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Paper summary
This paper proposes SABER, a framework for improving the optimization progress of agentic Agent Red Teaming. It introduces five ordered attack progress stages and combines Feedback Approximation with Construction Approximation to diagnose execution failures and guide targeted, bounded repairs of attack instances. Experiments across direct and indirect prompt injection settings, multiple target agents, and transfer scenarios demonstrate substantial improvements in attack success rates over existing methods.
Critical strengths
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Well-motivated method design. SABER connects execution failures to attack-instance components through stage-aware diagnosis and uses explicit modification and preservation constraints to guide targeted repairs. This provides a meaningful approach to improving agentic ART optimization.
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Strong empirical results. SABER substantially outperforms existing baselines across multiple target agents under both IPI and DPI. The component ablations, human audit, transfer experiments, and optimization dynamics analyses further support its effectiveness.
Critical weaknesses
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Limited validation of strict repair-boundary enforcement. Although Appendix D.3 demonstrates improvements from enforcing bounded repair constraints, the incremental gains are relatively modest and evaluated on only one target agent. Further validation across different targets would strengthen the evidence for this design choice.
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Limited evaluation of execution robustness and generalizability. The evaluation uses 96 selected cases from DTap. Despite the promising results across multiple target agents, repeated execution success rates and statistical uncertainty are not reported, making it difficult to assess robustness under stochastic agent behavior and generalizability beyond the evaluated platform.
Questions for authors
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Can the authors further validate the contribution of bounded scope enforcement across different target agents and provide statistical evidence for its improvements?
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How stable are the discovered attack instances across repeated target-agent executions, given the stochastic nature of agent behavior?
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How would SABER compare with existing methods under matched attacker-side token budgets, considering the additional computational overhead reported in Appendix D.4?
5 comments
Author Response (Part II)
Q2 & W2: (1) Are SABER’s results stable across independent runs? (2) How stable are the discovered attack instances across independent runs? (3) Does SABER’s effectiveness generalize beyond the evaluated platform?
R2: Thank you for your insightful questions!
- We first respectfully clarify that this setting is used simply to keep computational costs manageable. We deliberately chose DTap for its realistic simulated environments, but its complex, multi-step tasks require extensive agent–environment interactions, making evaluation more expensive than on simpler benchmarks. Our total experimental expenditure has already approached USD 20,000.
- Arguably, our case selection was designed to be as comprehensive as possible within this budget: we balanced easy, moderate, and complex tasks under both IPI and DPI and distributed cases as evenly as possible across DTap’s application domains.
- However, we fully understand your concern about the stability of our overall results across independent runs.
- We repeat the complete red teaming procedure three times on the same 16 moderate cases against OpenClaw with DeepSeek V4 Pro. The standard deviations reported in Table 4 support the stability of SABER’s performance, with results consistent with those in the original manuscript. The 50% ASR reported in our main experiment is the lowest among these three runs, indicating that our reported result does not overstate SABER’s performance across the repeated evaluations.
- To further alleviate this concern, We further double the number of evaluation cases, including previously unevaluated cases from DTap. Table 5 supports the same conclusion, with smaller standard deviations indicating more stable performance across independent runs.
- To assess the stability of the discovered attack instances’ effectiveness, we replay 16 discovered attack instances against OpenClaw with DeepSeek V4 Pro, including eight originally successful and eight originally unsuccessful instances, with two replays per instance. Table 6 supports the repeatability of the discovered attacks. It shows that originally successful attacks remain effective in most replays, while originally unsuccessful attacks rarely become successful.
- To further assess generalizability beyond the evaluated platform, we compare SABER with RedCodeAgent on the full RedCode-Gen benchmark, which was used in the original RedCodeAgent paper. Table 7 further supports SABER’s effectiveness beyond DTap, as it continues to substantially outperform RedCodeAgent on RedCode-Gen.
We have added these experiments and the accompanying discussion to Appendix D.9 and D.10 of the revised manuscript.
Table 4. SABER ASR across three independent runs.
| Method | Run 1 | Run 2 | Run 3 | Mean ± SD |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SABER | 50.00 | 62.50 | 68.75 | 60.42 ± 9.55 |
Table 5. ASR cross three independent runs on the expanded set of 32 cases.
| Variant | Run 1 | Run 2 | Run 3 | Mean ASR ± SD |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SABER | 53.13 | 62.50 | 56.25 | 57.29 ± 4.77 |
Table 6. Replay success rates of discovered instances across two additional executions per instance.
| Original Outcome | Instances | Replay Success Rate |
|---|---|---|
| Successful | 8 | 87.50 |
| Unsuccesful | 8 | 6.25 |
Table 7. SABER's performance on RedCode-Gen.
| ASR on RedCode-Gen | |
|---|---|
| RedCodeAgent | 45.00 |
| SABER | 72.50 |
Author Response (Part III)
Q3: How would SABER compare with existing methods under matched attacker-side token budgets?
R3: Thank you for this insightful question! We fully understand your concern about computational fairness and therefore compare SABER with the baselines under matched per-case token budgets, running each budget setting independently without a separate cap on target-agent rollouts.
- Table 8 shows that SABER significantly outperforms both baselines from 0.3M tokens onward. RedCodeAgent performs better at smaller budgets mostly because its shorter context might allow more attack attempts within the same token budget.
- More importantly, SABER continues to improve over a wider budget range, while the baselines saturate early. This gives SABER an additional advantage when more computation is available, enabling it to uncover vulnerabilities that remain undiscovered at smaller budgets.
- Since our main experiments correspond to approximately 0.3M tokens, these results indicate that the reported performance still has room for improvement under larger budgets.
We have expanded the cost-accounting details and added this matched-budget evaluation to Appendix D.4 of the revised manuscript.
Table 8. ASR (%) under matched total token budgets. Each column specifies the same per-case token budget for all methods.
| Method | 0.1M | 0.2M | 0.3M (Ours) | 0.5M | 0.75M | 1M | 1.5M | 2M | 3M |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AutoRedTeamer | 12.50 | 25.00 | 25.00 | 25.00 | 25.00 | 25.00 | 25.00 | 25.00 | 25.00 |
| RedCodeAgent | 43.75 | 43.75 | 43.75 | 43.75 | 43.75 | 43.75 | 43.75 | 43.75 | 43.75 |
| SABER | 12.50 | 25.00 | 50.00 | 62.50 | 62.50 | 75.00 | 75.00 | 75.00 | 75.00 |
Author Response (Part I)
Thanks for your review and comments. We are encouraged by your positive comments on well-motivated design, strong empirical results. We hope following responses could clarify misunderstandings and alleviate your concerns.
Q1 & W1: The gains from bounded scope enforcement are modest and evaluated on only one target agent. Can additional evaluations across different target agents and statistical evidence establish its contribution more convincingly?
R1: Thank you for this insightful question!
We have added these experiments and the accompanying discussion to Appendix D.3 of the revised manuscript.
Table 1. Bounded-repair ablations across target agents.
Table 2. Paired permutation tests results, with Holm correction across variant comparisons within each target and metric.
Table 3. ASR cross three independent runs on the expanded set of 32 cases.