- Rating
- 3(+1)
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
Read review
Paper summary
This paper presents PhaseLock, a generation-time watermarking framework for periodic time series. The method is motivated by the observation that vector-quantized (VQ) codebooks exhibit phase-dependent token usage patterns, even without explicit phase supervision. Existing watermarking approaches generally treat the codebook as an unstructured set, potentially introducing watermark biases that conflict with the periodic characteristics of the data.
PhaseLock partitions the codebook into phase-specific groups and restricts token quantization to the group corresponding to each patch's phase. During generation, a phase-gated logit bias is applied to green tokens within the current phase group, and the generated window is randomly shifted to accommodate arbitrary patch-grid alignments. During detection, a phase-aware re-encoding network estimates the patch-grid alignment, phase, and token identities before computing the watermark detection statistic.
The authors evaluate PhaseLock on ten periodic time-series benchmarks, comparing it with LVQMark, TimeWak, Tree-Ring, and Gaussian Shading. The experiments consider offset, crop, and insert attacks, as well as sample quality, wrong-key false positives, and preservation of periodicity. The reported results show improved sample quality at the evaluated detection operating points, fewer wrong-key false positives, and better preservation of periodic structure in most datasets.
Critical strengths
S1. A well-motivated and coherent phase-aware watermarking framework.
The paper identifies a meaningful connection between the periodic structure of time-series data and the organization of VQ codebooks. The observation that different codes are preferentially used at different phases provides a reasonable motivation for phase-partitioned tokenization and phase-gated watermark embedding. The proposed framework consistently incorporates phase information into tokenization, watermark insertion, and detection, making the overall design conceptually coherent.
S2. Comprehensive comparisons within the considered setting, supported by targeted ablations.
The experiments cover ten periodic datasets and compare PhaseLock with several existing watermarking methods. The evaluation considers watermark detectability, sample quality, false positives under incorrect keys, and periodicity preservation. Importantly, the authors compare PhaseLock with LVQMark at both matched and larger codebook sizes, and provide an ablation of phase partitioning. The additional analyses of watermark strength, training-seed robustness, and phase recovery further strengthen the empirical study.
Critical weaknesses
W1. The detection evaluation relies on large-scale aggregation and does not establish the effectiveness of watermark detection with limited observations.
A major concern is the scale at which watermark detection is evaluated. According to Appendix B.5, the detection protocol samples 1,000 windows from a pool of 10,000 generated windows, computes an aggregate green-ratio statistic, and repeats this procedure 100 times to estimate the true positive rate (TPR). Consequently, the reported TPR measures detection over large collections of generated windows rather than individual time-series samples.
This distinction is important because each output window contains only 15–16 or 31–32 scored tokens, depending on the dataset and alignment. Aggregating 1,000 windows provides substantially more statistical evidence than would be available when verifying a single generated series or a small collection of samples.
Although the experimental protocol is explicitly documented, the paper does not investigate how detection performance varies with the number of available windows. Therefore, the reported TPR of 1.00 under the evaluated conditions does not establish that the watermark remains reliably detectable when only a limited number of generated samples are available.
This limitation affects the practical interpretation of the detection results and makes it difficult to assess the applicability of PhaseLock to provenance verification scenarios with smaller observation budgets.
W2. The robustness evaluation is strongly tied to known attack families and attack-matched statistical calibration, limiting the evidence for generalization.
The robustness evaluation considers three post-editing attacks: offset, crop, and insert. However, the corresponding operations primarily modify data values while preserving the length of the time-series window. In particular, the offset attack applies an additive value shift, the crop attack masks part of the observed window, and the insert attack replaces existing time steps with random values rather than inserting new time steps.
Therefore, although PhaseLock explicitly incorporates patch-grid alignment and phase recovery, the evaluated attacks do not directly establish robustness against more general temporal desynchronization, such as deletion or insertion of time steps, changes in sampling rate, or temporal stretching. The authors acknowledge that length-changing edits are not evaluated, but this remains an important limitation given the emphasis on alignment recovery.
