- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
Read review
Paper summary
This paper introduces a framework(ECLIPSE) for triggerless implicit bias injection. It inserts LoRA adapters into MLP blocks of a text encoder, constructs a neutral-subspace projector from final-layer representations, and projects accumulated LoRA gradients before each AdamW step. Experiments cover CLIP and T5-XXL, multiple generation architectures, and two attention-based detectors.
Critical strengths
The problem is timely and security-relevant and the paper presents a concrete, runnable engineering pipeline and evaluates it across two text encoders and several generative architectures.
Critical weaknesses
-
The VLM judge was "calibrated against human annotations" is not supported by any reported calibration results. Since the core ASR numbers depend on this judge, the absence of calibration evidence leaves the central evaluation unverified.
-
The matched alarm rates establish that ECLIPSE does not increase detector alarms at the evaluated operating points. However, without demonstrating that the reproduced detectors detect a known trigger-based attack in the same setup, it remains unclear how strongly these results support detector evasion
Questions for authors
-
What exactly does the "Original" row in Table 1 represent? Is it a clean–clean control, or a baseline reference? If it is a clean–clean control, how does the 28% non-Same rate compare with the 0.05% corruption rate reported for the clean–clean control in Table 4? Please explain the discrepancy in these two baselines and how the 28% noise rate in Table 1 affects the interpretation of the reported ASR.
-
Can the authors provide a positive control showing that the reproduced SET and DAA detectors successfully identify a known trigger-based attack under the same evaluation conditions?
-
The paper repeatedly mentions human calibration. What are the specific methods and results of this human calibration?
2 comments
I thank the authors for their detailed rebuttal and additional experiments. The newly added ablation studies and the positive control results for the SET/DAA detectors indeed address some of my previous concerns.
However, I still have significant reservations regarding the reliability of the core evaluation. The high ASR reported in the paper, as well as the relative comparisons between methods, rely heavily on the VLM judge. The newly added human validation covers only 20 image pairs with 9 annotators, which remains limited in scale. Moreover, the chance-corrected agreement between the VLM and the human majority vote is low (Cohen’s κ = 0.176). These results are insufficient to support the authors' claims that the "absolute ASR is a conservative lower bound" and that "relative comparisons are unaffected."
I also agree with orTc's concern that a sufficient distinction must be made between target semantic manipulation and non-target content preservation. The current evidence is insufficient to determine to what extent the outputs judged as successful by the VLM actually achieve the intended emotional shift while preserving non-target content. Therefore, I cannot establish sufficient confidence in the reported ASR and the core conclusions it supports.
While I acknowledge the value of the authors' additional work and the importance of the research question, I maintain my original score.
Response to Reviewer BRbp
We sincerely thank the reviewer for these precise questions, which target the three evaluations we care most about. We address them in order.
Q1. The 28% non-Same rate in the "Original" row of Table 1 vs. the 0.05% corruption rate in Table 4
The "Original" row is a clean–clean control: two images generated from the unmodified model are compared by the VLM judge, which must output one of three relative-emotion labels. The 28% non-Same (18.2% more-positive + 9.8% more-negative) is therefore the judge's intrinsic classification noise on near-identical pairs — its noise floor. Table 4's corruption rate (0.30% in the revision; 0.05% in the submitted version), by contrast, comes from a fidelity check, not an emotion judge: each generated image is scored as Preserved / Corrupted / Unclear against a reference via CLIP similarity (the Unclear column happens to be zero). It measures whether an image is degraded, not which bias it expresses. The two numbers quantify different things — attack strength (emotion) versus image fidelity — and are not comparable.
This floor does not bias our conclusions: it is additive and direction-agnostic, so the attack effect is the excess ASR above the baseline. Subtracting the 28% floor yields net effects of +51.7pp (negative bias) and +70.8pp (positive bias), both highly significant. In the revision we will add a footnote to Table 1 clarifying that the "Original" row is a clean–clean judge control and report the net ASR explicitly.
Q2. A positive control for the SET and DAA detectors
We reproduced both detectors and evaluated them on a known trigger-based attack, Rickrolling (Struppek et al., ICCV 2023), whose non-Latin character trigger redirects generation to a hidden target, under the same evaluation setup:
DAA reports detection on trigger prompts per its original protocol; SET additionally reports the clean false-positive rate. Both detectors reliably identify the known backdoor with a high true-positive rate (and, for SET, a low clean false-positive rate), confirming the reproductions are functional rather than degenerate. Since ECLIPSE keeps detector alarm rates at the matched clean baseline, its evasion is genuine stealth rather than an artifact of broken detectors.
Q3. The specific methods and results of human calibration
We collected judgments from 9 annotators over 20 paired images under a unified three-way protocol (more-positive / more-negative / unchanged), with the judge prompt calibrated toward facial micro-expressions (raising the clean-image specificity from 72% to 88%). Inter-annotator agreement is 71.0% pairwise with Fleiss' κ = 0.349, indicating reliable annotations. The judge attains 57.9% agreement with the majority vote (Cohen's κ = 0.176). The gap reflects a criterion difference: the judge attends to micro-expressions whereas humans judge overall appearance, making the judge more conservative and more likely to label subtle changes as "unchanged." Consequently, the absolute ASR is a conservative lower bound, while relative comparisons (e.g., with vs. without OSGP) are unaffected. The full protocol and agreement statistics will be added to Sec. 4.4 ,Table 5(Human calibration of the judge.)