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Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

PrivacyAlign: Contextual Privacy Alignment for LLM Agents

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Abstract

AI agents acting on behalf of users are constantly making decisions, and for users to trust their agents, those decisions must align with what they actually want. Privacy is an important alignment problem for agents: every message, post, or tool call an agent makes is a contextual judgment about what is appropriate to share, with whom, and under which conditions. Because such judgments depend on social expectations and norms, human judgment does not merely label privacy violations but also helps define them. While existing work relies on unreliable proxies for both training and evaluation, we place human judgment at the center of agentic privacy alignment. We introduce PrivacyAlign, a dataset of 1,350 samples with 3,516 detailed annotations from 599 unique annotators across diverse scenarios where current LLMs actually leak, and use it to ground both alignment training and automated evaluation in human privacy norms. Building on these annotations, we first show that conditioning LLM judges on human annotations and explanations for reference responses to the same prompt makes their judgments more reliable. We then introduce annotation-conditioned reward modeling, which uses these annotations to score new responses during RL, and show that small open-weight agents trained with this reward better align with human privacy norms, with strong gains on PrivacyAlign and existing privacy benchmarks for agents.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
Privacy, Alignment, RL, LLM Judges

Reviews

Among:
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1234this paper, Top 4%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 3.33 over 3 reviews, above 96% of the others.
Reviewer_1VVtOpenReview ↗
Rating
3
Confidence
4
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
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Paper summary

This paper studies contextual privacy alignment for LLM agents, motivated by the observation that privacy leakage judgments made by LLM-based evaluators can be inconsistent with human judgments, especially when the appropriateness of a disclosure depends on the surrounding context. To better ground both evaluation and training in human privacy preferences, the authors construct PrivacyAlign, a human-annotated dataset of privacy-sensitive agent scenarios. It explores two ways of converting human annotations into reward signals for policy optimization: an annotation-conditioned pairwise judge that directly uses prompt-specific human annotations at scoring time, and a trained generative reward model that learns preference and leakage signals across the training set. The resulting reward signals are used for reinforcement learning of small open-weight agent models. Experiments evaluate both the agreement of privacy judges and the downstream privacy/helpfulness trade-off of the trained policies.

Critical strengths
  • The identified issue is novel, important, and ignored by current works.
  • The paper provides a substantial human-annotated resource for studying contextual privacy alignment. It includes pairwise preferences, leak/omit annotations, and free-text rationales, enabling analysis beyond simple binary leakage labels.
  • The proposed reward-modeling framework is well motivated. The paper compares annotation-conditioned reward modeling with a trained generative reward model, evaluates judge agreement, and further studies downstream policy optimization and transfer to held-out privacy benchmarks.
Critical weaknesses
  1. Table 1 uses “Unconstrained Scenarios” as a distinguishing dimension, defined as scenarios not being limited to a predefined set of domains or schemas. However, the criterion remains somewhat underspecified. It would be helpful to clarify what specifically constitutes a predefined “domain” or “schema,” and why each prior benchmark in Table 1 is categorized as constrained under this definition. A more precise term or explicit inclusion criterion would make this comparison easier to interpret.

  2. If human annotations are themselves subjective, it is not immediately clear why closer alignment between an LLM judge and those annotations should necessarily be considered better. The human labels may serve as a reference standard that encourages the reward model to learn the annotators’ perspective, but if those judgments are not uniquely correct—or demonstrably more reliable than the LLM’s own judgments—then higher human–LLM agreement should perhaps be interpreted as preference alignment rather than improved correctness. This concern seems particularly relevant given the paper’s own discussion in Appendix A that human-annotator heterogeneity may reflect genuine pluralism and that the resulting “gold” labels cannot exactly match any individual user’s preferences.

  3. A more controlled comparison against LLM-generated preference supervision would strengthen the paper. In particular, it would be useful to generate pairwise preferences using an LLM judge without access to human annotations (similar to PrivAct), and then train the policy using the same downstream optimization pipeline. This would better isolate the contribution of human-grounded supervision from differences in reward construction, data, and training procedure.

