- Rating
- 3(+1)
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 1
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Paper summary
The paper introduces GreedyBM, a method that uses an LLM to build models of human strategic choices. Across three decision-making tasks, it predicts choices more accurately than existing methods while using substantially fewer LLM tokens. The resulting models also capture recognizable behavioral patterns, making them easier to interpret.
I'm not confident and an expert in this area but had a detail look at the paper and made some comments from my opinion.
Critical strengths
- The authors have provided comprehensive results to show the capabilities of their method, such as experiments for weights and training NLLs.
- A good literature review has been done.
Critical weaknesses
- There is not clear definition of human strategic behavior and in which applications this is applicable.
- Just LLM-based baselines have been compared while other non-LLM baselines not working?
- The authors compared the model with expert-designed models while no information about these models included in main body (related work).
- definition for I^{train} on page 3 is not clear.
- Figure 1 is not reflected by the text in section 3. what is "Selected Term 𝑓𝑡" (in Fig. 1)? it's not in the text.
Questions for authors
- why Predicting human strategic behavior is essential? what makes this area interesting? Using examples may be helpful.
- Expert-designed models are from "Automated human strategic behavior modeling via large language models" 2026? This is not cited in the main body on page 6. Have you talked about these models in related work section?
- In Figure 1, 𝑞𝑉𝑇 (𝑦 ∣ 𝑥) in prediction step, in which equation is comupted?
- What is the measurement on y axis in Figs. 5-6? what is V1-V5? V is utility but it's confusing what is V1-V5 (seems to be parameter) and why V should be a paremeter? based on what the Equation on Page 9 shows, V1 is computed from other values but it's not clear for V2-5.
4 comments
Response to Reviewer NUVP: Sources, figures, and manuscript changes
Q2: Source and citation of the expert-designed models
Expert-designed models are from "Automated human strategic behavior modeling via large language models" 2026? This is not cited in the main body on page 6. Have you talked about these models in related work section?
Yes, we follow the expert-designed baseline set compiled by Xie et al. (2026), “Automated human strategic behavior modeling via large language models,” which introduces AutoBM. The evaluation paragraph in Section 4 (p. 7) cites this paper as AutoBM (Xie et al., 2026). The underlying behavioral models themselves originate in the economics and game-theory literature, for example, inequity aversion from Fehr and Schmidt (1999), ERC from Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and regret matching from Hart and Mas-Colell (2000). Related Work discusses these model families (p. 2), and Appendix B.2 gives the exact specifications and primary references used in our experiments.
Q3: Equation for the prediction step in Figure 1
In Figure 1, in prediction step, in which equation is computed?
The prediction is computed by substituting the final systematic utility from Eq. (3) into the logit choice rule in Eq. (1):
The revised Figure 1 caption (p. 4) now points directly to Eq. (1) for this prediction step.
Q4: Measurements in Figures 5–6 and the meaning of –
What is the measurement on y axis in Figs.5-6?
In Figure 5 (p. 10), the left panel measures the difference between repeat rates after wins and after losses (in percentage points), while the right panel shows the probability of choosing the unplayed action after playing two different actions (in percent). In Figure 6 (p. 10), the two panels show the probabilities of repeat bids () and raised bids (), both expressed as percentages, where denotes the player's previous bid. Dashed lines indicate empirically observed values. We have updated the Figure 6 caption to state the percentage units and stage-model notation explicitly.
what is V1-V5? V is utility but it's confusing what is V1-V5 (seems to be parameter) and why V should be a parameter?
Along the horizontal axes, – label the systematic utility functions obtained after stages one through five. They do not denote fitted scalar parameters. Specifically, Eq. (3) defines each as a function of the strategic context and action, . Here, the weights are the fitted scalar parameters, and the superscript reflects that previously selected terms can receive updated weights during joint refitting at later stages. Pairing with the logit rule in Eq. (1) defines the stage- behavioral model.
based on what the Equation on Page 9 shows, V1 is computed from other values but it's not clear for V2-5.
For CDA, the displayed equation on p. 10 (p. 9 of the original submission) writes out the stage-1 systematic utility explicitly. Stages two through five each add one selected term and jointly refit all weights. Combining the term expressions in Appendix B.3 (pp. 23–24) with the stage-wise weights in Table 11 (p. 24) via Eq. (3) gives the explicit expressions for through .
