discernible structure. Perhaps, this part needs much more thorough investigation.
Together, I could not find enough materials to change my initial assessment.
Response (Part 1)
Thank you for your thoughtful suggestions.
We believe that some of the concerns may reflect a difference in how the scope of our work is interpreted. Our goal is not to explain how biological mechanisms generate specific phenomena such as grid-cell firing. Rather, we provide a normative theory of what the low-dimensional manifolds underlying cognitive maps are, how they arise from state–action structure, and, crucially, why different task structures produce different representational geometries. Our framework provides mathematically interpretable answers to these questions. We believe that identifying these organizing principles is important for understanding the nature of cognitive maps and can provide insights for experimentalists and theorists investigating their biological implementation.
We strongly encourage you to first read our clarification regarding the interpretation of the “action-consistent coordinate system” as a theoretical framework linking behavior, cognition, and neural population geometry, rather than as an account limited to neural population geometry alone. We sincerely hope that this clarification addresses some of your questions and offer more insights to the theory.
Below, we address your thoughtful questions.
Weakness. Model simplicity and biological insight.
We thank the reviewer for raising this concern. We agree that our model is not intended to reproduce the biophysical details of neural circuits; rather, it is a deliberately simplified normative model. The purpose of using a linear network is not to claim that biological computation is linear, but to isolate and characterize exactly the component of representational geometry that is necessarily imposed by task structure, independently of architectural choices, initialization, and optimization dynamics. Importantly, the model is provided only with categorical state and action identities: no spatial coordinates, distances, or path histories are supplied. Thus, although state identities are indexed, their representational geometry is not predefined and must be learned through next-state prediction.
We also agree that the additive state–action form constitutes a compositional inductive bias. However, this assumption does not make the resulting geometry or dimensionality trivial. A shared action displacement must be globally consistent across every occurrence of that action and across all alternative paths and cycles in the transition graph. These constraints can make nominally distinct actions dependent, collapse task dimensions, or prevent a globally consistent coordinate from existing. Our main theoretical contribution is to characterize these nonlocal constraints and to derive exact predictions for the learned dimensionality and principal-component subspace. For example, the theory predicts when shared action codes permit structural transfer and when merging relations reduces representational dimensionality, predictions that are not specified merely by assigning state indices.
We therefore view the linear solution as an analytically tractable and falsifiable baseline, rather than as a complete mechanistic model of the biological system. It identifies which population-level geometric signatures follow from a proposed state–action organization; deviations from these signatures in nonlinear networks or neural data can then reveal contributions beyond this minimal account. Our nonlinear-network analyses further show that the predicted geometric signatures are not restricted to an exactly linear implementation. Nevertheless, we agree that the present comparison with biology is primarily at the level of representational geometry rather than a direct quantitative fit to neural recordings, and we will try our best to revise the manuscript to state this scope and limitation more explicitly.
Q1. How might hippocampal and entorhinal components interact to support cognitive maps and cross-domain generalization?
Our current framework is formulated at the computational rather than circuit-mechanistic level and therefore does not explicitly model interactions between the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex. One possible interpretation is that the state-specific component represents hippocampal-like coding of particular entities or locations, whereas shared action increments provide an entorhinal-like relational scaffold that can be reused across environments or cognitive domains. Their combination would allow distinct contents to occupy a common relational coordinate system. We emphasize, however, that this is a hypothesis suggested by the model, not an established mapping between network variables and brain regions.