Furthermore, Appendix A states that the detection statistic is standardized using non-watermarked data under the same attack and detector. The re-encoding network is also trained using the same attack families considered during evaluation. Consequently, the reported robustness is demonstrated under an attack-aware training and statistical calibration protocol.
It remains unclear how the method would perform when the attack type is unknown, when clean-data calibration statistics are used, or when the observed transformations differ from those encountered during training.
These limitations do not invalidate the reported results within the evaluated setting. However, they substantially restrict the strength of the evidence supporting the broader robustness claims.
Questions for authors
Q1. Detection performance under different observation budgets
Appendix B.5 evaluates watermark detection by aggregating 1,000 windows. Could the authors clarify whether PhaseLock is intended primarily for collection-level provenance verification?
How does the detection performance change when only 10, or 100 windows are available? Reporting TPR at a fixed false positive rate across different observation budgets would help establish the practical detection requirements of the proposed method.
Q2. Robustness to temporal desynchronization
The proposed detector explicitly recovers patch-grid alignment and phase, but the evaluated offset, crop, and insert attacks preserve the window length.
Could the authors clarify the expected behavior under actual temporal editing operations, such as deleting or inserting time steps, temporal stretching, or changes in sampling rate? In particular, does the phase-aware re-encoding mechanism remain effective when the temporal correspondence between the generated and observed series is altered beyond the random sub-patch shift considered in the current experiments?
Q3. Attack-matched calibration and unseen attacks
Appendix A states that the detection statistic is standardized using non-watermarked data under the same attack and detector. Does the detection procedure therefore require knowledge of the attack type or an attack-matched non-watermarked reference set?
How would detection performance change if the null-distribution statistics were calibrated only on clean data and then applied to attacked samples? Additionally, are the samples used for statistical calibration independent of those used to evaluate the false positive rate?
These clarifications would help determine whether the method can be deployed without prior knowledge of the transformations applied to the observed data.
Q4. Selection of watermark strength
Section 4.1 and Appendix B.5 define the operating watermark strength as the smallest strength achieving TPR = 1.00 under the clean condition and all three evaluated attacks.
Were these operating points selected using a separate validation set, or were they determined directly from the evaluation pools reported in the main experiments?
5 comments
Rebuttal by Authors
We thank the reviewer for the kind follow-up, and we're glad the new experiments addressed the earlier concerns. Both remaining questions were covered in [W2, Q2 & Q3 - 1] of our earlier response, but the answer there sat between two large tables, and we apologize for not stating it more clearly. We restate it below in a more direct form, with the same two tables for reference.
[1] Do the reported results rely on attack-matched calibration statistics?
No. As the reviewer points out, the sentence in Appendix A, "The score is standardized by the mean and standard deviation of on non-watermarked windows under the same attack and the same detector," is not worded in line with how the detector is run. In every reported result, and are estimated once per dataset from the clean non-watermarked pool, and the same two numbers standardize every row, clean and attacked. The detector never receives the attack type or an attack-matched reference set.
We will replace that sentence in Appendix A with "The score is standardized by the mean and standard deviation of on clean non-watermarked windows scored by the same detector, and the same two values are used for every condition, clean and attacked."
This can be checked in the supplementary code. get_zscore in Utils/watermark_metrics.py (line 482) computes from its first argument, the null pool. In cli/evaluate.py (--mode zscore, lines 701 to 736) that argument is always the pool read from the clean detect-wo directory, for the clean row (line 709), the attacked watermarked rows (line 733), and the attacked non-watermarked rows (line 736). No attacked pool is ever used to estimate the null.
[2] Are the calibration and false-positive evaluation samples independent?