  4. It would be informative to include an inference-time in-context baseline that provides the base policy with the same-prompt reference responses and human annotations, without any parameter updates, and compare it against RL with the annotation-conditioned reward. This would help disentangle the benefit of simply exposing the model to instance-specific human guidance from the benefit of internalizing that supervision through RL. This comparison would provide a clearer picture of the additional value contributed by RL beyond direct access to the human annotation context.

Questions for authors
  1. Could the authors clarify the definition of “Unconstrained Scenarios” in Table 1?
  2. How should the role of human annotations be interpreted when contextual privacy judgments are inherently subjective?
  3. Could the authors include comparison against (i) a vanilla LLM judge supervised baseline, (ii) vanilla LLM judge provided with human annotations in the prompt?
4 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Thank you for your thoughtful review and helpful recommendations.

Thank you for your thoughtful review and helpful recommendations. We clarify our methodology and report the requested inference-time baselines below.

Scenario generation

“Could the authors clarify the definition of ‘Unconstrained Scenarios’ in Table 1?”

We use “Open-ended scenario generation” to mean that the generator model proposes both the setting and the underlying privacy situation, rather than selecting from predefined domains or expanding supplied scenario seeds. For example, a PrivacyLens seed already specifies the sender, recipient, and information being disclosed; generation develops that specified information flow into a detailed scenario. PrivacyAlign also generates these initial elements. Because privacy depends on these elements together, generating them lets us explore situations beyond an author-supplied seed set. This is the distinction in Table 1.

Human norms and subjectivity

“How should the role of human annotations be interpreted when contextual privacy judgments are inherently subjective?”

PrivacyAlign aims to align agents with shared human expectations about appropriate disclosure, while allowing for differences in particular cases. This follows contextual integrity, which understands privacy through social norms governing information flow [1]. Empirical work also finds common contextual expectations across people with different general attitudes toward privacy [2]. Individual variation therefore does not make privacy an arbitrary or unlearnable target.

We collect multiple annotations to identify these shared expectations and retain explanations to understand where judgments differ. Disagreement can reflect different interpretations of the context or annotation mistakes, as well as legitimate differences in privacy expectations. Our aim is to learn the common norms. Table 3 shows that annotation conditioning improves agreement with independent human labels, supporting this approach.

[1] Helen Nissenbaum. “Privacy as Contextual Integrity.” Washington Law Review, 2004.

[2] Kirsten Martin and Helen Nissenbaum. “Measuring Privacy: An Empirical Test Using Context to Expose Confounding Variables.” Columbia Science and Technology Law Review, 2017.

LLM-only preference supervision

“It would be useful to generate pairwise preferences using an LLM judge without access to human annotations … and then train the policy using the same downstream optimization pipeline.”

We conducted this ablation, now more clearly stated in Appendix K. The conditioned and unconditioned runs used the same frozen base-model judge, training data, optimizer, penalties, and training budget. Without annotation conditioning, RL failed to improve performance and instead degraded clean rate, privacy, and usefulness.

Human guidance at inference time

“Include an inference-time in-context baseline that provides the base policy with the same-prompt reference responses and human annotations, without any parameter updates.”

We evaluated this baseline on all 200 test scenarios, varying access to reference responses, labels, and explanations. Unguided and PrivacyAlign scores below are from Table 4. Clean rates averaged across both paper judges are:

Inference-time guidanceNemotron 4BQwen 4BQwen 8B
None (base policy)18.9%17.0%14.5%
References15.5%12.5%11.3%
References + labels20.8%25.8%27.0%
References + labels + explanations42.5%49.3%46.8%
PrivacyAlign (no inference-time guidance)34.0%28.1%27.7%

Full guidance achieves the highest clean rates, with large gains from explanations. It requires annotations for each test scenario, whereas PrivacyAlign learns from training annotations to improve behavior on new scenarios. The same comparison on two frontier models shows consistent benefits:

Inference-time guidanceGPT-6 AstraClaude Fable 5.1
None67.0%69.0%
References69.5%71.0%
References + labels80.0%79.5%
References + labels + explanations87.3%88.8%

Explanations add 7.3 and 9.3 percentage points beyond labels, showing that contextual reasoning remains valuable. Appendix U.2 reports the full results, and Appendix U.3 gives the prompts.

