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- 4
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
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- Soundness
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Paper summary
The paper asks whether a model's stated values are reflected in its reasoning and final advice, and whether asking it to reason step by step improves this match. The authors introduce DAISY, a dataset of advice scenarios, and compare direct answers with four-step reasoning across eight models. A separate evaluator labels which Schwartz values appear in the responses. The authors find that reasoning does not improve value-action alignment and significantly lowers it for some models. They also find that values mentioned during reasoning often do not appear in the final advice, which they call "pseudo-deliberation." They then introduce ViVALDI, a multi-agent method intended to preserve these values, and report improvements on GPT-4o and Qwen.
Critical strengths
- The prompts, data, and much of the analysis are available, so it was possible to understand how the study was run and check many of the results. I also appreciated the limitations section and the separate evaluator check.
- Testing eight models is useful, and following values from an initial statement, through reasoning, and into final advice is an interesting setup.
Critical weaknesses
- Fast and Slow differ in more than whether reasoning is shown. Fast tells the model to be decisive and avoid balanced or neutral answers. Slow does not include this instruction and adds a request to consider practical realities; for four models it also asks the model to reflect norms. In the GPT-4o data, Slow answers are also scored as neutral about twice as often as Fast answers. Because of this, I do not think the current comparison isolates the claim that reasoning itself lowers value-action alignment.
- The model's initial form, the generation prompts, and the evaluator do not use exactly the same value definitions, and the evaluator is much more conservative about assigning values than the form. Some values also have special judging rules. Task 1 also asks about each value separately for one situation, while Schwartz's theory treats values as general goals whose relative importance and trade-offs matter. Some of what is described as value "loss" may therefore reflect measurement differences or a trade-off between competing values.
- The ViVALDI result is also hard for me to interpret. Its repair prompt asks for additions whose removal would "materially weaken or change the recommendation," which is very close to the evaluator's own rule for deciding whether a value is present. The separate Claude evaluator uses the same basic rule. The headline improvement is also relative to CoT, which the paper itself finds is the weaker baseline. Compared with Fast, the gain is about 8%, and ViVALDI is tested on two models.
Questions for authors
- Could you run or report a Fast/Slow comparison where the instructions are matched and the only difference is the reasoning step? This is the result that would most affect my assessment.
- How much of the value-action gap remains if the same value definitions and more comparable thresholds are used for the initial form and the evaluator?
- Did you examine whether values that disappear are replaced by competing values in Schwartz's value structure? In the supplementary GPT-4o data, I found that when an encouraged value is missing from the advice, an opposing value is encouraged about twice as often as when the value survives (47% vs. 25%). This makes me wonder whether some "suppression" is actually a trade-off.
- Why is the empirical baseline of about 0.333 that appears in the analysis logs and Figure 5 not reported with the main results? How do the model scores compare with this baseline?
- Could you define "pseudo-deliberation" more precisely? At different points I understood it as reasoning lowering alignment, values appearing in reasoning but not advice, or value-aware reasoning not carrying into the answer. I am not sure these are the same claim.
I would add a short explanation of Schwartz's theory and define what the paper means by "values." Explaining the value structure and why the paper uses these 10 values would make the measurement choices easier to understand. "Other value orientations" is also mentioned as something the method could extend to, but I could not find an example of what this means.
I would also either support the claim that CoT should "naturally" improve value-action alignment with prior work, or just present it as a hypothesis. The discussion could do more to explain why the effects differ across values and models, and to consider explanations such as prompt wording, value trade-offs, and the evaluator itself.
8 comments
Author Response (2/2)
Value Tradeoff Analysis
Our initial analysis consisted of analyzing different opposing values from Schwartz’s circular structure [1]. We test whether the disappearance of a value initially encouraged in reasoning was associated with encouragement of an opposing Schwartz value in the final advice. As seen in Table 4, some value pairs exhibit patterns consistent with a trade-off. For example, Security is more frequently encouraged when Self-Direction disappears (66.5% vs. 33.4%; r=0.327), but this is not consistent with raw patterns or correlations across all pairs. So value tradeoffs may explain some cases of suppression, but does not generalize for va-gap across all the Schwartz values in our data.
