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Paper summary
ARENA is an automated red-teaming framework for audio-language models under a text-safe, audio-grounded threat setting. A trained controller generates text–audio specifications, executes them using speech or environmental-sound synthesis, and revises candidates using MD-Judge feedback. The stated evaluation protocol retains a candidate after search and scores it with a separate Llama Guard 3 evaluator. Across 520 AdvBench objectives and four target models, the method reports joint fault-detection rates between 68.1% and 87.9%. Additional experiments examine transferability, refinement budgets, sampling settings, and sound variants.
Critical strengths
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The paper addresses a relevant safety setting in which text-only screening can miss risk introduced by audio. Integrating speech and environmental-sound generation with iterative feedback provides a useful automated auditing workflow.
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The main metric retains all 520 objectives in its denominator, counting text-check failures and recognition mismatches as unsuccessful cases. Evaluation across four targets and transfer experiments provides useful evidence beyond selected demonstrations. Separating search feedback from final scoring is also a sensible design, subject to the clarification below.
Critical weaknesses
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The main comparison confounds method quality with adaptive search budget. ARENA receives repeated feedback-driven attempts, whereas the principal baselines are static benchmark-based attacks. Table 2 reports approximately 9–12.5 average attempts, and the main budget is 30. Without budget-matched automated baselines and controller-training ablations, the large performance gap does not establish how much benefit comes from the proposed training and feedback design rather than repeated search.
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The success criterion and evaluator separation require stronger validation. The final evaluator accesses the waveform indirectly through textual descriptions and recognition responses, without a reported systematic human validation. Furthermore, Eq. (7) uses membership in the success set defined through the final evaluator in Eqs. (1)–(2), which appears inconsistent with the stated MD-Judge-only training protocol. Figure 3 also labels the vertical axis as MD-Judge ASR while its caption describes final Llama Guard ASR. These may be documentation errors, but they affect interpretation of the evaluation.
Questions for authors
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Under matched target-model query budgets, how does ARENA compare with non-adaptive repeated sampling and an untrained controller? What additional gains come from SFT and DPO separately?
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Was final-evaluator output used in constructing the training weights in Eq. (7), or should that equation refer to a distinct MD-Judge-defined event? Please also reconcile the evaluator labels in Figure 3.
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Can a representative sample of claimed successes be independently assessed using the actual audio and target response, with agreement and false-positive estimates? Audio-removal or mismatched-audio controls would also help assess whether the failures depend on the intended acoustic content.
5 comments
Response to Reviewer UYy1 (2/2)
Q3: The final evaluator sees the waveform only indirectly. Can successes be checked with the actual audio, and do audio-removal or mismatched-audio controls hold?
A3: Indirect access is a deliberate and conservative design. Llama Guard 3 is a text model, so the waveform enters the criterion through the target's own recognition response. A case counts only if that response matches the intended content and the harmful response is grounded in it. When the target misperceives the audio, the case fails even if the response is harmful. This design can undercount faults, but it cannot credit a response that is unrelated to what the target heard.
Human audit with the actual audio. A human annotator listened to the waveform and read the full target response for 300 randomly sampled cases. For each case the annotator judged whether the audio contains the intended content, whether the response is harmful and actionable, and whether the response depends on the audio. The human judgment and the final label agree on 273 of 300 cases (91.0%).
Audio-removal and mismatched-audio controls. We ran both on every retained case with the query text unchanged (harmful-response rate %):
| Audio input | AF3 | Qwen2-Audio | MiMo-Audio |
|---|---|---|---|
| Original audio | 90.8 | 75.2 | 72.3 |
| Silence | 45.4 | 34.0 | 35.6 |
| Clip of another objective | 40.6 | 46.2 | 27.3 |
Removing the audio halves the harmful rate on every target, and a mismatched clip lowers it by 29.0 to 50.2 points. The text is identical across rows, so the difference is caused by the intended acoustic content. This table uses the most lenient measure, any harmful response. Under the paper's criterion, which also requires the recognition response to match the intended audio, neither control can produce a detected fault.