Ethics Review Flag and annotator welfare

“The paper studies privacy-sensitive agent behavior and involves human annotations of contextual privacy judgments.”

As described in the Ethics Statement and Appendix P, participants consented to the use of their judgments and rationales and were compensated at £10/hour. Participants who made even a minimal good-faith effort were compensated even when their annotations were excluded during quality review. We addressed annotators’ concerns through Prolific messages. We also note that PrivacyAlign uses LLM-generated scenarios to avoid collecting and sharing real users’ sensitive interactions.

Definition of Unconstrained Scenarios: The authors emphasize that the generator model proposes both settings and underlying privacy situations from scratch, rather than using predefined domains or seed expansion. It would be interesting to see a few concrete examples of novel, cross-domain, or multi-party privacy dilemmas uncovered by this approach.

LLM-only preference supervision: Appendix K mentions that using the untrained base model as a reward judge does not improve policy performance and may increase leakage and omissions. It would be helpful if the authors could provide the corresponding quantitative results (leak, omit, and clean rates) under the same evaluation settings as Table 4.

Human guidance at inference time: Thank you for providing these additional results evaluating this baseline on all 200 test scenarios, varying access to reference responses, labels, and explanations.. The comparison helps clarify the effectiveness of human annotations.

Overall, I find the core motivation of this work interesting, and I appreciate the authors' clarifications and additional experiments.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Thank you for your reply and engagement.

Scenario Diversity

“It would be interesting to see a few concrete examples of novel, cross-domain, or multi-party privacy dilemmas uncovered by this approach.”

We summarize three examples that illustrate different stories, settings, and privacy dilemmas.

Community outreach and family privacy. (train, ID 785). An agent prepares a public Facebook announcement post for an employment-support workshop using participant feedback. One agent response names a participant and quotes her account of updating her resume for a custody appeal, exposing private circumstances involving her children. The other keeps the workshop logistics and positive testimonials while removing the participant’s name and custody details.

Healthcare and software engineering. (test, ID 166). An agent reports a data-mapping issue affecting three patients to an internal engineering team. One response copies patient names, contact details, medications, and allergies into the Jira comment. The medication lists can reveal sensitive conditions. The other provides the requested record identifiers, mapping error, and correction deadline without copying unnecessary personal and clinical details.

Recruitment and religious privacy. (train, ID 1305). An agent arranges an interview with an external recruiter, consulting its user’s calendar to avoid a religious holiday. One response explains that the user is unavailable for a “Bahá’í Holy Day—Ridvan,” revealing her religious practice. The other only shares available interview times and the requested reference information without mentioning the observance.

These scenarios involve distinct situations. Generator models develop these stories and situations without relying on supplied scenario seeds.

Unconditioned Reward Ablation

“It would be helpful if the authors could provide the corresponding quantitative results (leak, omit, and clean rates) under the same evaluation settings as Table 4.”

We provide the quantitative comparison for the ablation described in Appendix K below. We evaluated Nemotron checkpoints under the same settings as Table 4, using both paper judges, GPT-5.5 and Gemini 3.1 Pro. The reward judge model, training data, and training setup are the same between the conditioned and unconditioned runs. We report leak/omit/clean percentages.