Table 4: Association Between Value Suppression and Opposing Value Encouragement
| Suppressed Value | Opposing Value | Opposing value encouraged when suppressed (%) | Opposing value encouraged when retained (%) | Pearson r |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Self-Direction | Security | 66.5% | 33.4% | 0.327 |
| Stimulation | Conformity | 1.8% | 0.0% | 0.064 |
| Hedonism | Tradition | 0.0% | 0.0% | NA |
| Achievement | Benevolence | 10.8% | 5.7% | 0.092 |
| Power | Universalism | 23.2% | 14.8% | 0.088 |
| Security | Self-Direction | 56.4% | 25.5% | 0.280 |
| Conformity | Stimulation | 2.2% | 0.0% | 0.103 |
| Tradition | Hedonism | 6.7% | 0.0% | 0.194 |
| Benevolence | Achievement | 15.9% | 2.6% | 0.245 |
| Universalism | Power | 9.3% | 3.3% | 0.122 |
Empirical Baseline
Due to formulation of our 3-class structure, a naive, uniform random baseline would score 0.33 macro-F1. However, we see various levels of class imbalance within the Task 1 setup (Fig2a in manuscript). We therefore additionally report an empirical random baseline that samples predictions according to the Task 1 class distribution, providing a more realistic comparison under class imbalance.
Clarify Pseudo-deliberation
Prior work suggests that deliberation can improve value alignment [2,3], motivating our hypothesis that structured reasoning would reduce the value-action gap in AI's dialogue. Our results instead show that explicit reasoning does not reliably reduce this gap, and in several settings, can increase it. We originally used the term “pseudo-deliberation” to describe this pattern: models appear to engage with relevant values during reasoning, but those values are not reliably carried through to the final recommendation. We agree with the reviewer that the term may blur several distinct claims, particularly the distinction between reasoning lowering alignment and value-aware reasoning failing to translate into advice. To avoid this ambiguity, we will remove the term “pseudo-deliberation” and instead frame the paper directly around our empirical finding: the effect of reasoning on the value–action gap.
Clarifying Value Choices
- What are values and why Schwartz: We use “values” to refer to broad, trans-situational goals that guide individuals’ judgments and behavior. We agree this definition of what values are and how they guide decision-making is not explicit in our text. We will clarify this and state why we chose Schwartz, particularly due to its impact on recent work on AI and value alignment [4,5].
- Extendable to other value orientations: When we state that our framework is extendable, we refer to adapting definitions and evaluator criterion to frameworks such as Moral Foundations Theory and Rokeach Value Survey [6,7].
Supporting the Claim that CoT Improves VA-alignment
We found prior work supporting our initial hypothesis that structured reasoning/deliberation can improve value alignment [2]. We agree that this motivation should be more clearly foregrounded in the Related Work section. We will also expand our Discussion section to present different explanations for our heterogenous effects in alignment, including discussion of RLHF and differences in family-wise post-training, and evaluator/value/prompt choice.
[1] Schwartz, S. H. (2012). An overview of the Schwartz theory of basic values. Online Readings in Psychology and Culture, 2(1), 11.
[2] Nguyen-Hien, T. D., Teh, Y. W., Lee, W. S., & Zhi-Xuan, T. (2026). Rational Clarification by Assistive Agents via Value-of-Information Reasoning.
[3] Chakraborty, M., Wang, L., & Jurgens, D. (2025). Structured Moral Reasoning in Language Models: A Value-Grounded Evaluation Framework. EMNLP 2025.
[4] Shen, H., Clark, N., & Mitra, T. (2025). Mind the Value-Action Gap: Do LLMs Act in Alignment with Their Values? EMNLP 2025.
[5] Shen, H., Knearem, T., Ghosh, R., Yang, Y.-J., Mitra, T., & Huang, Y. (2024). ValueCompass: A Framework of Fundamental Values for Human-AI Alignment.
[6] Graham, J., Haidt, J., Koleva, S., Motyl, M., Iyer, R., Wojcik, S. P., & Ditto, P. H. (2013). Moral foundations theory: The pragmatic validity of moral pluralism. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 55–130.
[7] Rokeach, M. (1973). The nature of human values. New York: Free Press.
