- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper proposes the Faithfulness-Oriented Adversarial (FOA) attack, which introduces prediction-preserving perturbations that can redirect saliency toward regions that provide weaker support for the VLM's predictions. Specifically, FOA uses insertion- and deletion-based objectives with a stop-gradient strategy to avoid backpropagation through the explanation method. Across five explanation methods and three datasets, the attack can substantially reduce faithfulness across multiple explainers while preserving the original predictions. This work highlights that a substantial explanation shift does not necessarily imply unfaithfulness and that we should assess explanations both in terms of where they shift and whether the resulting explanations remain faithful.
Critical strengths
Strength 1: The paper is well-motivated and has a clean formulation of the research problem. The authors observe and highlight that a change in the saliency map does not mean that the resulting explanation is unfaithful. As a result, the authors move beyond measuring how much an explanation changes and instead investigate whether the highlighted regions remain informative for the model's prediction.
Strength 2: The proposed FOA framework provides a simple way to incorporate established faithfulness metrics into adversarial optimization. In particular, the stop-gradient strategy avoids significant computational complexity and cost associated with differentiating through the explanation method.
Strength 3: The experimental evaluation covers multiple representative explanation methods and multiple datasets, ensuring that the proposed attack is not restricted to a single explanation technique or dataset.
Critical weaknesses
Weakness 1: Although the paper shows that the FOA attack induces changes in saliency maps and degrades explanation faithfulness metrics, it remains somewhat unclear how much of the observed degradation is attributable to changes in saliency rankings versus changes in the model's response to masked inputs. Since the attack directly optimizes the model's confidence on masked images, additional control experiments could help disentangle these two effects. For example, evaluating the clean and adversarial saliency maps on the same adversarial image using IMD and ROAD could be useful. This additional analysis could strengthen the paper.
Weakness 2: Currently, all experiments use the same underlying ViT-B/16 CLIP model (as mentioned in Section 4.1, page 6). It remains unclear whether the proposed attack would exhibit similar effectiveness on larger CLIP variants or alternative VLM architectures. Additional experiments on other backbones could help strengthen the paper.
Weakness 3: While I appreciate that the authors propose gradient detachment through the (M_t) generation branch to save computation and potentially avoid second-order derivatives in some cases, the performance impact of using the surrogate gradient in Equation (8) remains unclear.
Questions for authors
Question 1: Can the authors potentially provide additional analysis on the sources of faithfulness degradation under attack? For example, a quick controlled study that evaluates the clean and adversarial saliency maps on the same adversarial image could be helpful.
Question 2: Can the authors perform similar experiments on different VLM backbones (a larger one or a different VLM)?
Question 3: Can the authors explain how they chose the hyperparameters in Section 4.1, particularly the step size and the number of optimization iterations (K=50)? Are the experimental results consistent across different step sizes and numbers of optimization iterations?
Question 4: Can the paper also report the prediction accuracy after the attack? The main idea is that we can introduce attacks without reducing accuracy, so it would be useful to verify how the FOA attack achieves both objectives.
5 comments
Weakness 2 and Question 2 - Attack Across Different VLM Backbones (BLIP and SigLIP)
Weakness 2
Weakness 2: Currently, all experiments use the same underlying ViT-B/16 CLIP model (as mentioned in Section 4.1, page 6). It remains unclear whether the proposed attack would exhibit similar effectiveness on larger CLIP variants or alternative VLM architectures. Additional experiments on other backbones could help strengthen the paper.
Question 2
Question 2: Can the authors perform similar experiments on different VLM backbones (a larger one or a different VLM)?
We thank the reviewer for this suggestion. To investigate whether our findings generalize beyond CLIP, we have extended our experiments to two additional VLM backbones, BLIP and SigLIP.
We have addressed this weakness and Question in our response to Reviewer JxgH (see Question 3: https://openreview.net/forum?id=sQeTssIaEL¬eId=FgWmeKDxG7). We kindly refer the reviewers to that response for the detailed results and discussion.
The results, reported in Appendix F - Table 6, show that FOA also effectively degrades explanation faithfulness on these backbones. These findings provide further evidence that the vulnerabilities exposed by FOA are not specific to the CLIP architecture.
Question 4 - Prediction Accuracy
Question 4
Question 4: Can the paper also report the prediction accuracy after the attack? The main idea is that we can introduce attacks without reducing accuracy, so it would be useful to verify how the FOA attack achieves both objectives.
We thank the reviewer for this suggestion. FOA explicitly preserves the original predicted class through its candidate-selection mechanism: only candidates with unchanged predicted labels are accepted, and the one with the lowest attack objective is retained (Line 27 of Algorithm 1 - Appendix A). Moreover, the KL-divergence regularization further encourages prediction distributions to remain close to the original. Since our evaluation set contains correctly classified samples, the accepted adversarial examples preserve the original classification accuracy.
Regarding the confidence scores, which may additionally help address your concern, we kindly refer the reviewers to our response to Reviewer JxgH (Question 3: https://openreview.net/forum?id=sQeTssIaEL¬eId=yfQ6evpfuV) for the detailed results and discussion.
Weakness 1 and Question 1 - Controlled Ablation on Saliency Ranking and Masked-Input Responses
Weakness 1
Quesiton 1
We thank the reviewer for this valuable suggestion. Following the reviewer's recommendation, we conducted an additional experiment to evaluate clean and adversarial saliency maps on the same adversarial images, using the same model and masking protocol. The results are presented in the following table:
Table 5. Faithfulness evaluation of clean and adversarial saliency maps on the same adversarial images generated by FOA. Higher IMD (↑), and lower Del$_{\text{mean}}$ (↓) and ROAD (↓), indicate the saliency map is more faithful. Results are averaged across the three FOA variants (IOA, DOA, and IOA+DOA) and the three datasets. The Without Attack rows report the faithfulness performance of each explainer under clean conditions, averaged across the three datasets.
However, we think this comparison is not entirely appropriate because the clean and adversarial saliency maps are generated on different input images from those they were originally generated to explain, resulting in a mismatch between the saliency maps and their corresponding inputs.
Motivated by this limitation, we therefore designed an alternative ablation study. Specifically, we compared three masking strategies: (1) Adaptive-mask, which dynamically updates the saliency ranking during attack optimization, following the original FOA; (2) Clean-mask, which uses a fixed saliency ranking generated from the clean image; and (3) Random-mask, which uses a fixed randomly generated ranking. This comparison allows us to examine whether dynamically adapting the salient regions provides additional attack effectiveness beyond changes in the model's responses to masked inputs.
We refer the reviewer to our response to Reviewer JxgH regarding Weakness 1 and Question 1 for a detailed discussion of this ablation study (see https://openreview.net/forum?id=sQeTssIaEL¬eId=QFew3CP4ds).
The results, reported in Table 4 , Appendix D, show that Adaptive-mask generally causes greater faithfulness degradation than Clean-mask and Random-mask under both Del$_{\text{mean}}$ and ROAD, particularly for IOA and DOA. Meanwhile, Clean-mask also produces non-negligible degradation, suggesting that changes in model responses to masked inputs may also contribute to FOA's effectiveness even without adaptive saliency ranking.