EpochConditioned Leakage ↓Conditioned Omission ↓Conditioned Clean ↑Unconditioned Leakage ↓Unconditioned Omission ↓Unconditioned Clean ↑
0 (untrained base)56.155.018.956.155.018.9
549.453.421.681.159.48.2
1047.351.223.982.860.65.7
30 (final conditioned model)30.449.834.0———

Without annotation conditioning leak and omit rates increase and clean rate collapses from 18.9% to 5.7% by epoch 10. We stopped this run early because of this decline. With annotation conditioning, clean rate improves to 23.9% by epoch 10 and reaches 34.0% after continued training.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Thank you again for engaging with our responses and additional experiments.

Thank you again for engaging with our responses and additional experiments. In our latest reply, we provided the requested scenario examples and quantitative results comparing conditioned and unconditioned rewards at matched training epochs. We hope these address your follow-up questions. If your main concerns are now resolved, we would appreciate your considering a higher score. Please let us know if there is anything further we can clarify.

Reviewer_Bqm2OpenReview ↗
Rating
3
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The paper presents a dataset consisting of 1,350 samples to test LLM agents' compliance with privacy norms. Each scenario features two possible responses and annotations from 599 individuals that comprise disclosure/omission labels, preferences, and motivations. The paper demonstrates that conditioning an LLM judge on human annotations related to the same prompt makes its judgments more consistent and closer to human labels. Using this judge as an RL reward trains 4B- to 8B-scale models to disclose and omit less information than the original models.

Critical strengths
  • S1. The paper clearly explains why evaluations based solely on string matches and labels generated autonomously by LLMs may not be sufficient for assessing models' compliance with contextual privacy policies. The dataset's main contribution, providing annotations accompanied by justifications for the leak/omit label, is original and represents a needed contribution in the current situation. The overall pipeline to generate the dataset is carefully designed, and includes filtering for deduplication and multi-judge filtering. Additionally, the AI-generated suggestions to aid annotation is shown only after a first human analysis, making the overall annotation strategy robust.
  • S2. The paper presents its results both in terms of privacy leaks and utility retention (with the adoption of the omit metric). These dimensions capture complementary aspects of the model's behaviour and the resulting evaluation is a comprehensive assessment of the trade-off between privacy protection and utility. The evaluation on different models (including proprietary ones) demonstrates that the benchmark is also measuring effective limitations of the current models, as the majority of the tested models struggle to strike a balance between privacy preservation and utility retention.
Critical weaknesses
  • W1. Agreement among annotators is moderate (preference k = 0.61, pairwise agreement of 78.1%; leak k = 0.56; omission k = 0.12). This is not alarming for a subjective task, and the authors acknowledge this in the limitations section and use flexible objectives for gen-RM. However, the paper does not analyse what the disagreements are about (e.g., by domain, thematic scope, or type of audience) nor whether they reflect genuine normative pluralism or ambiguous guidelines. This is an important weakness because the central argument is that human norms should form the basis of evaluation and training: if the signal is unclear from the beginning, it is unclear what the annotation-conditioned judge is actually basing their decisions on. A breakdown and characterization of the disagreements would strengthen the main contribution (see Q1).
  • W2. I have some concerns regarding the evaluation of the proposed methodology. The best trained model reaches 37.6% of clean answers (Nemotron-3-Nano-4B), and leak rates remain around 18-41%, while proprietary models demonstrate sensibly lower leaks and a higher rate of overall clean answers. The paper is transparent with this limitation which is clearly listed in the limitations section. My worry is the comparison with the baselines: for two out of three trained models (Qwen3-4B and Qwen3-8B), differences with CI-RL are small. The experimental setting reinforces my worry: the experiments are run over a single seed, no confidence intervals nor statistical tests are reported, and the test set is only 200 examples. Additionally, some baselines are missing: while a privacy-enhanced prompting strategy is used, stronger strategies, like PrivacyChecker [1], that directly require the model to first identify sensitive and relevant attributes in the request, should be tested to demonstrate the soundness of the proposed approach.

