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Paper summary
This paper mainly studies the problem of accumulating experience from failures into memory in multi-agent systems. In multi-agent systems (MAS), memory modules mainly store and retrieve successful experiences. Lessons from failures are not utilized, so the authors argue that agents develop a "positive bias", and get trapped in local optima.
The authors propose M-Memory, which divides memory into two levels. The high level distills three types of insights: shortcuts, traps, and cross-domain consensus. The low level condenses similar successful task trajectories into key steps, and uses a similar failed trajectory and a dissimilar successful trajectory as references. Retrieval uses cosine similarity to find similar tasks and MMR to find dissimilar tasks. Each agent receives memory tailored to its role.
They integrate this method into three MAS frameworks and use two LLMs, testing it on four benchmarks. Whether the memory is initially empty, or has accumulated experience over three rounds, this method outperforms all baseline methods, and its advantage becomes even greater after accumulation. Ablation experiments show that adding traps and consensus in sequence can progressively improve the results. They also report that the token cost of this method is lower than that of G-Memory.
The contribution presented in the paper is that it proposes a multi-perspective hierarchical memory framework for MAS, and experimentally demonstrates its advantages in performance and efficiency.
Critical strengths
- The framework proposed in the paper is plug and play. M-Memory does not require any changes to the structure of the MAS, and can be integrated into AutoGen, DyLAN, and MacNet, which respectively use centralized division of labor, debate-based, and decentralized structures.
- The method shows thoughtful consideration in its handling of failure signals. The authors analyze five possible causes of a failure in the paper: the insight itself was wrong, the agent did not follow it, environmental randomness, errors in multi-agent collaboration, and the insight was retrieved but never actually used. Only the first case should weaken the insight. So the authors choose not to reduce the support for an insight when a failure occurs, but instead route the failure information through several other proposed paths. This is a very practical credit assignment problem, and the authors provide clear reasoning and alternatives.
- Separately reporting the first-round results starting from empty memory is a good experimental setup. In the first round, each task can only use memories left by tasks completed before it, and cannot use its own trajectory. Under this setup, M-Memory outperforms the strongest baseline across all three frameworks and both backbones. This helps rule out the possibility of memorizing test questions, showing that the organization of memory itself has an effect.
Critical weaknesses
- I find the novelty to be somewhat limited, and the characterization of prior work is not entirely accurate. The concept of learning from failure has already been explored in works such as Reflexion, ExpeL, REMEMBERER/RLEM, and ReasoningBank. Furthermore, in the multi-agent domain, there is G-Memory. The paper’s claim that G-Memory relies too heavily on similar successful tasks is inaccurate; G-Memory’s query nodes record both successes and failures, generate insights from failed tasks, and utilize prompts that compare successful and unsuccessful trajectories. The overall framework also mirrors that of G-Memory—incorporating elements like a three-layer graph, hop-based expansion, trajectory summarization, LLM-based relevance scoring, bidirectional traversal, and role-based memory initialization. The actual innovations appear to be limited to the categorization of insights into three types, the use of MMR (Maximal Marginal Relevance) to retrieve dissimilar tasks, and the application of more conservative update rules alongside additional reference examples during trajectory summarization.
- The classification of insights into three types lacks a solid rationale and fails to account for dimensions specific to multi-agent systems. While the classification seems to be inspired by an analogy to neuroscience, essentially a 2x2 matrix based on similarity and success/failure (notably omitting "dissimilar-failure" tasks, without explanation), this core innovation is not tied to distinct underlying mechanisms. Moreover, there is no experimental validation for this specific taxonomy (while the paper includes incremental ablation studies, it lacks comparisons against alternative classification schemes or justifications for this particular approach). More importantly, although the paper emphasizes its multi-agent nature, the design does not effectively reflect this. The proposed method could just as easily be applied to a single-agent setting, the paper could place greater emphasis on the dynamics of collaboration and conflict among agents. As it stands, the approach treats collaborative failures as noise to be filtered out, rather than as valuable experiences to learn from.
- There is an overlap between the test set and the dataset used to construct the memory. The main experiments involve running three iterations over the same set of tasks, by the third iteration, the memory already contains trajectories and insights derived from those very tasks. This creates a risk of "memorizing" the test questions, leading to data leakage. Consequently, the authors' claims regarding generalization capability are not well-supported.
Questions for authors
- Is it possible to provide a check for whether any answers have leaked into the memory?
- Why is there no insight type for dissimilar failed tasks?
6 comments
W2#1 The classification of insights ...for this specific taxonomy (while the paper includes incremental ablation studies, it lacks comparisons against alternative classification schemes or justifications for this particular approach).
Q2.Why is there no insight type for dissimilar failed tasks?
We thank the reviewer for the comments. The rationale for our three-way classification of insights lies in "what information a memory can provide to the agent." Specifically, a successful memory tells the agent what to do in order to succeed, and a failed memory tells the agent what to do in order to avoid a particular failure mode. Accordingly, similar successes serve a reuse function, similar failures serve a warning function, and diverse successes can point to another success pattern that may be borrowed and can help the agent broaden its view. In contrast, diverse failures can only rule out one possible failure mode, and since the causes that can lead to failure are far more numerous than those that can lead to success, diverse failures are in most cases noise that provides no actionable information [1]. For this reason, we do not model the diverse-failure perspective of the agent.
