- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper studies contextual privacy alignment for LLM agents, motivated by the observation that privacy leakage judgments made by LLM-based evaluators can be inconsistent with human judgments, especially when the appropriateness of a disclosure depends on the surrounding context. To better ground both evaluation and training in human privacy preferences, the authors construct PrivacyAlign, a human-annotated dataset of privacy-sensitive agent scenarios. It explores two ways of converting human annotations into reward signals for policy optimization: an annotation-conditioned pairwise judge that directly uses prompt-specific human annotations at scoring time, and a trained generative reward model that learns preference and leakage signals across the training set. The resulting reward signals are used for reinforcement learning of small open-weight agent models. Experiments evaluate both the agreement of privacy judges and the downstream privacy/helpfulness trade-off of the trained policies.
Critical strengths
- The identified issue is novel, important, and ignored by current works.
- The paper provides a substantial human-annotated resource for studying contextual privacy alignment. It includes pairwise preferences, leak/omit annotations, and free-text rationales, enabling analysis beyond simple binary leakage labels.
- The proposed reward-modeling framework is well motivated. The paper compares annotation-conditioned reward modeling with a trained generative reward model, evaluates judge agreement, and further studies downstream policy optimization and transfer to held-out privacy benchmarks.
Critical weaknesses
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Table 1 uses “Unconstrained Scenarios” as a distinguishing dimension, defined as scenarios not being limited to a predefined set of domains or schemas. However, the criterion remains somewhat underspecified. It would be helpful to clarify what specifically constitutes a predefined “domain” or “schema,” and why each prior benchmark in Table 1 is categorized as constrained under this definition. A more precise term or explicit inclusion criterion would make this comparison easier to interpret.
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If human annotations are themselves subjective, it is not immediately clear why closer alignment between an LLM judge and those annotations should necessarily be considered better. The human labels may serve as a reference standard that encourages the reward model to learn the annotators’ perspective, but if those judgments are not uniquely correct—or demonstrably more reliable than the LLM’s own judgments—then higher human–LLM agreement should perhaps be interpreted as preference alignment rather than improved correctness. This concern seems particularly relevant given the paper’s own discussion in Appendix A that human-annotator heterogeneity may reflect genuine pluralism and that the resulting “gold” labels cannot exactly match any individual user’s preferences.
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A more controlled comparison against LLM-generated preference supervision would strengthen the paper. In particular, it would be useful to generate pairwise preferences using an LLM judge without access to human annotations (similar to PrivAct), and then train the policy using the same downstream optimization pipeline. This would better isolate the contribution of human-grounded supervision from differences in reward construction, data, and training procedure.
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It would be informative to include an inference-time in-context baseline that provides the base policy with the same-prompt reference responses and human annotations, without any parameter updates, and compare it against RL with the annotation-conditioned reward. This would help disentangle the benefit of simply exposing the model to instance-specific human guidance from the benefit of internalizing that supervision through RL. This comparison would provide a clearer picture of the additional value contributed by RL beyond direct access to the human annotation context.
Questions for authors
- Could the authors clarify the definition of “Unconstrained Scenarios” in Table 1?
- How should the role of human annotations be interpreted when contextual privacy judgments are inherently subjective?
- Could the authors include comparison against (i) a vanilla LLM judge supervised baseline, (ii) vanilla LLM judge provided with human annotations in the prompt?
4 comments
Definition of Unconstrained Scenarios: The authors emphasize that the generator model proposes both settings and underlying privacy situations from scratch, rather than using predefined domains or seed expansion. It would be interesting to see a few concrete examples of novel, cross-domain, or multi-party privacy dilemmas uncovered by this approach.
LLM-only preference supervision: Appendix K mentions that using the untrained base model as a reward judge does not improve policy performance and may increase leakage and omissions. It would be helpful if the authors could provide the corresponding quantitative results (leak, omit, and clean rates) under the same evaluation settings as Table 4.
Human guidance at inference time: Thank you for providing these additional results evaluating this baseline on all 200 test scenarios, varying access to reference responses, labels, and explanations.. The comparison helps clarify the effectiveness of human annotations.
Overall, I find the core motivation of this work interesting, and I appreciate the authors' clarifications and additional experiments.
Thank you for your reply and engagement.
Scenario Diversity
“It would be interesting to see a few concrete examples of novel, cross-domain, or multi-party privacy dilemmas uncovered by this approach.”
We summarize three examples that illustrate different stories, settings, and privacy dilemmas.
Community outreach and family privacy. (train, ID 785). An agent prepares a public Facebook announcement post for an employment-support workshop using participant feedback. One agent response names a participant and quotes her account of updating her resume for a custody appeal, exposing private circumstances involving her children. The other keeps the workshop logistics and positive testimonials while removing the participant’s name and custody details.
Healthcare and software engineering. (test, ID 166). An agent reports a data-mapping issue affecting three patients to an internal engineering team. One response copies patient names, contact details, medications, and allergies into the Jira comment. The medication lists can reveal sensitive conditions. The other provides the requested record identifiers, mapping error, and correction deadline without copying unnecessary personal and clinical details.
Recruitment and religious privacy. (train, ID 1305). An agent arranges an interview with an external recruiter, consulting its user’s calendar to avoid a religious holiday. One response explains that the user is unavailable for a “Bahá’í Holy Day—Ridvan,” revealing her religious practice. The other only shares available interview times and the requested reference information without mentioning the observance.