[1] Privacy in Action: Towards Realistic Privacy Mitigation and Evaluation for LLM-Powered Agents, EMNLP Findings 2025

Questions for authors
  • Q1. The paper states that the annotators first read the guidelines and a practical example, but the guidelines themselves are not included in either the article or the appendices (only the interface is shown in the appendix).
    • Since inter-annotator agreement is moderate regarding leaks and preferences and very low for omissions, precise instructions are essential for interpreting the labels and for reproducing or extending the dataset. Could the authors make the complete guidelines and the practical example available? How were the concepts of leak (sensitive information, data flow inappropriate for this recipient) and omission (information considered relevant, non-sensitive, or useful) defined?
    • Which elements, domains, subject areas, types of recipients, or final actions determine the disagreement? Do they reflect real differences in privacy regulations, ambiguities in the guidelines, or carelessness on the part of the annotators? A sample of cases of disagreement, accompanied by the annotators’ reasoning, would be helpful, in addition to a more in-depth analysis of the disagreements.
    • Could you clarify the implications for the method? For training examples with only two annotators, how does the judge, who is influenced by the annotation, respond when opinions diverge? Does the quality of the reward differ between examples with high and low agreement among annotators, and does this affect the final performance of the policy?
3 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Thank you for your detailed feedback and constructive suggestions.

Thank you for your detailed feedback and constructive suggestions. We have added disagreement analyses, statistical tests, and a PrivacyChecker comparison.

Annotation guidelines and practice example

“Could the authors make the complete guidelines and the practical example available?”

Yes. Appendix Q now includes this. Annotators identify inappropriate disclosures and omissions of non-sensitive information needed for the task.

What annotators disagree about

We have added a disagreement analysis in Appendix F on 30 test scenarios, with examples of disagreements. 13 scenarios had leakage, 16 omission, and 13 preference disagreements. Each table assigns one primary reason per scenario based on the annotator rationales.

Leakage disagreements (13 cases)

Reason for disagreementCases
Whether the recipient and task justified sharing contact, financial, or client details5
Whether less specific descriptions still revealed private facts5
Misreading restrictions or overlooking sensitive content3
Total13

Omission disagreements

Reason for disagreementCases
Whether additional task details were necessary or optional7
Whether withholding private information made the response incomplete4
Overlooking information already included or paraphrased3
Labels conflicting with rationales that justified withholding the information2
Total16

Overall preference disagreements

Reason for disagreementCases
Whether details were appropriate to share and their usefulness justified the privacy risk9
Relative disclosure severity, the value of disclaimers, or whether to assign a tie3
Preferring additional context or brevity when both responses were considered safe1
Total13

Please also review Appendix F.3 which presents three examples.

Disagreement and reward quality

“For training examples with only two annotators, how does the judge … respond when opinions diverge?”

When the initial two annotators disagree on overall preference, we collect additional judgments (Section 3.2). Agreement on preference need not imply agreement about what is sensitive or necessary. The judge therefore receives individual labels and explanations when scoring new responses. Annotation-conditioned rewards yield higher policy clean rates than the gen-RM trained on aggregated preference and leakage targets across all three backbones (Table 4), supporting the value of this richer feedback.

Statistical reliability and comparison with CI-RL

We re-evaluated each checkpoint on all 200 test prompts over three sampling trials under both naive and PE prompting. For one-sided exact paired permutation tests, we average all three trials and both judges within each prompt.

PromptBackboneGain over baseGain over CI-RLGain over gen-RM
NaiveNemotron 4B+15.1*+11.7*+12.4*
NaiveQwen3-4B+11.1*+3.7*+7.6*
NaiveQwen3-8B+13.2*+4.4*+5.9*
PENemotron 4B+14.4*+10.5*+10.1*
PEQwen3-4B+12.6*+3.2+6.6*
PEQwen3-8B+12.5*+0.9+6.4*

Gains are clean rate percentage points averaged across three trials. * Significant at α = 0.05 after Holm–Bonferroni correction across all 18 comparisons. Under naive prompting, all comparisons are significant. Under PE prompting, gains are significant over every base and gen-RM model, and over CI-RL for Nemotron. Table 4 includes these results.