Thank you for the detailed response and for running new experiments. The prompt-matched comparison is very helpful, and I think removing the term “pseudo-deliberation” makes the paper clearer.
With matched prompts, the drop for GPT-4o is much smaller than before (−0.0145 now, compared with −0.0378 in the original 500 scenarios). The p-value of 0.028 would not pass a Bonferroni correction for two models (threshold 0.025). The alignment distance is almost the same in both conditions (0.1726 and 0.1731), and Gemini shows no difference. So I read the new results as showing that reasoning does not help. They no longer show that reasoning makes things worse. Do you plan to update the abstract, the contributions, and the conclusion to match this? It would also help to see the matched prompt itself. If possible, please also run it on Llama or Qwen. These are smaller open models, and they were the ones with clear drops in the original Table 1.
Thank you for the trade-off analysis. Looking at your Table 4, in every pair the opposing value is encouraged more often when the original value is dropped. The only exception is Hedonism–Tradition, where both numbers are 0%. To me this looks like a consistent pattern that is strong for some pairs. Testing the broader Schwartz dimensions, and not only single pairs, might show this more clearly. Adding the number of cases in each row would also help, since some rows seem small.
About the evaluator. The values you report for the human-aligned evaluator (0.67 and 0.62) are the same as the Claude evaluator in the paper. The main results use the GPT ValueJudge, which the paper reports at about 0.62. Which evaluator is compared in your new table? Also, my question was about how much of the gap remains when the form and the evaluator use the same definitions and similar thresholds. Agreement with humans is useful, but alignment scores under that setup would answer the question directly.
Could you add the empirical baseline for each model to Table 1? This would show how far above chance each model really is.
Reference [2] uses “value” to mean value of information, which is about whether asking a question is worth it. It is not about human values, so I don’t think it supports the hypothesis. Reference [3] is relevant and would be a good addition to the related work.
Finally, my concern about ViVALDI was not addressed. The repair prompt uses almost the same wording as the evaluator’s rule for detecting a value. Also, the main gain is reported against chain of thought and not against Fast, which the paper itself shows is the stronger baseline.
Author Response (1/2)
We thank the reviewer for finding the paper “interesting”, for recognizing that tracking values from initial statements through reasoning and final advice is an “interesting setup,” and for highlighting the usefulness of our evaluation across eight models. We also appreciate the reviewer’s positive assessment of our transparency with prompts, data, analyses, and limitations. We conduct 3 new experiments to address the reviewer’s concerns:
Instruction-matched Fast and Slow
We understand the concern associated between Fast and Slow’s prompts and how that may result in confounders which artificially inflate Fast’s performance. To address this, we conduct a prompt-matched analysis on 10% of our dataset using two different models (GPT-4o, Gemini only for cost), where Slow differs from Fast only in requiring an explicit reasoning format; all other prompt text remains identical.
Table 1: Comparison of prompt-matched Fast and Slow (N=500 scenarios). P-values are from two-sided paired permutation tests with 1,000 permutations.
As shown in Table 1, under prompt-matched conditions, Slow yields lower alignment than Fast for GPT-4o (Δ macro F1 = −0.0145, p = 0.0280). For Gemini, Slow yields a small improvement that is not statistically significant (Δ macro F1 = +0.0045, p = 0.5714). Matching the prompts changes the magnitude of the effect observed in our original experiments, but provides support for our central claim: explicit deliberation does not reliably improve value–action alignment.
Neutrality of Values
We thank the reviewer for raising this concern. We understand the concern that the original prompt setup produced more neutral labels for Slow, which could artificially reduce its alignment with Task 1. To address this, we conduct a neutrality analysis between our original setup and the new prompt-matched setup on 500 scenarios which we showed results for above in Tab 1. Table 2: GPT-4o’s neutrality analysis on N=500 scenarios.
As seen in Table 2, despite neutrality dropping in the prompt-matched setting compared to our old setting, we find the results from Table 1 to hold true, with Slow < Fast. We find that reduction in value-action alignment cannot be explained solely by the higher neutrality rate from the original Slow prompt.
Evaluator Definitions
We thank the reviewer for noticing this discrepancy. We would like to clarify our reasons for different evaluator labels.
Table 3: Kappa Differences Based on Evaluator Type