- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 1
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper studies the trade-offs between risk and utility in residual policies for imperfect-information games. The authors propose RSD-Poker, a structure-adaptive and shift-robust certification framework that combines policy-visible partition, risk–utility certification, and mixture-robust selection. Experiments on poker benchmarks show higher weak-response utility and lower violation rates compared with baseline methods.
Critical strengths
- The presentation of this paper is complete. The structure of this manuscript is well-organized.
- The topic of this work is interesting and useful for the game field, especially imperfect-information games.
- The experiments are thorough and complete.
Critical weaknesses
- The author's line of thought in Section 3 is a bit difficult to understand, but this section is very important in the paper. I lost myself many times when reading this section and trying to understand the proposed method. Although the authors provide Fig.1 for explanation, it would be better to give an explanation at the beginning of this section.
- I am confused about the relation between imperfect-information settings and the proposed method in this paper. It seems that the authors did not solve the problem caused by imperfect-information settings. I did not find any relevant words for imperfect information, such as "belief".
- Several variables lose their definitions, i.e., "pot(s)", "" ,"".
- I don't understand the relation between and , and . They use the same formulation. But I cannot find and after Eq.3 in the manuscript. What are the purpose of and ?
Questions for authors
Please review my weaknesses.