Remaining privacy and usefulness errors

“proprietary models demonstrate sensibly lower leaks and a higher rate of overall clean answers.”

We agree that errors remain, as discussed in the limitations. Our claim is that human-grounded rewards improve the small open-weight agents, not that they solve contextual privacy or outperform much generally stronger proprietary models. Frontier models also continue to leak and omit information.

PrivacyChecker

“Stronger strategies, like PrivacyChecker [1], that directly require the model to first identify sensitive and relevant attributes in the request, should be tested.”

We added a comparison with PrivacyChecker on all 200 test scenarios for all three backbones to the paper. Each cell reports leak / omit / clean rates (%).

MethodNemotron 4BQwen 4BQwen 8B
Base56.1 / 55.0 / 18.965.7 / 46.5 / 17.074.8 / 40.6 / 14.5
PrivacyChecker44.0 / 64.3 / 17.055.3 / 55.5 / 18.373.3 / 44.8 / 14.0
PrivacyAlign30.4 / 49.8 / 34.044.9 / 48.0 / 28.143.8 / 50.3 / 27.7

PrivacyChecker reduces leakage but increases omissions, yielding little change in clean rate. PrivacyAlign achieves clean rates 9.8–17.0 points higher across all three backbones. Appendix U.1 reports the results, and U.3 gives the adapted prompt.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Thank you again for your detailed and constructive feedback.

Thank you again for your detailed and constructive feedback. Following your suggestions, we added the annotation guidelines and practice example, an analysis of annotator disagreements, statistical tests across three evaluation trials, and a PrivacyChecker comparison. We hope these additions address your concerns about the annotation process and empirical evidence. If so, we would appreciate your considering a higher score. We would be happy to discuss any remaining concerns.

Thank you for the response and the revised manuscript. The guidelines, the practice example and the definitions of leakage and omission address my concern on the annotation protocol.

The significance tests over three evaluation trials and the PrivacyChecker comparison address my concerns on the evaluation. The tests also confirm part of my concern on CI-RL. Under PE prompting, the gains over CI-RL are not significant for either Qwen model. Each configuration is still trained once, so the tests capture sampling variance only.

The disagreement analysis in Appendix F is a good start. But the analysis is limited, covers only 30 scenarios, and the breakdown by domain, recipient or final action is missing.

The effect of disagreement on the reward remains unaddressed. How the judge behaves when annotators diverge, and whether policy gains depend on agreement, remain unanalysed, and the gen-RM comparison cannot isolate this effect. The revised guidelines also reveal a mismatch. Annotators are told to prioritise leakage, the judge prompt gives a tie when one response leaks and the other omits, and the clean rate weighs both equally. As this trade-off drives 9 of the 13 preference disagreements, it is unclear what the reward takes from human preferences.

Overall, this is a good paper, but unfortunately, I do not think a score of 4 is justified, so I maintain my score.

Reviewer_uxzwOpenReview ↗
Rating
4(+1)
Confidence
4
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper introduces PrivacyAlign, a dataset of human annotations identifying privacy leakage and omission of useful information in synthetic privacy-sensitive scenarios. The goal is to use human annotations and explanations to guide LLM-based reward models toward contextual privacy norms.

The paper investigates two reward modeling approaches: (1) annotation-conditioned reward modeling, which uses in-context human annotations and explanations of reference responses to score new completions during RL; and (2) gen-RM, a conventional RLHF-style reward model trained on these annotations.

Experiments show that both approaches improve the clean rate (responses exhibiting neither privacy leakage nor omission) compared to the base model without RL and CI-RL, which uses rule-based string matching instead of an LLM judge.