Ethics flag
Flag For Ethics Review: Yes
Our evaluation reuses previously released behavioral datasets from laboratory or classroom studies, as noted in the Ethics Statement (p. 11), and no new human-subject data were collected for this study. The models take as input recorded action choices together with task-level game or market variables, such as resource endowments, action histories, and bid/ask records (Section 4, p. 6). All primary data sources (Lin et al. (2020), Komai et al. (2022), and Ikica et al. (2023)) are cited in Section 4 and Appendix B.2. We would be glad to provide further clarification on any specific ethical concern.
Changes made in the revised manuscript
In response to your suggestions, we have:
- Defined human strategic behavior and added an online bargaining example explaining its practical use in the opening of the Introduction (Section 1, p. 1).
- Added an explicit definition of the training-index set in Section 3.1 (p. 3).
- Identified the selected term and added equation references for joint refitting and prediction in the Figure 1 caption (p. 4).
- Explicitly labeled the expert-designed baselines as non-LLM models in Table 1 (p. 7).
- Identified as the stage- model and specified the percentage units in the Figure 6 caption (p. 10).
Thank you again for your constructive feedback. We welcome any further questions.
Thanks for your clear response to my comments and questions. I've found these answers satisfactory and increase my score to 3.
We are pleased that our responses have addressed your concerns. Thank you for your time and for the discussion.
Response to Reviewer NUVP: Motivation and problem clarification
Thank you for your valuable suggestions. Page numbers refer to the revised manuscript unless stated otherwise.
W1: Definition of human strategic behavior and applicable settings
Human strategic behavior concerns choices in situations where the actions of two or more participants jointly determine their outcomes and payoffs. A bidder's outcome, for example, depends on both their own bid and competing bids. We model how a person chooses an action given the strategic context available at the time of choice (Section 3.1, p. 3). This formulation applies to auctions, bargaining, and market trading. We have added an explicit definition and an online bargaining example at the start of the Introduction (Section 1, p. 1).
Our experiments examine bargaining offers in the Ultimatum Game (UG), next actions in repeated rock-paper-scissors (RPS), and buyer bids in continuous double auctions (CDA). Section 4 (p. 6) describes the strategic context and predicted action for each task.
W2: Non-LLM baselines
The comparison in Table 1 (p. 7) includes nine non-LLM expert-designed behavioral models:
To make this distinction easier to identify, the revised Table 1 explicitly labels this group as “Expert-designed models (non-LLM).”
W3: Information about the expert-designed models in the main text
These baselines express established hypotheses about preferences and learning. For example, IA and ERC capture how relative payoffs affect bargaining choices. RM and FP model adaptation to previous play. BB and TDB represent belief-based and time-dependent bidding. The “Human choice modeling” paragraph in Related Work (Section 2, p. 2) outlines these preference and learning hypotheses and connects them to the expert-designed baselines evaluated in Section 4. Table 1 reports their predictive performance, and Appendix B.2 (starting on p. 19) provides the individual specifications and original references.
W4: Definition of Itrain
Itrain is the set of indices of the training records. Thus Dtrain=(xi,yi):i∈Itrain and N=∣Itrain∣. For example, if records 1, 3, 6, and 8 are used for training, then Itrain={1,3,6,8} and N=4. We have added an explicit definition immediately before the training-NLL objective in Section 3.1 (p. 3).
W5: Figure 1 and the selected term ft
The selected term ft is the highest-scoring candidate from the stage-t candidate pool Pt. The “Select & Refit” paragraph in Section 3.3 (p. 5) describes this selection step, followed by the joint weight refitting in Eq. (8). Combining the selected terms with their refitted weights yields the updated systematic utility in Eq. (3). To make the connection between the diagram and these steps easier to follow, we have revised the Figure 1 caption (p. 4) to identify ft explicitly and include the corresponding equation references.
Q1: Why predicting human strategic behavior matters
On an online bargaining platform, buyers choose offers and sellers accept, reject, or counter them. Predicting these choices helps the platform assess how minimum offer thresholds or limits on bargaining rounds affect agreement rates and transaction prices. Human decisions are shaped by fairness concerns and past interactions, often departing from predictions based solely on individual payoff maximization. Predictive models capture these preferences and history dependence from interaction data. We have added this online bargaining example and its use in evaluating platform rules to the opening of the Introduction (Section 1, p. 1).