These scenarios involve distinct situations. Generator models develop these stories and situations without relying on supplied scenario seeds.
Unconditioned Reward Ablation
“It would be helpful if the authors could provide the corresponding quantitative results (leak, omit, and clean rates) under the same evaluation settings as Table 4.”
We provide the quantitative comparison for the ablation described in Appendix K below. We evaluated Nemotron checkpoints under the same settings as Table 4, using both paper judges, GPT-5.5 and Gemini 3.1 Pro. The reward judge model, training data, and training setup are the same between the conditioned and unconditioned runs. We report leak/omit/clean percentages.
| Epoch | Conditioned Leakage ↓ | Conditioned Omission ↓ | Conditioned Clean ↑ | Unconditioned Leakage ↓ | Unconditioned Omission ↓ | Unconditioned Clean ↑ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 (untrained base) | 56.1 | 55.0 | 18.9 | 56.1 | 55.0 | 18.9 |
| 5 | 49.4 | 53.4 | 21.6 | 81.1 | 59.4 | 8.2 |
| 10 | 47.3 | 51.2 | 23.9 | 82.8 | 60.6 | 5.7 |
| 30 (final conditioned model) | 30.4 | 49.8 | 34.0 | — | — | — |
Without annotation conditioning leak and omit rates increase and clean rate collapses from 18.9% to 5.7% by epoch 10. We stopped this run early because of this decline. With annotation conditioning, clean rate improves to 23.9% by epoch 10 and reaches 34.0% after continued training.
Thank you again for engaging with our responses and additional experiments.
Thank you again for engaging with our responses and additional experiments. In our latest reply, we provided the requested scenario examples and quantitative results comparing conditioned and unconditioned rewards at matched training epochs. We hope these address your follow-up questions. If your main concerns are now resolved, we would appreciate your considering a higher score. Please let us know if there is anything further we can clarify.
Thank you for your thoughtful review and helpful recommendations.
Thank you for your thoughtful review and helpful recommendations. We clarify our methodology and report the requested inference-time baselines below.
Scenario generation
“Could the authors clarify the definition of ‘Unconstrained Scenarios’ in Table 1?”
We use “Open-ended scenario generation” to mean that the generator model proposes both the setting and the underlying privacy situation, rather than selecting from predefined domains or expanding supplied scenario seeds. For example, a PrivacyLens seed already specifies the sender, recipient, and information being disclosed; generation develops that specified information flow into a detailed scenario. PrivacyAlign also generates these initial elements. Because privacy depends on these elements together, generating them lets us explore situations beyond an author-supplied seed set. This is the distinction in Table 1.
Human norms and subjectivity
“How should the role of human annotations be interpreted when contextual privacy judgments are inherently subjective?”
PrivacyAlign aims to align agents with shared human expectations about appropriate disclosure, while allowing for differences in particular cases. This follows contextual integrity, which understands privacy through social norms governing information flow [1]. Empirical work also finds common contextual expectations across people with different general attitudes toward privacy [2]. Individual variation therefore does not make privacy an arbitrary or unlearnable target.
We collect multiple annotations to identify these shared expectations and retain explanations to understand where judgments differ. Disagreement can reflect different interpretations of the context or annotation mistakes, as well as legitimate differences in privacy expectations. Our aim is to learn the common norms. Table 3 shows that annotation conditioning improves agreement with independent human labels, supporting this approach.
[1] Helen Nissenbaum. “Privacy as Contextual Integrity.” Washington Law Review, 2004.
[2] Kirsten Martin and Helen Nissenbaum. “Measuring Privacy: An Empirical Test Using Context to Expose Confounding Variables.” Columbia Science and Technology Law Review, 2017.
LLM-only preference supervision
“It would be useful to generate pairwise preferences using an LLM judge without access to human annotations … and then train the policy using the same downstream optimization pipeline.”
We conducted this ablation, now more clearly stated in Appendix K. The conditioned and unconditioned runs used the same frozen base-model judge, training data, optimizer, penalties, and training budget. Without annotation conditioning, RL failed to improve performance and instead degraded clean rate, privacy, and usefulness.
Human guidance at inference time
“Include an inference-time in-context baseline that provides the base policy with the same-prompt reference responses and human annotations, without any parameter updates.”
We evaluated this baseline on all 200 test scenarios, varying access to reference responses, labels, and explanations. Unguided and PrivacyAlign scores below are from Table 4. Clean rates averaged across both paper judges are:
Full guidance achieves the highest clean rates, with large gains from explanations. It requires annotations for each test scenario, whereas PrivacyAlign learns from training annotations to improve behavior on new scenarios. The same comparison on two frontier models shows consistent benefits:
Explanations add 7.3 and 9.3 percentage points beyond labels, showing that contextual reasoning remains valuable. Appendix U.2 reports the full results, and Appendix U.3 gives the prompts.
Ethics Review Flag and annotator welfare
“The paper studies privacy-sensitive agent behavior and involves human annotations of contextual privacy judgments.”
As described in the Ethics Statement and Appendix P, participants consented to the use of their judgments and rationales and were compensated at £10/hour. Participants who made even a minimal good-faith effort were compensated even when their annotations were excluded during quality review. We addressed annotators’ concerns through Prolific messages. We also note that PrivacyAlign uses LLM-generated scenarios to avoid collecting and sharing real users’ sensitive interactions.