In the paper, the calibration windows and the windows used for the false positive rate come from the same generation run. The null statistics, however, hardly depend on the run. The table gives / for PhaseLock at , one row per generation seed of Table 1, and they differ across seeds by at most 0.004 on every dataset.
| Seed | ETTh | ETTm | AirQ-1 | AirQ-2 | AirQ-3 | AirQ-4 | AirQ-5 | AirQ-6 | Energy | Weather |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12345 | 0.503 / 0.191 | 0.497 / 0.114 | 0.498 / 0.162 | 0.501 / 0.151 | 0.498 / 0.142 | 0.501 / 0.141 | 0.501 / 0.147 | 0.501 / 0.141 | 0.501 / 0.098 | 0.497 / 0.095 |
| 12346 | 0.503 / 0.192 | 0.497 / 0.117 | 0.498 / 0.162 | 0.501 / 0.149 | 0.497 / 0.144 | 0.501 / 0.140 | 0.499 / 0.148 | 0.499 / 0.141 | 0.501 / 0.100 | 0.499 / 0.094 |
| 12347 | 0.504 / 0.192 | 0.500 / 0.113 | 0.499 / 0.161 | 0.500 / 0.148 | 0.500 / 0.143 | 0.502 / 0.140 | 0.501 / 0.148 | 0.497 / 0.142 | 0.499 / 0.099 | 0.499 / 0.096 |
To make the two fully independent, we took from the clean non-watermarked pool of one generation seed and applied them to the watermarked and non-watermarked pools of the other two seeds. Cells give the minimum TPR / maximum non-watermarked FPR over clean, offset, crop, and insert, averaged over the two evaluated seeds.
| Calibration → evaluation | ETTh | ETTm | AirQ-1 | AirQ-2 | AirQ-3 | AirQ-4 | AirQ-5 | AirQ-6 | Energy | Weather |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12345 → 12346, 12347 | 1.0 / 0.01 | 1.0 / 0.02 | 1.0 / 0.01 | 1.0 / 0.00 | 1.0 / 0.02 | 1.0 / 0.00 | 1.0 / 0.02 | 1.0 / 0.00 | 1.0 / 0.01 | 1.0 / 0.02 |
| 12346 → 12345, 12347 | 1.0 / 0.00 | 1.0 / 0.01 | 1.0 / 0.01 | 1.0 / 0.00 | 1.0 / 0.01 | 1.0 / 0.01 | 1.0 / 0.03 | 1.0 / 0.02 | 1.0 / 0.01 | 1.0 / 0.01 |
| 12347 → 12345, 12346 | 1.0 / 0.00 | 1.0 / 0.00 | 1.0 / 0.01 | 1.0 / 0.01 | 1.0 / 0.00 | 1.0 / 0.01 | 1.0 / 0.00 | 1.0 / 0.05 | 1.0 / 0.01 | 1.0 / 0.01 |
With an independent calibration, TPR is 1.00 in every cell and the false positive rate stays at or below 0.05.
We hope this resolves the remaining point, and we thank the reviewer again for the careful reading, which led us to clarify the description of the calibration.
Thank you for the further clarification of the calibration procedure and the additional experimental results.
The authors have clarified that the same clean, non-watermarked calibration statistics are used across all conditions. The additional cross-seed experiments also offer useful evidence regarding detection performance with independent calibration and evaluation samples. These explanations help clarify the evaluation protocol and provide further context for interpreting the reported results.
Thank you for the detailed rebuttal and additional experiments. I appreciate the authors' efforts to address my concerns and provide further experimental evidence.
The new results on smaller observation budgets, temporal editing attacks, and held-out generation seeds have substantially addressed my previous concerns. However, one point regarding statistical calibration remains unclear. Although the authors state that the detector does not require knowledge of the attack type, the paper describes using non-watermarked data under the same attack for standardization. Could the authors clarify whether the reported results rely on attack-matched calibration statistics and whether the calibration and false-positive evaluation samples are independent? Overall, I appreciate the additional experiments and clarifications provided by the authors.