Critical strengths
  • Substantial contribution. The human-annotated dataset is a valuable resource for the research community.
  • Useful reward modeling approach. Annotation-conditioned reward modeling provides a promising way to incorporate human judgments and explanations into RL.
  • Empirical improvements and generalizability. The paper implements RL using both reward modeling approaches and demonstrates improvements on held-out test sets, providing evidence of generalization to unseen scenarios.
Critical weaknesses
  1. Overstated novelty relative to existing work. The paper appears to overstate the extent to which existing research lacks human annotations when operationalizing and evaluating privacy leakage in LLM agents.

    A directly relevant concurrent, if not earlier, work is CIDER: A Dataset of Contextual Disclosure Boundaries for Privacy Preference Alignment (COLM 2026). CIDER contains 14,850 human annotations from 169 participants, forming 1,650 contextual disclosure boundary sets across 60 interpersonal communication scenarios involving privacy-sensitive information sharing.

    A direct comparison with CIDER would help clarify PrivacyAlign's distinct contributions and more accurately acknowledge the existing literature.

  2. Unresolved annotator disagreement and potential evaluation circularity. Inter-annotator disagreement does not appear to be explicitly adjudicated during either RL training or evaluation; instead, it is delegated to annotation-conditioned LLM judges. This is particularly concerning during evaluation, where the gold labels also appear to be determined by annotation-conditioned LLM judges (Table 4). This raises potential circularity concerns: the reported outcomes may reflect the normative judgments of LLM judges rather than independent human judgments. I consider this a major evaluation caveat for a paper emphasizing the importance of human annotations. Independent validation of final outcomes against fresh human judgments would make the results more compelling.

  3. Missing baseline to isolate the contribution of human annotations. The evaluated baselines are the non-RL model and CI-RL, which relies on rule-based string matching rather than an LLM judge. Both proposed approaches incorporate human annotations, either through reward model training or in-context conditioning. However, the experiments lack a baseline that uses a frozen, unconditioned LLM judge to assess privacy and helpfulness as the RL reward, without grounding in human annotations. Such a comparison would more directly establish whether the observed improvements are attributable to the human annotations.

Questions for authors
  1. How does PrivacyAlign differ from CIDER (COLM 2026), particularly in its annotation methodology, dataset contributions, and treatment of contextual privacy norms?

  2. How is disagreement among human annotators handled during RL training and evaluation? Is there an explicit adjudication procedure, or are conflicting annotations resolved entirely through the annotation-conditioned LLM judges?

  3. Given the reliance on annotation-conditioned LLM judges for evaluation (Table 4), could the authors independently validate the final outcomes using fresh human judgments?

  4. Could the authors include an RL baseline using a frozen, unconditioned LLM judge for privacy and helpfulness, without access to human annotations, to isolate the contribution of annotation conditioning?

3 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Thank you for your careful review and time.

Thank you for your careful review. We clarify our contributions, human-grounded evaluation, and the unconditioned-judge ablation below.

CIDER and novelty

Thank you for bringing CIDER to our attention. We would like to respectfully note that though we believe CIDER differs considerably from our work, CIDER was first posted to arXiv less than two months before the ICLR submission deadline, and would therefore fall within ICLR's definition of contemporaneous work and so comparing with this work is not required. We have nonetheless cited CIDER and explain the differences between our works in Section 2.

CIDER studies a different problem: predicting a person’s acceptance of disclosure options based on their own judgments in other scenarios. It collects binary choices without written explanations for individual decisions and studies inference-time personalization. PrivacyAlign instead evaluates and trains agents for general contextual privacy alignment. We collect preferences, leakage and omission labels, and explanations for agent responses involving tools and memory, then use these judgments to evaluate fresh responses and train agents with annotation-conditioned rewards.

Annotation collection and use

“How is disagreement among human annotators handled”

We collect at least two annotations per training example and three per test example, requiring additional judgments when the overall preference lacks a clear majority (see section 3.2). We retain all annotations, including disagreements.

“Is there an explicit adjudication procedure”

We intentionally retain conflicting human annotations rather than adjudicating them into a single consensus label. Preserving individual judgments together with their explanations gives the evaluator more human evidence. This is an intentional part of our human-grounded automated evaluation. Collapsing the annotations simply removes information about the reasons behind differing human assessments.