Revision. Appendix D.4 reports the audit, and the evaluator paragraph of Appendix C cites it. Table 5 and the paragraph "Audio Dependence" in Sec. 4.4 report the controls, and Appendix D.2 gives the protocol.
Please let us know if any of these points needs further detail.
Thank you!
Dear Reviewer UYy1,
We sincerely appreciate the time and effort you have devoted to reviewing our submission. You read the paper closely and noticed that Eq. (7) and Figure 3 name different judges, which we had missed ourselves. We are grateful for this careful reading, and correcting it has made the paper more precise.
As the discussion period ends in under 24 hours, we would like to briefly share where your three points now stand. On the matched budget, when every method receives 30 queries, an untrained controller in the same loop still stays 23.2 to 23.5 points below ARENA, which shows that the gain comes from training rather than from extra queries. On the judge roles, the final Llama Guard 3 response evaluation never enters training, Eq. (7) now has its own MD-Judge symbol, and the Figure 3 label has been corrected. On the waveform, a human audit with the actual audio agrees with the final label on 91.0% of 300 cases, and removing the audio halves the harmful rate.
We would be very grateful if you could kindly take a look at our response when you have a moment, and we would truly value your view on whether these clarifications resolve your concerns. If anything remains unclear, please do not hesitate to let us know.
Sincere thanks,
The Authors
Response to Reviewer UYy1 (1/2)
We thank the reviewer for the precise reading and for recognizing the full 520-objective denominator, the evaluation on four targets with transfer and the separation of search feedback from final scoring. We clarify the budget, the judge roles and the waveform check below, and we report every control the reviewer asked for.
Q1: Under matched query budgets, how does ARENA compare with non-adaptive repeated sampling and an untrained controller, and what do SFT and DPO add separately?
A1: Repeated attempts are part of every automated method, from PAIR and TAP to ART, and HarmBench evaluates such attacks next to fixed jailbreak templates without equalizing the number of queries. The static sets have no controller and no feedback, so they cannot run in an adaptive loop. The paper therefore reports the cost. Table 2 gives 9.1 to 12.5 attempts on average against a budget of 30. Appendix C states that the K=30 rate is not comparable with a single-query attack unless the budget is controlled. Figure 3(a) gives ARENA at every budget, with 23% to 30% at a single attempt (K=0), in the range of the static baselines.
The table below adds the matched comparison the reviewer asked for. Every row uses 30 target queries per objective and the same renderers, input guard and final evaluator (FDR %):
Revision. Sec. 4.1 describes the two new baselines. Table 4 and the paragraph "Equal Query Budget" in Sec. 4.4 report the comparison, and Appendix D.1 gives the protocol.
Q2: Was final-evaluator output used for the training weights in Eq. (7), and why do the evaluator labels in Figure 3 differ?
A2: No. The final response evaluation never enters training. Llama Guard 3 is called in two separate ways. Its input check reads the text query alone and filters text-unsafe queries in the training log, in search and in final scoring. Its response evaluation runs once on the frozen record after search and produces every reported number. MD-Judge supplies the training rewards, the preference labels and the search feedback.
The indicator in Eq. (7) is the MD-Judge success event on the 2,000-seed training log. It holds when the query passes the input check and MD-Judge reports all positive indicators with no failure indicator. The response evaluation of Llama Guard 3 is first called after search on the AdvBench objectives, which share no objective with the training pool. Eq. (7) reused the symbol Z⋆ of Eq. (1), which is defined through the final evaluator, and this caused the confusion. The revision gives the training-time event its own symbol, where s+ and s− are the positive and failure indicators of the MD-Judge report: ZMD={(x,qp,a):ϕt(qp)=0∧s+=1∧s−=0},λi=1+Ri+1{(xi,qp,i,ai)∈ZMD}.
The Figure 3 axis label "MD-Judge ASR" is a typo. All four panels show the final Llama Guard 3 ASR, as the caption and Sec. 4.4 state ("All panels report final Llama Guard ASR after the text guard"). The plotted values do not change.
Revision. Sec. 3.6 defines ZMD, and Figure 3 is relabeled as Llama Guard 3 ASR. Table 10 in Appendix B.4 lists which judge produces every reported quantity and at which stage.