- Rating
- 4(+1)
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 3
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Paper summary
This paper proposes an randomized adversarial defense with no knowledge of attacks. The main idea is to design a randomized feature squeezing input processing layer which is learnt during training. The input layer utilizes Gaussian noise addition, 2d convolution, and reciprocal. The authors modify the loss function to work with the proposed special input layer. After training, the learned 2d convolution and reciprocal are replaced with the sign function. The simplified input processing that serves as extreme feature squeezing is used for inference. The authors evaluate the robustness agains different lp attacks and show better performance across attacks. The proposed defense uses only clean images, so there is no overhead during training. Experiments include adaptive attacks such as BPDA and EOT to show the robustness. In addition, the proposed defense can also bypass unlearnable examples (one-pixel shortcut).
Critical strengths
The special processing layer is interesting and the settings, training only with clean images without requiring any attack-specific knowledge reflects practical settings. The layer can be plugged into different networks. Its simple cheap mechanism does not add additional training cost. The special layer is learnt during training before squeezing.
Cross attack results are interesting. The experiments include ImageNet-scale evaluation and consider adaptive attacks.
Critical weaknesses
The novelty may be a bit over-claimed. The specific reciprocal multiplication may be new, but learned input squeezing inside the network and randomized layer as a defense are not new. For example, spartan networks, QuSecNets, thermometer encoding. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167404819300069 https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.01437 https://openreview.net/forum?id=S18Su--CW This, "the only one that does not require any prior knowledge about the attacks with standard training with clean images" may be over claimed. Randomized smoothing and feature denoising (cited in the paper) or diffpure do not require prior knowledge. The experiments do not show accuracy vs noise budget.
Questions for authors
How do you sample ImageNet 5k for clean accuracy and 1k for robust accuracy?
4 comments
Response on how ImageNet images are sampled for clean and robust evaluation.
For the 5K evaluation, we follow the RobustBench protocol and use the 5,000 images it specifies for ImageNet.
For the 1K evaluation, we use the first 1,000 images of this same 5,000-image set.
Thank you for clarifying the novelty and evaluation dataset. Since the paper bring new components that are different from traditional defenses, I increase my score.
We thank the reviewer for the re-evaluation and for the positive update. We are glad the clarifications were helpful, and we appreciate the recognition of the method's distinction from traditional defenses.
Response on novelty and related work.
We thank the reviewer for the positive assessment and we agree that parts of our novelty claim were over-stated. We will revise them as follows.
(1) On the components. We agree that learned input squeezing inside the network (Spartan Networks, QuSecNets) and randomized layers as a defense are not new, and we will cite these works explicitly in the revision, together with thermometer encoding. Our claim will be narrowed to the specific combination we introduce: a reciprocal-multiplication input layer trained end-to-end with a sparse loss, a detour training scheme whose auxiliary conv/reciprocal/Sigmoid path is discarded at inference, and a test-time predictor that reduces to Sign(x+ϵ).
(2) On "the only one that does not require any prior knowledge." We agree this is an over-claim and we will remove it. Randomized smoothing, feature denoising, and DiffPure indeed do not require knowledge of the attacker, so "no attack prior" alone does not distinguish our method. We will restate the claim precisely as: among methods trained only with standard training on clean images and no attack-specific prior, ours is, to our knowledge, the only one that reports robustness against l0,l1,l2,l∞ and OPS at once without data augmentation or a pre-trained generative model.
(3) On accuracy vs. noise budget. We agree that a curve against the perturbation budget ϵ (attack strength) is missing, and we will add it for both CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. Results at different training noise levels σ are already reported in Tables 9 and 10.