Our trained gen-RM approach uses averaged preference and leakage targets, whereas annotation-conditioned rewards retain access to individual, possibly disagreeing, human judgments and explanations at scoring time. Policies trained with annotation-conditioned rewards achieve higher clean rates across all three backbones (Table 4), supporting the value of keeping this richer human context available during training.

Evaluation concerns

“the gold labels also appear to be determined by annotation-conditioned LLM judges (Table 4).”

The LLM judges do not determine the gold labels used to validate them. In Table 3, we (the authors) assigned the “gold labels” before seeing the judges’ outputs and without seeing the Prolific annotations supplied to the judges. In Table 3, condition B withholds annotations for the evaluated response: the judge sees only the other reference response’s Prolific annotations. Here, annotation conditioning improves mean agreement with our human gold labels from κ = 0.45 to 0.54 for leakage and 0.29 to 0.37 for omission, across four judges on 30 scenarios with two responses each. This demonstrates improved agreement with independently assigned human labels, beyond agreement among LLM judges.

Validation with fresh human judgments

“could the authors independently validate the final outcomes using fresh human judgments?”

Human-grounded automated evaluation is one of PrivacyAlign’s main contributions. The aim is to use human judgments of reference responses to evaluate new outputs without requiring a new (time-consuming and expensive) annotation campaign for every policy. Annotation conditioning improves agreement among LLM judges (Table 2) and with independently assigned human gold labels (Table 3), even when annotations for the evaluated response are withheld (condition B). This supports the use of human annotations to improve automated privacy evaluation.

A full human evaluation of the trained policies is beyond the scope of the present study. Though, we directly examined a sample of final agent outputs from Table 4 and present examples, comparisons and analysis in Appendix E.

Further human evaluation is always valuable. However, establishing the reported policy differences with human evaluation would require a systematically sampled set of outputs across policies, sufficient coverage to assess the performance differences, and multiple judgments to account for annotator disagreement, which would be highly expensive and difficult.

RL without human annotation conditioning

“Could the authors include an RL baseline using a frozen, unconditioned LLM judge”

We conducted this ablation, now more clearly stated in Appendix K. The conditioned and unconditioned runs used the same frozen base-model judge, training data, optimizer, penalties, and training budget. Without annotation conditioning, RL failed to improve performance and instead degraded clean rate, privacy, and usefulness.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Thank you again for your thoughtful review.

Thank you again for your thoughtful review. We wanted to follow up on our clarifications regarding CIDER, annotator disagreement, evaluation setup, and the unconditioned-judge ablation. If these clarifications and results address your main concerns, we would appreciate your considering a higher score. Please let us know if any concerns remain that we could clarify.

Thank you for addressing my concerns. I've increased my score.

Comments on the paper

1 comment
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Summary of Revisions and Responses

We thank the reviewers for their thoughtful feedback. We appreciate their recognition of:

ReviewerStrengths highlighted
uxzwThe dataset’s value to the research community, the promise of annotation-conditioned rewards, and improvements on unseen scenarios.
Bqm2The carefully designed annotation pipeline, human explanations accompanying labels, and joint evaluation of privacy protection and usefulness.
1VVtThe importance of the problem, the substantial human-annotated resource, and the well-motivated reward-modeling framework.

We have uploaded a revised manuscript, with additions and revisions highlighted in blue, incorporating:

  • An audit of annotator disagreements, with categorized reasons and illustrative cases.
  • Paired statistical significance tests, showing the effectiveness of our methods.
  • Human-guidance baselines separating the effects of reference responses, labels, and explanations.
  • A PrivacyChecker prompting baseline.
  • Clarified validation against independently assigned human labels.
  • A clearer description of the unconditioned-reward ablation.
  • Original annotation guidelines and practice materials.
  • A comparison with CIDER
  • A clearer definition of open-ended scenario generation.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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