To further verify the above view, we add an experiment in which diverse failure is injected as a new perspective, with the total number of insights held constant. The results on the PDDL dataset with Qwen2.5-14b are as follows.
Round 1 results
| Setting | MAS | PDDL | PDDL (RE) |
|---|---|---|---|
| M-Memory with diverse failure | AutoGen | 31.67 | 51.00 |
| DyLAN | 28.33 | 54.81 | |
| MacNet | 26.67 | 49.47 | |
| Full M-Memory | AutoGen | 36.67 | 58.38 |
| DyLAN | 31.67 | 56.19 | |
| MacNet | 31.67 | 53.45 |
Round 3 results
| Setting | MAS | PDDL | PDDL (RE) |
|---|---|---|---|
| M-Memory with diverse failure | AutoGen | 35.00 | 56.09 |
| DyLAN | 36.67 | 60.92 | |
| MacNet | 28.33 | 52.09 | |
| Full M-Memory | AutoGen | 43.33 | 64.22 |
| DyLAN | 41.67 | 66.96 | |
| MacNet | 35.00 | 55.43 |
The results show that after the diverse-failure perspective is injected, M-Memory shows degraded performance in both generalization and self-evolution capability, which is consistent with the view stated above. In addition, Appendix A.4.6 discusses the applicability boundary of consensus insights. A positive, concrete, and executable entry from a diverse sub-domain (tyreworld → blocksworld) still fails to take effect, and the cost is borne by prompt length and attention dilution. A negative entry from a diverse sub-domain would apply in even fewer scenarios and would additionally introduce misleading information.
[1] Gentner, D. (1983). Structure-mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy. Cognitive Science, 7(2), 155-170.
W2#2. More importantly, ... rather than as valuable experiences to learn from.
We thank the reviewer for this comment. We would like to clarify that, in our method, collaborative failures are not discarded as noise to be filtered out. Instead, they are explicitly exploited as learnable experience. First, in the memory writing stage of M-Memory, we designed a dedicated pathway. This pathway simultaneously retrieves similar failure trajectories and diverse success trajectories, and injects both into the prompt for key-step extraction, requiring the model to “refer to the failure trajectories and filter out erroneous actions such as Nothing happens”(Eq. 7). Failure trajectories therefore contribute directly to the formation of experience rather than being excluded from it. Second, Appendix A.3 provides a dedicated analysis of collaborative failures. We attribute them to three categories, namely role confusion, communication conflict, and collaborative deadlock, and we explain that M-Memory routes them through hyperedge binding, rule-level auditing, and counterexample trajectory extraction, so that different types of collaborative failures enter different memory structures.
At the same time, we acknowledge the limitation pointed out by the reviewer. The current failure routing mechanism does learn from collaborative failures, yet it does not learn who caused them. Our failure attribution remains at the task level and is not grounded in a specific agent or a specific interaction pattern, and collaborative failure is neither explicitly modeled nor analyzed in isolation. In the revised manuscript, we will discuss the collaboration dynamics and conflicts among agents more explicitly and will list the explicit modeling and separate analysis of collaborative failures as an important direction for future work.
W1. I find the novelty ... during trajectory summarization.
Thank the reviewer for the insightful comments. We do not claim that "learning from failure" is itself a novel contribution. ExpeL, RLEM, and Reflexion have already demonstrated the value of failure experiences, and in our experiments we therefore compare directly against Reflexion and RLEM as baselines (on AutoGen at Round-3, they score 57.92 and 53.20, respectively, while M-Memory scores 69.19). Our claim is not whether failure experiences are useful, but that existing methods still exhibit insufficient utilization of the pedagogical value provided by failure experiences: Failure experiences are used, but they are not treated as a category of retrieval objects that requires its own frame of reference and its own slots.
We frame this underutilization as an access problem rather than an inventory problem. Existing methods typically record memory categories—successful demonstrations, failure lessons, or transferable consensus—as metadata at write time, without making them first-class retrieval variables. All categories therefore compete in one candidate pool under a single relevance function for limited slots. When this function favors surface similarity, abstract or lexically dissimilar categories may rank systematically lower without being explicitly excluded. Without category-level outcome feedback, the retrieval policy struggles to detect or correct this bias. Failures thus remain in memory but out of reach, leaving the agent repeatedly exposed to similar experiences and a narrower range of perspectives.
M-Memory turns categories from textual attributes into retrieval control variables. Each category has its own candidate pool and ranking, so a failure lesson need not outrank a successful demonstration globally—only other lessons from similar failed tasks. We therefore argue that categorization must be built into the retrieval operator through four stages: candidate pool partitioning, slot allocation, within-category ranking, and credit assignment. Our framework support this view: incorporating categories into these stages enables successful, failed, and consensus experiences to be retrieved together for a single task, making multiple perspectives operational.
We will revise "G-Memory over-rely on similar successful tasks" to state that G-Memory anchors retrieval to a single relevance neighborhood and therefore makes insufficient use of multi-perspective experience. We will clarify in the contributions that M-Memory identifies and fixes a structural blind spot of hierarchical MAS memory, namely that evidence type appears only in the content of insights and never in the retrieval and credit operators.