- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
The work proposes a sample-wise attack mechanism for in the TTA setting as opposed to the class-wise setting. The authors claim that class-wise attack on TTA can shift the label distribution which can work as a marker to understand that an attack is being performed. Motivated by this observation, they propose the sample-wise attack mechanism. They focus on an interesting observation that attack and stealth objectives are misaligned (their gradients point is opposite directions). As a result, they suggest an ellipsoidal trust-region problem formulation for the gradient update. They show that their meta-learning approach improves existing baselines as well.
Critical strengths
- The authors make the observation that the gradients of the attack and stealth objectives are misaligned. This hampers the attack and the authors propose an effective meta-learning based approach to handle this. The optimization approach works well and not just for the proposed method, but also for the baselines as well as shown by the authors. This is a valuable contribution.
- The authors provide theoretical guarantee for the loss minimization. This makes the approach rigorous bothe empirically and theoretically.
Critical weaknesses
- The motivation for sample-wise attack is not convincing. The label-distribution shift alone cannot justify sample-wise attack and the stealth can still be violated if one is not careful in choosing the percentage of victim samples.
- The triggers for the victim samples still require indirect access to the sampels of other users. This vioaltes the assumed attack setting.
Questions for authors
- Even if the attacker does not actively modify the victim's data stream, changing the samples by attaching the physical path or similar approach means accessing the data stream of the victim in the physical world. Can the authors clarify how it still is not violation of the assumed attack setting and attacker capability as the attacker is not supposed access the victim data stream at all? Also, the simulation instead of running experiments with actual physical-world data makes the claims bit weaker -- can the authors elaborate on that?
- The motivation of the label-distribution shift is not convincing enough. Can the authors illustrate a scenario where such label distribution shift can lead to identification of the attack or attacker? Even with distribution shift, it can be that the attacker cannot be identified so the service has to be down for everyone. But the real question is, how does one distinguish between the label-distribution shift due to shift in environment and due to attack? As per my understanding, if the percentage of victim samples is high, the proposed method can introduce high label-distribution shift. can the authors please address this concern and elaborate on the impact of the attack?